Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 30
Advertising and welfare. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003
Avinash K. Dixit, Victor Norman
Bell Journal of Economics.
1976.
Vol. 9.
No. 1.
P. 1-17.
This paper applies conventional welfare-theoretic methods to study advertising which
changes consumer tastes. In a wide range of empirically plausible circumstances,
private profitability is seen to be necessary but not sufficient for the social desirability
of a small amount of advertising. The market equilibrium level of such advertising
is shown to be socially excessive, even when postadvertising tastes are used as the
standard for welfare judgments and the monopoly profits resulting from the advertising
are included in welfare. Settings of monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition
are examined, and the contention that advertising is excessive is found to be strengthened
at each stage. [Авторский текст]


Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003
Robert L. Bish, Patrick D. O'Donoghue
Journal of Political Economy.
1970.
Vol. 78.
No. 6.
P. 1367-1371.
The recent literature has contained considerable discussion of conditions under which
socially optimal levels[1] of public-goods consumption will be achieved through consumer
cooperation.[2] However, analyses in this field have neglected one important problem:
the potential monopsony situation which arises when consumers cooperate to articulate
demand. In several instances neglect of this problem by examination of only constant-cost
situations has led to erroneous conclusions. Sharp and Escarraz (1964) conclude that
voluntary bargaining among consumers will lead to the optimal output, when they have
in fact considered only the special case of perfectly elastic supply. In The Theory
of Public Finance (1959) Musgrave also examines only constant-cost situations while
stating that "both figures ... may be adapted to conditions of increasing cost without
changing the principle of our argument" (p. 76, n. 2). More recently, Buchanan, in
The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (1968), makes the constant-cost assumption
and consequently arrives at an erroneous conclusion when he states: "At equilibrium,
the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the numeraire private
good, summed over all persons in the group, must equal the marginal cost of supplying
the public good, again expressed in units of the numeraire. This statement of the
necessary marginal conditions for equilibrium in a world that contains a public good
is fully general, and holds without qualification" (p. 43). In this analysis we outline
the equilibrium outputs of public goods which result from consumer cooperation under
conditions of both constant and increasing costs and discuss some of their implications.
[Авторский текст]


Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Emmanuel Saez
NBER Working Paper Series.
2002.
No. 8833.
Optimal tax theory has shown that, under weak assumptions, indirect taxation such
as production subsidies, tariffs, or differentiated commodity taxation, are sub-optimal
and that redistribution should be achieved solely with the direct income tax. However,
these important results of optimal tax theory, namely production efficiency and uniform
commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation, have been shown to break down
when labor taxation is based on income only and when there is imperfect substitution
of labor types in the production function. These results in favor of indirect tax
instruments are valid in the short-run when skills are exogenous and individuals
cannot move from occupation to occupation. In the long-run, it is more realistic
to assume that individuals choose their occupation based on the relative after-tax
rewards. This paper shows that, in that context, production efficiency and the uniform
commodity tax result are restored. Therefore, in a long-run context, direct income
taxation should be preferred to indirect tax instruments to raise revenue and achieve
redistribution.


Опубликовано на портале: 24-12-2007
Gundi Knies, Simon Burgess, Carol Propper
DIW Berlin Discussion Papers.
2007.
No. 697.
We test empirically whether people’s life satisfaction depends on their relative
income position in the neighbourhood, drawing on a unique dataset, the German Socio-economic
Panel Study (SOEP) matched with micro-marketing indicators of population characteristics.
Relative deprivation theory suggests that individuals are happier the better their
relative income position in the neighbourhood is. To test this theory we estimate
micro-economic happiness models for the years 1994 and 1999 with controls for own
income and for neighbourhood income at the zip-code level (roughly 9,000 people).
There exist no negative and no statistically significant associations between neighbourhood
income and life satisfaction, which refutes relative deprivation theory. If anything,
we find positive associations between neighbourhood income and happiness in all cross-sectional
models and this is robust to a number of robustness tests, including adding in more
controls for neighbourhood quality, changing the outcome variable, and interacting
neighbourhood income with indicators that proxy the extent to which individuals may
be assumed to interact with their neighbours. We argue that the scale at which we
measure neighbourhood characteristics may be too large still to identify the comparison
effect sought after.


Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Emmanuel Saez
NBER Working Paper Series.
2005.
No. 9046.
This paper analyzes optimal progressive capital income taxation in an infinite horizon
model where individuals differ only through their initial wealth. We show that, in
that context, progressive taxation is a much more powerful and efficient tool to
redistribute wealth than linear taxation on which previous literature has focused.
We consider progressive capital income tax schedules taking a simple two-bracket
form with an exemption bracket at the bottom and a single marginal tax rate above
a time varying exemption threshold. Individuals are taxed until their wealth is reduced
down to the exemption threshold. When the intertemportal elasticity of substitution
is not too large and the top tail of the initial wealth distribution is infinite
and thick enough, the optimal exemption threshold converges to a finite limit. As
a result, the optimal tax system drives all the large fortunes down a finite level
and produces a truncated long-run wealth distribution. A number of numerical simulations
illustrate the theoretical result.


Population, Resources, and Welfare: An Exploration into Reproductive and Environmental Externalities [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Partha Dasgupta
Большая статья профессора экономики Кембриджского университета, посвященная проблемам роста численности и благосостоянию населения: различные взгляды на проблему, анализ с точки зрения экономической теории и т. д. Эта статья была включена в сборник «Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics» (редакторы: Karl-Göran Mäler и Jeff Vincent; Amsterdam: North Holland, 2001 г.)


Poverty in Russia [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
Bernard M.S. van Praag, Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell
Journal of Happiness Studies.
2001.
This paper is intended to shed light on the extent of poverty in the Russian
Federation.We present estimates of poverty lines and poverty ratios derived from
subjective questions used in a data collection for a large household panel (RUSSET).
We estimate poverty using a subjective approach, where the level of the poverty line
is derived using the opinion of the individual, rich or poor, on poverty. This approach
differs from the objective approach to poverty, which defines poverty according to
the opinion of experts. Three subjective poverty lines are presented: one the Financial
Satisfaction Poverty Line, two the Leyden Poverty Line, and three the Subjective
Well-Being Poverty Line. The first two poverty lines are based on subjective questions
regarding income and economic welfare while the last concept focuses on satisfaction
with life as a whole. The results obtained are compared with each other and with
results derived using objective measures and official figures.


Preference revelation and monopsony [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003
G. Fane, E. Sieper
Journal of Public Economics.
1983.
Vol. 20.
No. 3.
P. 357-372 .
Presents the formal equivalence between the free-rider problem and monopsony. Elimination
on the inefficiencies of monopsony; Mechanisms used in the problem of free-rider;
Determination on the consumer with willingness-to-pay for public good. (Из Ebsco)


Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003
Hal R. Varian
American Economic Review.
1985.
Vol. 75.
No. 4.
P. 870-875.
Studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality
theory. Features of the reservation model presented; Quasi-linear utility and consumers'
surplus; Upper and lower bounds on welfare change; Bounds on welfare change with
optimal price discrimination. (From Ebsco)


Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
Hirofumi Shibata
Journal of Political Economy.
1973.
Vol. 81.
No. 1.
P. 223-230.
Focuses on the effects of the increasing cost of public goods on the emergence of
monopsony problem. Assessment of the behavior of the producers of public goods; Attitude
of consumers towards potential monopoly of consumers; Expansion of production of
the goods. (Из Ebsco)


Опубликовано на портале: 09-03-2004
Alvaro Espina
International Labour Review.
1996.
Vol. 135.
No. 2.
P. 181-205.
The current pensions situation requires a number of reforms in order to correct distortions
which have emerged and to meet the challenges posed by the radically changing demographic
structure of most European countries. The direction that those reforms should take
is crucial to the current debate on the outlook for the Welfare State.
This article examines the pension schemes of the most developed countries of the
OECD, with particular reference to Spain, and discusses the prospects for reform.


Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004
Christine A. Greenhalgh
University of Oxford Working Papers.
2002.
No. 119.
The thesis of this paper is that a free-market capitalist economy is biased against
supplying basic needs of poor consumers and also biased against creating inventing
and using green technology. We begin by identifying the patterns of perverse logic
in the system of market supply and in the process of technological advance under
capitalism. The first pivotal problem is that economic decision makers place too
high a value on the time of the current generation of workers. Hence capitalist markets
create and use technologies to produce goods and services that are geared to saving
worker and consumer time, instead of being geared to conserving scarce non-renewable
resources. A second bias arises because of the existing inequality of wealth and
the differential price of time between the rich and the poor. Demands for positional
goods for the rich, which are time saving and resource using, crowd out demands to
meet basic needs of the poor. Entrepreneurs react by satisfying the dominant, but
wasteful, market demands of the rich, both in current supply and by responding to
incentives to invent new products and processes that appeal to the rich. This has
a further consequence in accentuating inequality, as prices fall and quality rises
for products subject to innovation, and in driving up the relative price of skilled
labour yet further, refueling the cycle of labour saving innovation at the expense
of the environment. Policy to redress these perverse pressures must be far more radical
than those currently under discussion in either the `Green` or the `Poverty` forums.
We argue for rethinking definitions of private property rights, to attach more importance
to use rights than to ownership rights, where the corollary is that lack of use can
cause loss of ownership. Although a wealth tax is an obvious first step in reducing
the power of the rich to distort production towards resource intensive goods, it
is never likely to be sufficient. Within consumption and production, policy should
aim to increase the rate of utilisation of all durable consumer goods and productive
capital. This requires incentives which promote rental markets for privately owned
durables and restore shift working to ensure better capacity utilisation. The taxation
of production could also change: incentives to business should be restructured to
maximise the use of renewable resources, particularly of unskilled labour, and minimise
the use of materials intensive techniques leading to the depletion of reserves and
the creation of waste products. Finally the rewards to invention and innovation,
whether through R&D tax credits or the award of intellectual property rights, must
circumvent the present bias of invention for today`s rich in order to address the
needs of today`s and tomorrow`s poor.


Sorting, Education and Inequality [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003
Raquel Fernandez
NBER Working Paper Series.
2001.
No. 8101.
This paper examines the education literature through the lens of sorting. It argues
that how individuals sort across neighborhoods, schools and households (spouses),
can have important consequences for the acquisition of human capital and inequality.
It discusses the implications of different education finance systems for sorting
and analyzes the efficiency and welfare properties of these in static and dynamic
frameworks.


Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003
Abba P. Lerner
Review of Economic Studies.
1934.
Vol. 1.
No. 3.
P. 157-75.
В классической статье проблема монополии рассматривается с точки зрения экономики
благосостояния. Анализируются причины недостижения парето-оптимального состояния
экономики в условиях монополии. Всеобъемлюще используется инструментарий предельного
анализа: как выгод и затрат. В анализ вводятся показатели степени монопольной власти.


The economic aspects of advertising [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-03-2003
Nicholas Kaldor
Review of Economic Studies.
1950.
Vol. 18.
No. 1.
P. 1-27.
Оценивается влияние рекламы на общественное благосостояние и распределение
ресурсов между различными сферами использования. Реклама рассматривается
как антиконкурентная, по своей сути, практика, в частности из-за того, что
она снижает ценовую эластичность спроса и служит определенным барьером для входа
в отрасль потенциальных конкурентов.

