Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004
Allan Drazen, Paul R. Masson
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1994.
Vol. 09.
No. 3.
P. 735-754.
Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced
policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the
role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a
policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present
a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues
if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence
in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than
raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this
implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-08-2003
Austan Goolsbee
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 113.
No. 1.
P. 121-148.
Using data on the prices of capital goods, this paper shows that much of the benefit
of" investment tax incentives does not go to investing firms but rather to capital
suppliers through" higher prices. The reduction in the cost of capital from a 10
percent investment tax credit" increases equipment prices 3.5-7.0 percent. This lasts
several years and is largest for assets with" large order backlogs, low import competition,
or with a large fraction of buyers able to use" investment subsidies. Capital goods
workers' wages rise, too. Instrumental variables estimates" of the short-run supply
elasticity are around 1 and can explain the traditionally small estimates of" investment
demand elasticities. In absolute value, the demand elasticity implied here exceeds
1."
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