Journal of Monetary Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004
Enrique Gabriel Estrada Mendoza, Assaf Razin, Linda L. Tesar
Journal of Monetary Economics.
1994.
Vol. 34.
P. 297-323 .
This paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and
revenue statistics. Using this method we construct time-series of tax rates for large
industrial countries. The method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes
at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding
tax bases. This method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes
and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent
in a general equilibrium framework. These tax rates compare favorably with existing
estimates of marginal tax rates, and highlight important international differences
in tax policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2007
Patrick J. Kehoe, Varadarajan V. Chari
Journal of Monetary Economics.
2007.
Vol. 54.
No. 8.
P. 2399-2408.
The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether
the monetary authority can commit to following its policies. If it can commit, then
debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has
a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider
problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-10-2007
Henry Siu
Journal of Monetary Economics.
2004.
Vol. 51.
No. 3.
P. 575–607.
In this paper I consider the role of state-contingent inflation as a fiscal shock
absorber in an economy with nominal rigidities. I study the Ramsey equilibrium in
a monetary model with distortionary taxation, nominal non-state-contingent debt,
and sticky prices. With sticky prices, the Ramsey planner must balance the shock
absorbing benefits of state-contingent inflation against the associated resource
misallocation costs. For government spending processes resembling post-war experience,
introducing sticky prices generates striking departures in optimal policy from the
case with flexible prices. For even small degrees of price rigidity, optimal policy
displays very little volatility in inflation. Tax rates display greater volatility
compared to the model with flexible prices. With sticky prices, tax rates and real
government debt exhibit behavior similar to a random walk. For government spending
processes resembling periods of intermittent war and peace, optimal policy displays
extreme inflation volatility even when the degree of price rigidity is large. As
the variability in government spending increases, smoothing tax distortions across
states of nature becomes increasingly important, and the shock absorber role of inflation
is accentuated.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
Federico Ravenna, Carl E. Walsh
Journal of Monetary Economics.
2006.
Vol. 53.
No. 2.
P. 199-216.
In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face
a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between
actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock
is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem.
In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel
for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel is
present when firms’ marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest.
Besides providing empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications
for optimal monetary policy. We show that its presence alters the optimal policy
problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed
to fluctuate in response to productivity and demand shocks under optimal monetary
policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-11-2007
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, Martin Uribe
Journal of Monetary Economics.
2007.
Vol. 54.
No. 6.
P. 1702-1725.
Welfare-maximizing monetary- and fiscal-policy rules are studied in a model with
sticky prices, money, and distortionary taxation. The Ramsey-optimal policy is used
as a point of comparison. The main findings are: the size of the inflation coefficient
in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar
as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy features a
muted response to output. Interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to
output can lead to significant welfare losses. The welfare gains from interest-rate
smoothing are negligible. Optimal fiscal policy is passive. The optimal monetary
and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal
policy.
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