Journal of Finance
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2000. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-33 .
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
A survey of corporate governance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 737-783.
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
Family firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2003. Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 .
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
Government ownership of banks [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301.
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 1131-1150.
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
What works in securities laws? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2006. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 1-32 .
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.