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Институциональная экономика (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 687

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004.  Vol. 119. No. 4. P. p1339-1382. 
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Nicolai J. Foss
Статья посвящена обсуждению понятия ограниченной рациональности в контексте ее применения в организационной экономике, а также в контексте попыток Герберта Саймона убедить экономистов воспринимать это понятие серьезно. Автор выделяет несколько причин относительной неудачи Саймона, среди прочих выделяя отсутствие четкого определения самого понятия ограниченная рациональность. Причины провала помогают объяснить крайне скупое использование ограниченной рациональности в работах по организационной экономике.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Daron K. Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson
Авторы статьи исследуют исторический процесс формирования институтов, призванных защищать права собственников зарождающегося в 16-19 веках класса торговой буржуазии. Анализ проводится в контексте развития межантлантической торговли, развития портов и ослабления монархии.
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Опубликовано на портале: 27-09-2003
John B. Knight, Linda Y. Yueh
Social capital is thought to play an economic role in the labour market. It may be particularly pertinent in one that is in transition from an administered to a market-oriented system. One factor that may determine success in the underdeveloped Chinese labour market is thus guanxi, the Chinese variant of social capital. With individual-level measures of social capital, we test for the role of guanxi using a data set designed for this purpose, covering 7,500 urban workers and conducted in early 2000. The basic hypothesis is supported. Both measures of social capital - size of social network and Communist Party membership - have significant and substantial effects in the income functions. Indeed, social capital may be just as important as human capital: remarkably, one additional reported contact contributes more than one additional year of education. Social capital can have influence either in an administered system or in one subject to market forces. We find that it does so in both parts of the labour market, but some of the evidence suggests that it is more important in the latter.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Gerald Friedman PERI Working paper series. 2001.  No. 14.
Society makes property. Economic systems are defined by what they allow to become property, and the extent of property varies enormously. Some allow property claims to fixed objects, such as land and trees, sometimes including the ephemeral, such as wildlife or flowing water. Some extend property to include ideas (patents); a few include human beings themselves as chattel slaves. Societies also differ in the intensive rights they accord property holders, the bundle of state enforced privileges attaching responsibility for the impact actions have on others. Intensive rights prevent us from assessing law as involving more or less protection to property because each use of property affects the property of others. Property has intensive dimensions because it involves reciprocal relationships among people; my intensive right to use property diminishes your right to be free of intrusion. This makes property law distributional. Few dispute that property law has important effects on income distribution, but some choose to emphasize arguments over efficiency.
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Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003
Stephen G. Marks Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
The separation of ownership and control refers to the phenomenon associated with publicly held business corporations in which the shareholders (the residual claimants) possess little or no direct control over management decisions. This separation is generally attributed to collective action problems associated with dispersed share ownership. The separation of ownership and control permits hierarchical decision making which, for some types of decisions, is superior to the market. The separation of ownership and control creates costs due to adverse selection and moral hazard. These costs are potentially mitigated by a number of mechanisms including business failure, the market for corporate control, the enforcement of fiduciary duties, corporate governance oversight, managerial financial incentives and institutional shareholder activism.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss DRUID Working Paper. 2002.  No. 02-04.
The role of transaction cost economics in developing research in strategy has been a hotly debated topic over the last decade. This paper presents the radical argument that transaction cost insights are more than merely useful complements to existing approaches to strategy. Rather, they are necessary for adequately understanding the nature of strategizing. This is because transaction costs are essential aspects of processes of creating, capturing and protecting value. If transaction costs are zero, these processes do not pose any strategic problems; strategizing is trivialized in such a world. When transaction costs are positive, on the other hand, opportunities for value creation through the reduction of inefficiencies caused by transaction costs exist, and protecting and appropriating value are costly activities that dissipate value. Also, contracting and expectations enter as central aspects of strategizing. Arguments are provided for why economizing (with transaction costs) is more fundamental than strategizing (in the sense of exploiting market power). Thus, the paper argues that models in which the fullest possible account of transaction costs is made be used as the proper foundations and benchmarks for economics-based strategy research, rather than the patched-up competitive equilibrium models that are now used, more or less implicitly, as the benchmark in important parts of strategy research, most notably in the resource-based view.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Keith N. Hlyton BUSL, Working Paper Series. 2002.  No. 02-17.
В статье представлена модель наказаний, которая совмещает в себе два противоположных подхода: подход Бейкера, который утверждал, что наказание должно интернализировать социальные издержки, и подход Познера, который предполагал, что наказание должно полностью предотвращать нарушения. В статье предлагаются рекомендации относительно того, когда лучше применять наказания для интернализации социальных издержек, а когда для полного предотвращения нарушений. Рассматривается применение модели к уголовному законодательству.
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The Theory of the Firm [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss, Henrik Lando, Steen Thomsen Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter is a survey of modern theories of the firm. Foss, Lando and Thomsen categorize these as belonging either to the principal-agent or the incomplete contracting approach. In the former category fall, for example, the Alchian and Demsetz moral hazard in teams theory as well as Holmstrшm and Milgroms theory of the firm as an incentive system. Belonging to the incomplete contracting branch are theories that stress the importance of the employment relationship (for example, Coase and Simon) as an adaptation mechanism, theories that stress the importance of ownership of assets for affecting incentives when contracts must be renegotiated (Williamson, Grossman and Hart, Hart and Moore), and some recent work on implicit contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy). Authors argue that these different perspectives on the firm should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive and that a synthesis seems to be emerging.
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Tort Law and Economics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci Economic Analysis of Law A European Perspective, Hatzis Aritides. 2003. 
В статье дан обзор основных результатов экономического анализа гражданского права, акцент сделан на американское законодательство. Затрагиваются работы следующих авторов: Калабрези, Тримарчи, Шавель, Лэндз, Познер, Мисели, Полински, Каплоу, Кутер и Улен (Calabresi, Trimarchi, Shavell, Landes, Posner, Miceli, Polinsky, Kaplow, Cooter and Ulen).
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg Socio-Economic Review. 2007.  Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 149-179. 
In this paper we analyse the comparative capitalisms literature, which encompasses several analytical frameworks, but shares common concerns in understanding the institutional foundations of diverse national ‘varieties’ of capitalism. One widespread weakness within this literature has been its static analysis and bias toward predicting institutional stability rather than change. Our contention is that introducing more dynamism into this literature must proceed on three distinct levels: the micro, meso and macro. On the micro level, it needs to develop a less deterministic view of institutions that incorporates a stronger understanding of how actors reshape institutions, not only as constraints on particular courses of action, but also as resources for new courses of action that (incrementally) transform those institutions. On the meso-level, it needs to specify more carefully the linkages among institutions and institutional domains and theorize how change in one affects change in the other. At the macro level, it needs to incorporate a compelling view of national and international politics that draws upon a theory of coalitional dynamics and the impact of particular rule-making processes that governs institutional reform in each nation.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003
Roland F. Spekle Rotterdam School of Economics Research Papers. 2002.  ERS-2002-06-F&A.
In this paper a theory of management control based on Transaction Cost Economics discusses. This theory specifies the composition of various archetypal control structures, and links these to their respective habitat. These are: (1) arms length control; (2) machine control; (3) exploratory control; and (4) boundary control. The gist of the argument is that activities predictably differ in the control problems to which they give rise, whereas control archetypes differ in their problem-solving ability, and that alignments between the two can be explained by delineating the efficiency properties of the match. This approach has some interesting qualities. Its relatively simple theme seems to speak to a wide empirical domain, and can be used to make sense of a large set of different control practices. Furthermore, it offers a practicable way to address control structure effectiveness. Finally, the approach is empirically testable.
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Transaction Costs [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglas W. Allen Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter addresses the history, use and significance of the term transaction costs. Few words in the economic language have been more abused or fought over and this is shown to result from the emergence of two distinct definitions and uses. The Neoclassical definition rests on the costs of trading across a market, while the property rights definition centers on the costs of establishing and enforcing property rights. In articulating these two separate definitions and in demonstrating their relationship and separate uses, it is hoped that more progress can be made in the field of transaction cost economics.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglass C. North Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 1994. 
An economic definition of transaction costs is the costs of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements. In the larger context of societal evolution they are all the costs involved in human interaction over time. It is this larger context that North explores in this essay. The concept is a close kin to the notion of social capital advanced by James Coleman (1990) and applied imaginatively to studying the differential patterns of Italian regional development by Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work (1993). This essay, therefore, is a study in economic history which focuses on the costs of human coordination and cooperation through time which I regard as the key dilemma of societies past, present and future.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson Industrial and Corporate Change. 2008.  Vol. 17. No. 1. P. 1-27. 
This article proposes a simple framework for understanding an emergent diversity of linkages between corporate governance (CG) and organizational architecture (OA). It distinguishes discreet modes of their linkage by different combinatorial patterns between three basic assets: managers human assets (MHA), workers human assets (WHA), and non-human assets (NHA). Using the concept of essentiality of human assets proposed by Hart (1995) and distinguished from that of complementarities, we first propose a new characterization of four known modes of CG-OA linkage: three traditional (Anglo-American, German, and Japanese) and one relatively new (Silicon Valley) models. Then we present empirical evidences of emergent diversity of CG-OA linkages in Japan, which is somewhat at odds with the old Japanese model. We interpret its emergent dominant mode as the path-dependent evolution of a new pattern of essentiality between human assets, made viable by lessening of institutional-complementarity-constraints, which surrounded the traditional Japanese model. We argue that this new mode interpreted in terms of essentiality may have broader applicability beyond Japanese context.
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