Всего статей в данном разделе : 687
Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss DRUID. 1995. No. 99-4.
Authors discuss the notion of ownership in economics, taking our point of departure in the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. They criticize the exclusive identification of ownership with residual rights to control in this approach, and argue that economic organization may be rendered determinate under complete contracting (contrary to the GHM approach). Crucially, they argue that under complete contracting, some control rights may be appropriable because of measurement and enforcement costs. This holds the key to a theory of ownership that is not dependent on the notion of residual rights to control, but rather relies on appropriable control rights. However, the two perspectives may be complementary rather than rival.
Understanding regulation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer European Financial Management. 2005. Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 439-451.
Using Behavioral Economics To Show The Power and Efficiency of Corporate law as Regulatory Tool [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003Kent Greenfield Boston College Law School Research Paper. 2001. No. 2001-06.
Изменения в корпоративном управлении США способствовали достижению более высокого уровня заработной платы и снижению неравенства в доходах среди занятых. Автор предлагает рассмотреть корпоративное право, как регулирующий инструмент, что означает, что это законодательство нужно анализировать не с точки зрения фирм, а с точки зрения благосостояния (чистой выгоды) общества в целом. Статья основана на постулатах поведенческой экономики.
Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macro-Economy: An Empirical Analysis [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-03-2008Peter A. Hall, Daniel W. Gingerich MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2004. No. 5.
Using aggregate analysis, this paper examines the core contentions of the “varieties of capitalism” perspective on comparative capitalism. We construct a coordination index to assess whether the institutional features of liberal and coordinated market economies conform to the predictions of the theory. We test the contention that institutional complementarities occur across sub-spheres of the macroeconomy by examining the correspondence of institutions across sub-spheres and estimating the impact of complementarities in labor relations and corporate governance on rates of growth. To assess the stability of the institutional features central to the theory, we assess the dynamics of institutional change in recent years. The evidence suggests that there are powerful interaction effects among institutions across sub-spheres of the political economy that must be considered if the economic impact of institutional change in any one sphere is to be accurately assessed.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007Geoffrey M. Hodgson Journal of Economic Issues. 1995. Vol. 29. No. 2. P. 575-584.
This article focuses on the varieties of capitalism from the perspectives of the economists Thorstein Veblen and Karl Marx. In contrast to the classical and neoclassical economists, Marx held that ahistorical categories such as "utility," "choice," and "scarcity" cannot capture the essential features of a specific economic system. Accordingly, Marx argues that core analytical categories should be abstract expressions of real and specific social relations. Marx contends that several types of economic system have existed including feudalism, capitalism, and socialism. Capital is not about economic systems in general, nor even socialism, but the capitalist mode of production. Although sympathetic to Marx's analysis of capitalism, Veblen notes that it fails to connect the actor with the specific structure and thereby to explain human motivation and action. Veblen suggests that the class position of an individual as a wage laborer or a capitalist tells us very little about the specific conceptions or habits of thought of the individuals involved.
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003Ayesha Yaqub Vawda, Varun Gauri World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. 2003. No. 3005.
Voucher programs consist of three simultaneous reforms: allowing parents to choose schools, creating intense incentives for schools to increase enrollment, and granting schools management autonomy to respond to demand. As a result, voucher advocates and critics tend to talk past each other. A principal-agent framework clarifies the argument for education vouchers. Central findings from the literature, including issues related to variance in the performance measure, risk aversion, the productivity of more effort, multiple tasks, and the value of monitoring are found relevant for an analysis of vouchers. An assessment of findings on voucher programs in industrial countries, as well as a review of voucher or quasi-voucher experiences in Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Czech Republic support the usefulness of the analytic framework. Gauri and Vawda conclude that vouchers for basic education in developing countries can enhance outcomes when they are limited to modest numbers of poor students in urban settings, particularly in conjunction with existing private schools with surplus capacity. The success of more ambitious voucher programs depends on an institutional infrastructure challenging to industrial and developing countries alike. This paper—a joint product of Public Services, Development Research Group, and the Education Team, Human Development Network—is a background paper for the 2004 World Development Report.
What Are Institutions? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007Geoffrey M. Hodgson Journal of Economic Issues. 2006. Vol. 40. No. 1. P. 1-25.
A primary aim of this paper is to establish some workable meanings of key terms including institution, convention and organization, by drawing on insights from several academic disciplines. Institutions are defined broadly as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. This, in turn, prompts some examination of the concept of a rule, and why rules are followed. The paper then addresses the controversial distinction between institutions and organizations. Douglass North’s influential formulations of these terms are criticized for being incomplete and misleading. Here an organization is treated as a type of institution involving membership and sovereignty. Further types of institution are also considered, including the difference between self-organizing and other institutions, and the differences in degrees of sensitivity to varying personality types of the agents involved.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2007Alfred D. Jr. Chandler European Economic Review. 1992. Vol. 36. No. 2-3. P. 483-994.
What works in securities laws? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2006. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 1-32 .
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003Douglass C. North Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 1996.
Improving our understanding of the nature of economic change entails that we draw on the only laboratory that we have--the past. But "understanding" the past entails imposing order on the myriad facts that have survived to explain what has happened--that is theory. The theories we develop to understand where we have been come from the social sciences. Therefore there is a constant give and take between the theories we develop, and their application to explain the past. To begin we need to assess what we have learned from the past and then assess the usefulness of the tools at hand--i.e. the rationality assumption and growth theory we employ in economics? We will then go on to explore in subsequent sections some recent development that offer the promise of improving our understanding of the past and of where we are going.
Why does democracy need education? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Giacomo A. M Ponzetto, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2007. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 77-99.
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.
Why Do Governments Operate Schools? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003Michael Kremer, Андрей Сарычев
Abstract Around the world, education is overwhelmingly publicly provided. This paper argues that democratic societies will prefer that education be publicly provided, rather than simply publicly financed, since under a voucher system, parents may send their children to schools teaching ideologies that are similar to their own. Over a series of generations, this leads to a more ideologically polarized society. There may be two steady states: one in which an ideologically homogeneous society votes for a public education system, thus maintaining ideological homogeneity, and another in which a more ideologically diverse society votes for school choice, thus maintaining ideological diversity. A quick survey of the empirical evidence suggests that school choice contributes to ideological and cultural segregation, but that the extent to which this creates costly conflict varies among societies.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Oliver E. Williamson UC Berkeley School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper. 2000. No. 37.
Williamson sketches some of the earlier strains on antitrust law and economics. He identifies a series of key contributions from the organization theory literature which, when interpreted from a transaction cost economizing perspective, provide support for the theory of the firm-as-governance structure. The value added of this construction is then developed by contrasting price theoretic with transaction cost theoretic ways of dealing with a variety of public policy issues. Additional applications to the subject of contract and legal education are then discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003Daron K. Acemoglu NBER Working Paper Series. 2002. No. 9377.
В статье рассматриваются различные аспекты политической экономии, связанные с выбором обществом неэффективных политик и институтов. Статья развивает аргумент о том, что существует эмпирическая и теоретическая основы полагать, что неэффективные политики и институты превалируют в обществе, так как служат интересам отдельно взятых политических групп, обладающих властью.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2012А.В. Ковалёв TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2011. Т. 9. № 4. С. 77-82.
В статье анализируются методологические подходы австрийской школы и институционализма к анализу социально-экономических процессов, делается вывод о схожести подходов и подчеркивается важность взаимодействия школ в целях обогащения теоретических конструкций.