Всего статей в данном разделе : 685
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009Gary G. Hamilton, Robert C. Feenstra, T.H. Yang Journal of International Economics. 1999. Vol. 48. No. 1. P. 71-100 .
We analyze the impact of market structure on the trade performance of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. South Korea has many large, vertically-integrated business groups known as 'chaebol' whereas business groups in Taiwan are smaller and more specialized in the production of intermediate inputs. We test the hypotheses mat a greater presence of business groups leads to less product variety but higher product quality, using data on exports from these countries to the United States. We find that Taiwan tends to export a greater variety of products to the US than Korea, and this holds particularly for final goods. In addition, Taiwan exports higher-quality intermediate inputs, whereas Korea exports higher-quality final goods. A comparison with Japan is also presented, which has greater product variety in its sales to the US than either Taiwan or Korea, due to its larger size.
Can High-technology Industries Prosper in Germany? Institutional Frameworks and the Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology Industries [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008Steven Casper, Mark Lehrer, David Soskice Industry and Innovation. 2008. Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 5 - 24.
The paper explores the influence of institutional frameworks on the evolution of the German software and biotechnology sectors. It links institutional constraints to poor performance of German firms in high volume market niches characterized by turbulent technological change and substantial financial risk. However, German firms are prospering in software services and “platform technologies” in biotechnology. The company organizational structures and investment strategies needed to excel in these market segments provide a close “fit” with incentives created within the German economy.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007Geoffrey M. Hodgson Journal of Economic Issues. 2003. Vol. 37. No. 2. P. 471-478.
Under capitalism there is a potential for increasing socioeconomic complexity and greater specialization of skills.1 One implication is that there is a potential for increasing inequalities of wealth, income, and power on both a national and international scale. What follows is an updated, broad-brush account of possible future developments in a knowledge-intensive capitalist economy. They can themselves be manifest in different ways, in a number of quite different institutional frameworks.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007Ernesto Screpanti Review of International Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 1-26.
This article proposes a classification of capitalist forms on the basis of two concepts, 'property rights regimes' (PRRs) and 'accumulation governance structures' (AGSs). The former defines the way in which the ownership of wealth and surplus value is distributed, the latter the institutional systems governing the uses of surplus value to sustain accumulation. Three PRRs-'concentrated private property', 'diffused private property' and 'state property'-and four AGSs-'goods markets', 'companies markets', 'external hierarchies' and 'internal hierarchies'-are defined. Various historical forms of capitalism are described as resulting from particular combinations of PRRs and AGSs. Then a few ideal types are outlined: 'classical capitalism', 'market-oriented corporate capitalism' and 'bank-oriented corporate capitalism'. Finally a hypothesis is advanced as to how capitalism evolves, namely that historical transformations of PRRs and AGSs tend to pave the way for the emergence of 'autonomous capital': accumulation is controlled through complex systems of external hierarchies among firms; the large concerns which are in command of these hierarchical structures are collectively self-owned and formally controlled by their managers through strategic cross-shareholding; no external shareholder exerts effective control.
Chaebols and Catastrophe: A New View of Korean Business Groups and Their Role in the Financial Crisis [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009Gary G. Hamilton, Robert C. Feenstra, Eun Mie Lim
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Jan Rivkin, Nicolaj Siggelkow Strategy Unit Harvard University Working Paper. 2001. No. 02-05.
Rivkinb and Siggelkow examine how a firms formal organizational structure affects its ability to cope with interdependent decisions. An agent-based simulation, in which firms struggle to discover good sets of decisions, allows us to examine four coordinating mechanisms that have rarely been analyzed jointly: the grouping of related decisions under a single subordinate, a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates, firm-level incentives, and managers who are able to process more information. Authors find that organizational structure affects long-term performance by influencing the number and nature of sticking pointsconfigurations of choices the organization will not change. They identify each of the four coordinating mechanisms as a force that either encourages firms to explore a broad set of alternatives or stabilizes firms around existing choices. Successful firms strike a balance between exploration and stability. The need to balance exploration and stability generates interdependencies among the coordinating mechanisms. As a result, firms sometimes benefit from seemingly harmful features: avoidable decision interdependence between departments, a passive CEO, or subordinates of limited ability. Authors further examine how appropriate organizational design depends on the underlying pattern of interaction among decisions. When interactions are pervasive, successful organizations employ coordinating mechanisms that promote broad exploration.
Coase Competition and Compensation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004Hal R. Varian
In a world with no transactions costs there is no reason to choose between the Coasian and Pigovian treatments: both come down to finding a way to achieve an efficient allocation that Pareto dominates some initial endowment. A mechanism that solves one problem will solve the other. I have described one such mechanism, the compensation mechanism here. This is, however, only one example among many. I think that the compensation mechanism has nice theoretical properties. The question is, how does it work in practice? I am currently carrying out a series of laboratory experiments to investigate this question.
Comparing capitalisms: understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg Journal Of International Business Studies. 2008. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 540-561.
This paper examines the role of institutional analysis within the field of international business (IB) studies. Within IB, institutions matter, but the view of institutions tends to be "thin", utilizing summary indicators rather than detailed description, and thus approaches institutions as unidimensional ''variables" that impact on particular facets of business activity. This paper argues that IB research would be usefully advanced by greater attention to comparing the topography of institutional landscapes and understanding their diversity. A number of alternative case-based approaches are outlined that draw on a growing "comparative capitalisms" literature in sociology and political science. The paper develops a number of empirical examples to show the utility and limits of these approaches for IB scholars.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003Rami Zwick, Amnon Rapoport, Alison King Chung Lo, A.V. Muthukrishnan
В статье рассматривается последовательный поиск потребителем лучшей альтернативы из известного конечного набора альтернатив, обладающих множественными характеристиками. По сравнению с предшествующими моделями, авторы ослабляют предпосылку о распределении качества альтернатив, ими предполагается только способность потребителя проранжировать альтернативы на любой стадии поиска. Также они дополнили анализ, включив в него издержки поиска и возможность возврата к предыдущим, уже изученным альтернативам. Пришли к выводу, что в условиях отсутствия издержек покупатели осуществляют недостаточный поиск, а в условиях наличия издержек – наоборот, затрачивают на поиск слишком много.
Corporate Governance and Control [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Alisa Roell NBER Working Paper Series. 2002. No. 9371.
В работе проводится обзор теоретических и эмпирических исследований в области базовых механизмов корпоративного управления. Обсуждаются основные правовые и регулирующие институты в различных странах. Акцент делается на следующей фундаментальной дилемме: управление со стороны крупных акционеров может создавать лучшую защиту для мелких акционеров, но данное управление может увеличить степень злоупотреблений со стороны менеджеров.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
Costly Coasian Contracts [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2005Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli LSE, STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series. 1998. No. 362.
We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up' problem which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a `contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the hold-up problem typically entails writing a 'contract over a contract' which generates a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence is associated with a new hold-up problem. We conclude the paper investigating two applications of our results to a static and to a dynamic principal-agent model.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. No. 2. P. 453-517 .
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003Richard A. Posner, Eric B. Rasmusen International Review of Law and Economics. 1999. No. 19. P. 369-382.
В статье затрагиваются центральные вопросы, связанные с социальными нормами – это, во-первых, то, каким образом нормы создаются и изменяются, а во-вторых, то, каким образом они принуждаются к исполнению. Санкции за отклонения от норм можно разбить на категории следующим образом: автоматические, вина, стыд, информационные, порождающие двусторонние издержки и порождающие издержки для нескольких сторон. Выбор санкции напрямую связан с проблемами создания и изменения норм. Авторы используют анализ создания, изменения и принуждения к исполнению норм для исследования возможных действий государства по продвижению желаемых норм и по пресечению нежелательных. Авторы приходят к выводу, что возможность таких действий ограничивается сложностью предсказания их результата.
Creating, Capturing, and Protecting Value: a Property Rights-based View of Competitive Strategy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Nicolai J. Foss, Kirsten Foss Copenhagen Business School Working Paper. 2002. No. 02.
This paper develops a property rights-based view of strategy (the PRV). A property right (or economic right) is an individuals net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of an asset (including, e.g., a monopoly position) or consume it indirectly through exchange. Resources expended on exchanging, protecting and capturing such rights are transaction costs, so that we directly link property rights, transaction costs, and economic value. Authors assume that all relevant exchange is costly and that all agents maximize their property rights. They argue that economizing with transaction costs become a distinct source of value, and potentially of sustained competitive advantage in such a setting. Strategizing revolves around influencing impediments (i.e., transaction costs) to value creation. Expectations and contracting also become crucial parts of processes of creating, protecting and capturing value. They use these insights to derive a number of refutable propositions, and argue that key insights from both industrial organization economics and the resource-based view are consistent with the PRV.