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Институциональная экономика (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 685

Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003
Oliver Hart, John Moore NBER Working Paper Series. 1998.  No. 6726.
In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of "incomplete contracting." However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, authors evaluate some of the criticism that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, Hart and Moore develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Louis Kaplow Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter addresses two fundamental characteristics of rules. The first concerns the degree of precision, detail, or complexity they embody: how finely are different sorts of behavior to be distinguished? A second aspect of legal commands concerns when a given level of detail is provided - at the time of promulgation (rules) or subsequent to individuals actions, in the context of adjudication (standards). These aspects of rules are considered from a perspective that focuses upon information costs and dissemination: different sorts of legal commands involve differing costs of formulation and application by private parties (deciding upon their own conduct) and adjudicators, and the character of laws also influences how well parties actually will understand the law and conform their conduct accordingly. The discussion encompasses related questions involving the role of precedent, the evolution of the law over time, legal uncertainty and accuracy in adjudication. This chapter also addresses the separate problem of how changes in legal rules should apply to prior behavior or preexisting investments - issues of retroactivity and transition.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-12-2007
Michael Grimm, Stephan Klasen Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Güttingen 2007. 2007.  No. 9.
There is well-known debate about the respective role of geography versus institutions in explaining the long term development of countries. These debates have usually been based on cross country regressions where questions about parameter heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity cannot easily be controlled for. The innovation of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) was to address this last point by using settler morality as an instrument for endegenous institutions and found that this supported their line of reasoning. We believe there is value-added to consider this debate at the micro level within a country as particularly questions of parameter heterogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity are likely to be smaller than between countries. Hence, we examine the determinants of agricultural growth across villages on the Indonesian Island of Sulawesi and find technology adoption to play a crucial role. We show that geography through its effects on migration and institutions is a valid instrument to establish the causal links between institutions and technology adoption as well as technology and agricultural growth.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301. 
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
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Опубликовано на портале: 28-10-2007
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Sergio Godoy NBER Working Papers. 2006.  No. 11992.
This paper examines alternative hypotheses concerning the determinants of success in the transition from Communism to the market. In particular, we look at whether speed of privatization, legal institutions or initial conditions are more important in explaining the growth of the transition countries in the years since the end of the Cold War. In the mid 90s a large empirical literature attempted to relate growth to policy measures. A standard conclusion of this literature was the faster countries privatized and liberalized, the better. We now have more data, so we can check whether these conclusions are still valid six years later. Furthermore, much of the earlier work was flawed since it did not adequately treat problems of endogeneity, confused issues of speed and level of privatization, and did not face up to the problems of multicollinearity. Our results suggest that, contrary to the earlier literature, the speed of privatization is negatively associated with growth, but is confirms the result of the few earlier studies that have found that legal institutions are very important. Other variables, which seemed to play a large role in the earlier literature, appear to have at most a marginal positive effect.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2007.  No. 2007-43.
This article starts from the limits of the policies that assume a significant de-connection between antipoverty strategies and the logic of the growth regime and that mainly rely upon market mechanisms. By contrast, a branch of the new institutional economics argues that a complete set of coordinating mechanisms is constitutive of really existing economies and that they are more complementary than substitute. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) may be useful for analyzing simultaneously the antipoverty policies and the viability of growth regimes. The different brands of capitalism are the outcome of complementary institutions concerning competition, labor market institutions, welfare and innovation systems. Generally, such configurations cannot be emulated by poor developing countries, but reviewing the preliminary findings of the UNRISD country case studies suggests some common features to all successful experiments. Basically, antipoverty policies are efficient when they create the equivalent of virtuous circles within which growth entitles antipoverty programs and conversely these programs sustain the speed and stability of growth. Two methods are proposed in order to detect possible complementarities and design accordingly economic policies: the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on one side, national growth diagnosis on the other side. A special attention is devoted to the timing of policies and the role of policy regimes. A brief conclusion wraps up the major findings and proposes a research agenda.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-08-2008
Иван Вадимович Розмаинский TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2007.  Т. 5. № 1. С. 28-40. 
Тезис о том, что институты постсоветской экономики не соответствуют институтам «нормальной» рыночной экономики, уже давно является общим местом, по крайней мере, для современных институционалистов различных ветвей. Среди различных объяснений такого «расхождения», на наш взгляд, пока что не уделялось достаточного внимания анализу основных стереотипов и норм экономического поведения «постсоветских россиян». Данная работа направлена на заполнение этого пробела.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2006.  No. 06/2 .
This essay reviews the development of approaches within the comparative capitalisms(CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, define and distinguish these approaches as a group. First, national economies are characterized by distinct institutional configurations that generate a particular systemic “logic” of economic action. Second, the CC literature suggests a theory of comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature has been interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Behind these unifying characteristics of the literature, however, lie a variety of analytical frameworks and typologies of capitalism. This paper reviews and compares these different frameworks by highlighting the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respective contributions and limitations in explaining economic performance and institutional dynamics. The paper concludes that the way forward for this literature lies in developing a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of politics and power.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Steven Tadelis, Patrick L. Bajari Stanford University - Department of Economics: Working Paper. 1999. 
В статье представлена модель, объясняющая многие стилизованные факты о контрактах на поставку (procurement contracts). Согласно модели покупатель несет издержки дизайна контракта и сталкивается с дилеммой: либо создавать стимулы у продавцов не проявлять оппортунизм, либо снижать ex post трансакционные издержки, связанные с затратами на пересмотр контракта. Авторы показывают, в каких случаях контракты с фиксированной ценой и контракты, составленные по принципу издержки плюс, будут превалировать над остальными стимулирующими контрактами. Также делается вывод о том, что в случае высокой сложности товара внутрифирменное производство будет доминировать рыночные контракты на поставку.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003
Karl Warneryd, Holger M. Mueller RAND Journal of Economics. 2001.  Vol. 32. No. 3. P. 527-541. 
Если внутрифирменные контракты неполны, то менеджеры будут тратить ресурсы на попытку присвоить часть созданного излишка себе. В статье показано, что внешние собственники могут снизить потери мертвого груза, ассоциирующееся с перераспределительным конфликтом, даже если возникает конфликт на новом уровне (менеджер-собственник). В случае, если менеджера стимулируют осуществлять специфические инвестиции, возникает дилемма между минимизацией издержек рентоориентированного поведения и максимизацией выручки. На этой основе авторы выдвинули объяснение, почему некоторые фирмы организованы как партнерства, а другие как корпорации.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-03-2003
Избранная аннотированная библиография по институциональному анализу, содержащая журнальные статьи, рабочие материалы и монографии.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Daron K. Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Yunyong Thaicharoen
Авторы подвергают критике распространенный (традиционный) взгляд о простой причинно-следственной взаимосвязи между макроэкономической политикой и экономическим развитием страны. Искажающая макроэкономическая политика может быть не причиной кризисов и высокой степени волатильности экономики, а лишь симптомом институциональных проблем. В подтверждение данного соображения авторы анализируют процесс формирования и качество институтов в бывших европейских колониях.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglass C. North Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 1994. 
A theory of institutional change is essential for further progress in the social sciences in general and economics in particular, because neo-classical theory (and other theories in the social scientist's tool bag) at present cannot satisfactorily account for the very diverse performance of societies and economies both at a moment of time and over time. North sketches out a framework for analyzing institutions. This framework builds on the economic theory of choice subject to constraints. However it incorporates new assumptions about both the constraints that individuals face and the process by which they make choices within those constraints. Among the traditional neoclassical assumptions that are relaxed are those of costless exchange, perfect information, and unlimited cognitive capabilities. Too many gaps still remain in our understanding of this new approach to call it a theory. North presents a set of definitions, principles, and a structure, which provide much of the scaffolding necessary to develop a theory of institutional change.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003
Joshua Aizenman, Mark M. Spiegel NBER Working Paper Series. 2002.  No. 9324.
На основе подхода принципала-агента авторы моделируют использование концепции издержек на принуждение к исполнению прав собственности в анализе прямых иностранных инвестиций. Результаты модели тестируются на основе межстрановых данных для развивающихся стран. Показано, что индикатор степени коррупции (индекс Мауро) имеет обратную связь с уровнем инвестиционной активности.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Steven G. Medema, Nicholas Mercuro, Warren J. Samuels Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, institutional economics has been concerned with the analysis of the interrelations between legal and economic processes. The institutional approach to law and economics examines both the influence of economy upon law and legal reasoning and the influence of law and legal change upon economic activity and performance. This essay examines the central tenants of institutional law and economics, dating from the early work of individuals such as Robert Lee Hale and John R. Commons and through its modern manifestations. As such, it emphasizes the evolutionary nature of law and economy, the tension between continuity and change, the problem of order, the reciprocal nature of legal-economic problems and the attendant dual nature of rights, the problematic nature of efficiency, and the need for a comparative institutional approach to the practice of law and economics. By recognizing the multiplicity of potential solutions to legal-economic problems and the underlying value premises attending each, the comparative institutional approach to law and economics attempts to flesh out both what is actually going on within the legal-economic nexus and the alternative possibilities open to society within the legal-economic decision-making process.
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