Всего статей в данном разделе : 685
Poison Pills, Optimal Contracting and the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from Fortune 500 Firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-01-2006Christopher F. Baum, Chakraborty Atreya International Journal of Finance. 1998. Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 1120-1138.
The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings of a large body of prior research that these defenses adversely affect shareholder wealth. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the adoption of such defenses may reflect shareholders desire to contract efficiently with their managers in an environment characterized by hostile takeovers and uncertainty about the managers true performance. Authors focus on financial characteristics of firms as they relate to the motives for adopting such defenses. Their empirical research does not support the optimal contacting hypothesis. They interpret their results as supportive of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-11-2004Oriana Bandiera, James Anderson
Private enforcement of property rights is ubiquitous. Is it socially efficient? What constraints does potential private provision of enforcement impose on efficient state policy? At times private enforcement is cartelized; at others it is competitive. Which form is more efficient? We provide answers in a model of the private enforcement of property rights.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2005. No. 87.
This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms' corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specific factors only modestly affect governance even when they are statistically significant. This suggests that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm-specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with sticky governance, in which firms alter their governance slowly in response to economic factors. In a companion paper, we report evidence that the corporate governance index used here predicts higher share prices for Korean firms. Black, Jang and Kim, Does Corporate Governance Affect Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea,: Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (forthcoming 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=311275
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Thomas J. Miceli, Lanse P. Minkler University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper. 1997. No. 1997-06.
Miceli and Minkler examine the link between social institutions and individuals' propensity to cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework. They transform the usual prisoner's dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material preferences. By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on expected partner behavior. All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis. As such it represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts. Exogenous social policy can affect cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if preferences are endogenous. Repeated play results in "switching" behavior, where formerly cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform). This behavior suggests further roles for institutions. Finally, continuing the effort to analyze community, they add the possibility of interaction with a new "low cost" player who, it is known, does not make social investments.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004Hal R. Varian, James Andreoni Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Working papers. 1999. No. 18.
We consider a modified Prisoners’ Dilemma game in which each agent can offer to pay the other agent to cooperate. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game is Pareto efficient. We examine experimentally whether subjects actually manage to achieve this efficient outcome. We find an encouraging level of support for the mechanism, but also find some evidence that subjects’ tastes for cooperation and equity may have significant interactions with the incentives provided by the mechanism.
Private credit in 129 countries [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2007. Vol. 84. No. 2. P. 299-329 .
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging. Finally, legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and informationsharing institutions. The analysis suggests that public credit registries, which are primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in developing countries.
Private States and the Enforcement of Property Rights: Theory and evidence on the origins of the Sicilian Mafia [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-11-2004Oriana Bandiera
Historical records show that the Sicilian mafia initially developed to protect land from predatory attacks, at a time when publicly provided security was scarce and banditry widespread. Using a common-agency model, the paper shows that: (i) it is optimal for each landowner to voluntarily buy protection even if this results in a worse equilibrium for the landowning class as a whole and (ii) other things equal, mafia profits are higher where land is more fragmented. The argument is based on the fact that protection involves an externality because by buying protection each landowner deflects thieves on others’ properties. Because of the externality, for each landlord protection is more valuable if he is one of the few to receive it, thus each landlord will be willing to pay more if some landlords are left out. Land fragmentation increases the number of landlords who would pay to keep some out, which in turn increases mafia’s profits. Using qualitative data from a parliamentary survey (1881), the paper also shows that in 19th century rural Sicily mafia was in fact more likely to be active in towns were land was more divided.
Property Rights [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Armen A. Alchian Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. 2002.
One of the most fundamental requirements of a capitalist economic systemand one of the most misunderstood conceptsis a strong system of property rights. The definition, allocation, and protection of property rights is one of the most complex and difficult set of issues that any society has to resolve, but it is one that must be resolved in some fashion. In this essay different aspects of private property rights system discuss.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Edwin G. Westi Carleton Economic Papers. 2002. No. 01-01.
This paper is designed to acquaint the reader with the historical background of the concept of property rights and several surrounding controversies by reviewing early work on property by economists and philosophers (with the main emphasis on the former). The survey focuses on significant contributions from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, setting the stage for the following chapters that reflect more recent thinking.
Public Enforcement of Law [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999.
This chapter discusses the theory of the public enforcement of law - the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. Authors first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. Then they examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses and incapacitation.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-08-2008Елена Алексеевна Бренделева TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2006. Т. 4. № 2. С. 42-47.
Институциональная ловушка – это неэффективная устойчивая норма (неэффективный институт), имеющая самоподдерживающийся характер. Институциональные ловушки сопутствовали и сопутствуют переходной экономике России в самых различных сферах: отношениях собственности, кредитно-денежной системе, структуре реального сектора экономики и т.д.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007Geoffrey M. Hodgson Journal of Economic Psychology. 2004. Vol. 25. No. 4. P. 651-660.
This paper reviews the concept of habit and its relation to institutions. The following questions are addressed: What are habits? Why have they evolved? How do institutions affect them? And what are some of the implications for economic analysis? It is argued that the early pragmatist and institutionalist thought of William James, John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen remains a useful guide in this area, for further research today.
Relevance of Canadian labour law to US firms operating in Canada (Применимость канадского трудового права к американским фирмам, работающим в Канаде) [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004Steven E. Abraham International Journal of Manpower. 1997. Vol. 18. No. 8.
As US firms expand into Canada, it becomes necessary for them to be aware of Canadian law governing labour and employment. Unlike what many might think, the laws in the two countries are substantially different. Further, the effects of these differences have been demonstrated empirically. Considers the differences between US and Canadian labour law in seven areas: certification procedures; first contract arbitration; new technologies; strike replacements; successorship; employee participation programmes and union security. Discusses the effects of the laws in these areas.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Steven Shavell, Tanguy Ypersele NBER Working Paper Series. 1999. No. 6956.
This paper compares reward system to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information requires for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward system, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights.