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Институциональная экономика (подробнее...)

Copenhagen Business School Working Paper

Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss, Kirsten Foss Copenhagen Business School Working Paper. 2002.  No. 02.
This paper develops a property rights-based view of strategy (the PRV). A property right (or economic right) is an individuals net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of an asset (including, e.g., a monopoly position) or consume it indirectly through exchange. Resources expended on exchanging, protecting and capturing such rights are transaction costs, so that we directly link property rights, transaction costs, and economic value. Authors assume that all relevant exchange is costly and that all agents maximize their property rights. They argue that economizing with transaction costs become a distinct source of value, and potentially of sustained competitive advantage in such a setting. Strategizing revolves around influencing impediments (i.e., transaction costs) to value creation. Expectations and contracting also become crucial parts of processes of creating, protecting and capturing value. They use these insights to derive a number of refutable propositions, and argue that key insights from both industrial organization economics and the resource-based view are consistent with the PRV.
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