NBER Working Paper Series
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Steven Shavell, Tanguy Ypersele NBER Working Paper Series. 1999. No. 6956.
This paper compares reward system to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information requires for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward system, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Herschel I. Grossman NBER Working Paper Series. 2000. No. 7897.
Traditionally, general-equilibrium models have taken effective property rights to be given and have been concerned only with analyzing the allocation of resources among productive uses and the distribution of the resulting product. But, this formulation of the economic problem is incomplete because it neglects that the appropriative activities by which people create the effective property rights that inform allocation and distribution are themselves an alternative use of scare resources. This paper develops two canonical general-equilibrium models of resource allocation and income distribution that allow for the allocation of time and effort to the creation of effective property rights to valuable resources. In one model the valuable resources are initially in common pool. In the other models the analysis reveals how the amount of time and effort that agents allocate to the creation of effective property rights, on the technology of production, and on the scale of the economy. The paper also analyses the security of initial claims to valuable resources and speculates about why initial claims are perfectly secure.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales NBER Working Paper Series. 2003. No. 9478.
Объясняя межстрановые различия в обеспечении прав собственности, авторы исследуют фактор их распределения. Показывается, что защита прав собственности существенно облегчается в случае, когда собственность находится непосредственно в руках производителей, в противоположность случаю, когда собственностью владеют третьи лица (получатели ренты).