Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 21
Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003
Pierre-Andre Chiappori, James J. Heckman, Jean Pinquet, Jaap H. Abbring
A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish
between adverse selection and moral hazard. Authors show that dynamic
insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on
unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies
negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with
the number of past claims. They discuss econometric tests for the various
types of data that are typically available. Finally, they argue that dynamic
data also allow to test for adverse selection, even if it is based on asymmetric
learning.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Benjamin E. Hermalin
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.
2002.
Vol. 1.
No. 1.
P. 1005-1028.
This article argues that the existence of adverse selection (worker heterogeneity) can explain the underprovision of general training by employers. High-ability workers value the option to entertain outside wage offers once their abilty becomes known to the market. Offering short-term contracts is, therefore, a way to screen high-ability types from low-ability types. A firm is not willing to train workers under short-term contracts. Hence, despite the positive returns to training, training may be underprovided in equilibrium. More generally, this article contributes to the literature that seeks to explain the puzzling phenomenon of short-term contracts governing long-term buyer-seller relationships.
A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law,
and the Theory of the Firm [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003
Harvey S. James
University of Missouri-Columbia, Paper Draft.
2001.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the common law governing the employment
of labor
makes the distinction not only between employee and independent contractor but also
between
managerial control and agency. The idea is that common law precedents govern workers
who are
employed and managerially controlled without the requirement that formal, written
contracts be
established, and that these defaults support the authority of management to direct
their activities within
the firm. However, many firm owners voluntarily restrict their ability to control
workers by making them
agents. Workers who are agents differ from workers who are managerially controlled
in that in the former
caseworkers are treated differently in the eyes of the common law and they often
sign detailed, formal
employment contracts. The typical features of formal employment contracts are examined.
The principal
conclusion is that formal employment contracts facilitate the granting of discretion
to workers by
superseding many of the legal defaults that define the relationship between the worker
and firm owner.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Harvey S. James
Объемная библиография по экономической теории трансакционных издержек, структурно
содержащая как журнальные статьи, так и монографии. Наиболее значимые статьи снабжены
небольшими аннотациями составителя. Библиография качественно рубрицирована, что только
повышает ее ценность для тех, кто связан с изучением исследовательской работой в
области теории трансакционных издержек.
Bibliography of Rules and Norms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Charlotte Hess
Библиография содержит литературу по теме: правила и нормы.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Библиография по институциональной экономике в целом, структурно содержащая как монографии,
так и журнальные статьи.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2005
Leonardo Felli
Research in Economics.
2004.
Vol. 58.
No. 1.
P. 3-30.
This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behavior and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they write must be algorithmic in nature. We start with a definition of contract incompleteness that seems both appealing and widely applicable. Our first task is then to show that, by itself, the algorithmic nature of contracts is not enough to generate genuinely incomplete contracts in equilibrium. As in Anderlini and Felli [Q. J. Econom. 109 (1994) 1085], we call this the Approximation Result. We then proceed to consider contractual situations in which the complexity costs of a contract are explicitly taken into account. We consider a broad (axiomatically defined) class of complexity measures and in this framework we show that incomplete contracts obtain in equilibrium. We also discuss extensively some recent literature directly related to the results reported here.
Corporate Governance and Control [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Alisa Roell
NBER Working Paper Series.
2002.
No. 9371.
В работе проводится обзор теоретических и эмпирических исследований в области базовых
механизмов корпоративного управления. Обсуждаются основные правовые и регулирующие
институты в различных странах. Акцент делается на следующей фундаментальной дилемме:
управление со стороны крупных акционеров может создавать лучшую защиту для мелких
акционеров, но данное управление может увеличить степень злоупотреблений со стороны
менеджеров.
Costly Coasian Contracts [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2005
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli
LSE, STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series.
1998.
No. 362.
We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up' problem which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a `contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the hold-up problem typically entails writing a 'contract over a contract' which generates a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence is associated with a new hold-up problem. We conclude the paper investigating two applications of our results to a static and to a dynamic principal-agent model.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Bouckaert Boudewijn, De Geest Gerrit
Детальная библиогафия по праву и экономике.
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003
Oliver Hart, John Moore
NBER Working Paper Series.
1998.
No. 6726.
In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under
the heading of "incomplete contracting." However, almost since its inception, the
theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper,
authors evaluate some of the criticism that have been made of the theory, in particular,
those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, Hart and Moore develop a model that
provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Детальная библиография по праву и экономике (статьи). Открытый доступ к оглавнениям
журналов по праву и экономике: European Journal of Law and Economics;
International Review of Law and Economics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
и др.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-01-2006
Christopher F. Baum, Chakraborty Atreya
International Journal of Finance.
1998.
Vol. 10.
No. 3.
P. 1120-1138.
The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings
of a large body of prior research that these defenses adversely affect shareholder
wealth. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the adoption of such defenses
may reflect shareholders desire to contract efficiently with their managers in an
environment characterized by hostile takeovers and uncertainty about the managers
true performance. Authors focus on financial characteristics of firms as they relate
to the motives for adopting such defenses. Their empirical research does not support
the optimal contacting hypothesis. They interpret their results as supportive of
the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004
Hal R. Varian, James Andreoni
Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Working papers.
1999.
No. 18.
We consider a modified Prisoners’ Dilemma game in which each agent can offer
to pay the other agent to cooperate. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage
game is Pareto efficient. We examine experimentally whether subjects actually manage
to achieve this efficient outcome. We find an encouraging level of support for the
mechanism, but also find some evidence that subjects’ tastes for cooperation
and equity may have significant interactions with the incentives provided by the
mechanism.
Social norms and moral hazard [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Martin Dufwenbergy, Michael Lundholmz
The Economic Journal.
2001.
No. 111.
P. 506-526.
В статье рассматривается функционирование системы социального страхования в условиях,
когда индивиды стремятся использовать частную информацию для увеличения своей выгоды
в ущерб другим. Авторы приходят к выводу, что социальные нормы могут способствовать
ослаблению проблемы морального риска. Тем не менее, распределение социального статуса
в обществе не будет равномерным.
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