Всего статей в данном разделе : 135
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003Gerald R. Faulhaber American Economic Review. 1975. Vol. 65. No. 5. P. 966-77.
Analyzes the issues of cross-subsidization in public enterprises with economies of joint production. Incentives to competitive entry and subsidy-free prices; Relation of welfare maximizing prices to subsidy-free prices; Price elasticity of demand; Costs of alternative means of supply; Choice between protected monopoly and open competition.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Damien J. Neven, Louis Phlips Journal of Industrial Economics. 1985. Vol. 34. No. 2. P. 133-149.
We analyse the properties of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which arises when two monopolies, operating each in a separate market, become a duopoly in a common market with two sub-markets (the formerly separated markets) and are allowed to price discriminate across sub-markets. This equilibrium implies "intra-industry" trade (or "crosshauling") of identical commodities and freight absorption (which is an increasing function of the slope of the marginal cost schedule). It also leads to price differences such as those observed in the European car market. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Stan J. Liebowitz American Economic Review. 1982. Vol. 72. No. 4. P. 816-824.
Focuses on the relationship between market structure and monopoly power. Durability models; New-used goods model; Durability and monopoly in the new-used model; Interdependence between market structure and durability. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Gerard R. Buttlers Review of Economic Studies. 1977. Vol. 44. No. 138. P. 465-491.
Focuses on the formulation of equilibrium distributions of sales and advertising prices. Development of a model in which sellers have constant average cost curves; Approach to prove assumptions on consumer preferences; Description of the basic model of consumer pricing. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Arthur Smithies Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1940. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 95115.
The meaning of an imperfect market, 95.--Assumptions underlying the present analysis, 96.--I. The demand functions, 96.--II. Competitor's expectation of his rivals' behavior, 98.--His estimated demand function, 100.--III. Diagrammatic demonstration of attainment of equilibrium, 100.--IV. Equilibrium conditions for the general case, 103.--Conditions affecting the relative magnitudes of p1 and p2 equilibrium: (1) differences in demand functions, 105; different methods of estimation, 106; (3) cost differences, 106.--V. Conditions under which equilibrium is stable and economically possible, 107.--Cases where the stability conditions are not fulfilled or where equilibrium is economically impossible, 114. (Из JStore)
Опубликовано на портале: 23-11-2004Peter J. Davis
This paper presents a theoretical framework that allows estimation of game theoretic models of quantity competition, including a non-trivial class of differentiated product quantity games. The simplest and yet arguably most important examples of a quantity games are entry games. In entry games the choice firms make is discrete (enter/don’t enter) and as a result I study a su ﬃciently general class of models to allow for either continous or integer quantity choices. The main theoretical results of the paper establish easily verifiable conditions under which an index of market output is uniquely determined within the set of Nash equilibria. The model’s parameters may then be estimated by comparing the predicted index of market output in a cross section of markets. The paper provides both a generalization and an extension of the theoretical results developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992) which allowed estimation of the homogeneous products entry game. I illustrate one member of the class of models that these results allow us to estimate by developing a model of discrete quantity competition using count data from the supermarket industry.
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003Dilip Abreu Journal of Economic Theory. 1986. Vol. 39. No. 1. P. 191-225.
Establishes a general proposition applied in the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. Two-dimensional characterization of optimal symmetric punishments; Analogous result holding for the general case of asymmetric punishments.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004Peter J. Davis
Using a large and comprehensive theater level database covering over $18billion in theater revenues over a five year period, I document the extent and nature of entry, exit, revenue cannibalization and market expansion that occurred during the height of the 1990’s boom in movie theater construction. The boom culminated when four of the six the largest cinema chains in the US went into bankruptcy protection during 2000. Along the way, I examine industry and media claims that the construction boom actually caused the bankruptcies. If true, such claims would raise important questions about the relationship between private and social returns to investment.
Frank H. Knight as Economic Theorist [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Arthur H. Leigh Journal of Political Economy. 1974. Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 578-586.
Focuses on the contributions of economist Frank H. Knight on improving the economic theory. Significance of Knight's theory of profit and capital; Effectiveness of a perfectly competitive market structure to achieve optimal allocative solutions; Emphasis on the universality of the choice problem imposed by scarcity. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003B. Curtis Eaton, Richard G. Lipsey Economic Journal. 1978. Vol. 88. No. 351. P. 455-69.
We have demonstrated that zero pure profit is not a necessary condition of free-entry equilibrium in a model in which the market is spatially extended and longrun cost curves decline over some initial range. We have shown that neither price competition among existing firms nor the entry of new firms will necessarily drive profits to zero. This is true even when firms assume that they can cut their own price without reaction from their competitors, and when new entrants rationally calculate whether or not their entry will force existing firms to relocate. We have further shown, in a specific example, that rates of return on capital of up to twice the competitive rate are possible in free-entry equilibrium. The model of this paper is formulated in terms of geographical differentiation among firms. There would seem, however, to be significant applications to product differentiation, where firms sell products with different locations in characteristics space, and a new product fitting in between two established ones must expect a market significantly smaller than those obtained by "neighbouring" products before entry. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in handling monopolistic competition in characteristic space see Archibald and Kosenbluth (1975) and for a practical application that uses some of the properties developed in our model see Schmalensee (1977). [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003B. Curtis Eaton Journal of Regional Science. 1976. Vol. 16. No. 1. P. 21-33.
Analyzes the process of spatial competition in a one-dimensional model under conditions of free entry. Solution to avoid the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium in a bounded spatial market; Properties of the model; Advantages of numerical techniques in studying the model. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003David D. Friedman Bell Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 10. No. 2. P. 706-708.
Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build. The argument, applied to longhaul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to nonoptimal construction decisions. [Авторский текст]
Intertemporal price discrimination [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Nancy L. Stokey Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 93. No. 3. P. 355-71.
Presents a model that examines the behavior of a monopolist selling a new product. Factors that influence time as a medium for price discrimination; Example that assumes no production costs to illustrate that discrimination is the only motive for selling to different buyers at different dates at different prices; Introduction of positive costs of production to explore an alternative motive for inter temporal price variation. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003Michael Bradfield Canadian Journal of Economics. 1990. Vol. 23. No. 3. P. 700-704.
This note extends the conventional short-run comparison of perfectly competitive and monopsony markets to show that the long-run monopsony equilibrium implies a greater divergence from the competitive results than is true in the short run. The conditions necessary to have a 'pure' monopsony, with power in only the labour market, are developed and generate a constant marginal revenue product of labour equal to the competitive wage. This leads the monopsonist to cut wages and labour inputs further in the long run and also forms the upper bound on the bargaining range for a union negotiating with a pure monopsonist. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005Joseph Farrell, Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 2002. No. 0303006.
We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms on equilibrium R&D projects. We compare a monopolist’s choice of R&D portfolio to that of a welfare maximizer. We next show that Sah and Stiglitz’s finding that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the number of firms under Bertrand competition extends to neither Cournot oligopoly nor a cartel. We also show that the ability of firms to pre-empt R&D by rivals along particular research paths can lead to socially excessive R&D diversification. Lastly, using Sah and Stiglitz’s definition of hierarchy, we establish conditions under which larger hierarchies invest in smaller portfolios.