Всего статей в данном разделе : 135
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004Sidney G. Winter, Yuri M. Kaniovski, Giovanni Dosi IIASA Working Papers. 1998. ir98022.
The paper analyzes some generic features of industrial dynamics whereby innovative change is carried, stochastically, by new entrants. Relying on the formal representation suggested in Winter et al. (1997), it studies both the asymptotic properties of such pro- cesses and their nite time dynamics to account for a few empirical stylized facts, including persistent entry and exit, skewed size distributions and turbulence in market shares.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Oliver Hart Review of Economic Studies. 1979. Vol. 46. P. 1-30.
Presents a study that clarified and developed the idea of a monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium model with differentiated commodities. Cause of monopolistically competitive behavior; Example illustrating the insignificance of an agent's monopoly power if the agent is small relative to the aggregate economy; Development of the model; Interpretation of the results. (Из Ebsco)
Monopoly and resource allocation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-03-2003Arnold C. Harberger American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings. 1954. Vol. 44. No. 2. P. 77-87.
В статье количественно оценивается влияние монополии как рыночной структуры на распределение ресурсов в экономической системе и уровень общественного благосостояния.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Hayne E. Leland, Robert A. Meyer Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 449-62.
While some firms, such as airlines, may have both the informational and legal capabilities for identifying and segmenting customers into different markets, most firms do not. When only the distribution of characteristics of consumers is known, we characterize the situation as one of imperfect discrimination. Individuals in such markets cannot be identified; thus, all must face the same price structure. Some discrimination is nonetheless possible through the use of nonuniform pricing policies. For optimal nonuniform pricing schedules, we have focused attention on two: profit maximization and welfare maximization, and consider two common forms of nonuniform pricing: two-part and two-block policies. We show that, regardless of the firm's objective, it can always do at least as well with a two-block as with a two-part policy (and at least as well with a two-part policy as with uniform pricing). The two-part and block pricing schemes strictly dominate the uniform scheme for a profit maximizer, and increased profit is not always at the expense of welfare. Under uncertainty we observe it is also possible to obtain an ordering over the uniform, two-part and block pricing strategies on risk-efficiency grounds. Without assuming any specific probability distributions or assuming any specific way in which the random component affects demand, we demonstrate that an expected utility of profit maximizer will find a block pricing policy at least as preferred as a two-part pricing policy, which in turn is strictly preferred to a uniform policy. Our results indicate that optimal regulation of utilities should not rule out block rate structures a priori. Declining block prices are not necessarily antithetical to welfare maximization in a profit-constrained environment. [Авторский текст]
Monopoly Supply and Monopsony Demand [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003A.J. Nichol Journal of Political Economy. 1942. Vol. 50. No. 6. P. 861-879.
В работе развиваются новые подходы к понятиям спроса и предложения применительно к анализу монополии и монопсонии. В статье показывается, что при определенных условиях возможно графическое выражение (в координатах цена-количество) предложения монополии и спроса монопсонии.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007Jeremy I. Bulow, John Geanakoplos, Paul Klemperer Journal of Political Economy. 1985. Vol. 3. No. 93. P. 488-511.
A firm's actions in one market can change competitors' strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other market. Whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on (a) whether it increases or decreases marginal costs in the second market and (b) whether competitors' products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The latter distinction is determined by whether more "aggressive" play (e.g., lower price or higher quantity) by one firm in a market lowers or raises competing firms' marginal profitabilities in that market. Many recent results in oligopoly theory can be most easily understood in terms of strategic substitutes and complements.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Michael Spence Review of Economic Studies. 1980. Vol. 47. No. 150. P. 821-841.
Focuses on a study which developed a formulae of optimal quantity-dependent pricing schemes for several products. Description of the single product model; Details on the Pareto optimality; Information on the multi-product pricing. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Dean A. Worcester Southern Economic Journal. 1973. Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 234-245.
The estimates of welfare loss to monopoly reported here are substantially lower than anticipated when this research was undertaken. The cumulative bias introduced to overestimate the size of the welfare loss should, it seemed a priori, produce an estimated welfare loss of at least 5 percent. I can only conclude that there is very little ground for the common belief that a large loss of welfare exists due to the economic impact of monopoly power. It is possible that the fault lies with the measurements and not with the (viscerally sensed) reality, but as a social scientist I believe that the burden of proof now rests on those who believe the loss is large. A reallocation of economists' time toward the public sector may be indicated. Greater welfare losses to misallocation may exist as a consequence of such government activities as oil import quotas, water diversion schemes, standards enforced to safeguard common property resources such as air, water, and fish, and other programs asserted to be in the public rather than the private interest. [Авторский текст]
Nonlinear prices and welfare [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Michael Spence Journal of Public Economics. 1977. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 8-18.
Focuses on the comparison of price and quantity rationing in terms of their capacities to allocate scarce goods. Effect of the price system on income redistribution; Correlation of quantity rationing with nonlinear price schedule; Factors attributing the quantity of rationing. (Из Ebsco)
On Monopoly Welfare Losses [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Abram Bergson American Economic Review. 1973. Vol. 63. No. 5. P. 853-870.
Studies welfare losses due to monopolistic pricing in the United States. Evaluation of calculations indicating that welfare losses from monopolistic pricing is inconsequential; Consumer's surplus analysis; Proposed method in deriving coefficient of net compensating variation. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 11-09-2007David E.M. Sappington Review of Industrial Organization. 2006. Vol. 29. No. 3. P. 171-191.
This paper demonstrates that vertical divestiture may increase consumer welfare even when the divestiture eliminates substantial scope economies and precludes only limited sabotage. More generally, the merits of vertical divestiture are shown to vary with: (1) the type and the intensity of competition in the retail market; (2) the locus of scope economies under vertical integration; and (3) the relative social values of consumers’ surplus and profit
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Joseph Hadar Economic Journal. 1969. Vol. 36. No. 1. P. 67-74.
The main results of the analysis can be briefly summarized. It was shown that it is possible to specify the nature of the effects of advertising on the demand function of a monopolistically competitive firm in a fashion which leads to meaningful and testable hypotheses. The approach followed in this paper produced a model in which the effects of changes in the shift parameters on the levels of output and advertising are always determinate. Furthermore, we saw that if the firm is a competitive buyer of advertising, then it turns out that the advertising ratio is invariant to changes in parameters belonging to a certain class, an example of which is an excise tax. Changes in parameters in the latter class also result in a predictable 4 Sufficient conditions for stability of much an adjustment process are given in Hadar . change in the price of the firm's output, since the price always moves in a direction opposite to that of the change in output whenever output and advertising change by the same proportion. [Авторский текст]
Optimal price discrimination [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003John M. Hartwick Journal of Public Economics. 1978. Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 83-89.
Focuses on practice of price discrimination among public utilities. Variations of charges with the user; Approach to maximize profits; Strategies for transferring consumer surplus to the revenues of producers.(Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Richard Schmalensee American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 71. No. 1. P. 242-247 .
Focuses on output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. Maximization of profits by charging different prices to different markets or classes for customers; Maldistribution of resources for different uses. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003A. Ross Shepherd American Economic Review. 1971. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 237-239.
Comments on the article by Milton Kafoglis concerning the output of the restrained firm. Examination of the price and output behavior of the restrained monopoly firm; Implications of private cost saving on output and revenue; Production of optimal output by output and revenue maximizers in the case of increasing cost; Production of optimally large outputs in single markets through monopsony power. (Из Ebsco)