Всего статей в данном разделе : 135
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Ariel Rubinstein Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. No. 1. P. 97-110.
Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)
Preference revelation and monopsony [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003G. Fane, E. Sieper Journal of Public Economics. 1983. Vol. 20. No. 3. P. 357-372 .
Presents the formal equivalence between the free-rider problem and monopsony. Elimination on the inefficiencies of monopsony; Mechanisms used in the problem of free-rider; Determination on the consumer with willingness-to-pay for public good. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Hal R. Varian American Economic Review. 1985. Vol. 75. No. 4. P. 870-875.
Studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory. Features of the reservation model presented; Quasi-linear utility and consumers' surplus; Upper and lower bounds on welfare change; Bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination. (From Ebsco)
Pricing the Internet [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004Hal R. Varian, Jerey K. MacKie-Mason
This paper was prepared for the conference ‘‘Public Access to the Internet,’’ JFK School of Government, May 26--27 , 1993. We describe some of the technology and costs relevant to pricing access to and usage of the Internet, and discuss the components of an efficient pricing structure. We suggest a possible smart-market mechanism for pricing traffic on the Internet.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Roger W. Koenker, Martin K. Perry Bell Journal of Economics. 1981. Vol. 12. No. 1. P. 217-232.
This paper generalizes a model of monopolistic competition attributable to Spence (1976). Firms produce symmetrically differentiated products with declining or U-shaped average costs. Free entry drives profits to zero in equilibrium. Spence finds that when firms behave "competitively," in a specific sense, the market equilibrium yields too little product diversity. However, when Spence' s "competitive" behavioral assumption is relaxed, we find that the market may produce excessive diversity; this occurs when product differentiation is weak relative to scale economies of production. We also study two second-best regulatory policies and characterize conditions under which they are potentially effective in improving the market outcome. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Michael Spence Review of Economic Studies. 1976. Vol. 43. No. 134. P. 217-235.
Deals with a study which investigated the effects of fixed costs and monopolistic competition on the selection of products and product characteristics in a set of interacting markets. Price discrimination; Impact of monopolistic competition on complementary products; Approaches to the problems of substitute products. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 13-03-2003Edward Hustings Chamberlin Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1948. Vol. 1. No. 62. P. 229-262.
В рамках неоклассической экономической теории рассматриваются пропорциональность и делимость факторов, применяемых в процессе производства, их связь с размером производства и влияние этих параметров на существование фирмы.
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003James Friedman Review of Economic Studies. 1968. Vol. 35. No. 103. P. 257-272.
Focuses on reaction functions and the theory of duopoly. Introduction and development of the reaction function; Crucial element of duopoly; Equilibrium points in a dynamic duopoly.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-08-2003David P. Baron, Roger B. Myerson Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. No. 4. P. 911-30.
Discusses the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator. Definition of the basic model used to describe the problem of the regulator; Derivation of the optimal policy; Analysis of the optimal solution.(Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Val E. Lambson Journal of Economic Theory. 1984. Vol. 34. No. 2. P. 282-91.
Examines the self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic market. Mechanics of a folk theorem in game theory; Description of the theory of oligopoly by Cournot; Effect of increase in demand and competitive equilibria among firms on the applicability of the folk theorem. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003George Norman Review of Economic Studies. 1981. Vol. 48. P. 97-111.
Presents information on a study which analyzed the link between spatial monopoly and spatial competition. Impact of the degree of price discrimination on the degree of competition; Spatial analogue of the conventional, spaceless, monopoly/perfect competition comparison. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003John G. Greenhut, Melvin L. Greenhut Economica. 1975. Vol. 42. No. 168. P. 401-419.
Spatial price theory has typically assumed homogeneous gross demand curves among buyers who are dispersed over an economic landscape. Subtracting varying costs of distance to their locations yields a set of heterogeneous net demand curves. Any spatial monopolist subject to these conditions faces separable markets which are characterized by different effective demands. As a result price discrimination is feasible, and in theory straight-lined delivered price schedules of less than unit slope per unit cost of distance are customarily derived. But do spatial competitors ever discriminate (or appear to discriminate) over economic space? And if they do, what is the form of their delivered price schedules? Would their schedules also be linear given the same demand conditions that generate linear schedules for a discriminating monopolist? Without answering questions such as those raised above anti-trust regulations dealing with unfair price practices and, in particular, the determination of what is legal or illegal, ethical or not, cannot be readily accepted by economists. The present paper is designed to provide a basis for answering such questions by uncovering selected properties of spatial price discrimination under conditions of varying intensities of competition over an economic space. More generally, the paper is designed to determine the effect on prices of rival locations and the intensity of their competition. Sharp contrasts between spaceless and spatial price theory will thus be drawn, with competitive differences over the seller's trading area being revealed to generate differential discriminatory prices over the landscape. [Авторский текст]
Spatial price policies revisited [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Martin J. Beckmann Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 619-630.
This paper reexamines the theory of spatial price policies under more general conditions to compare mill pricing, uniform delivered pricing, and discriminatory local pricing and to interpret their implications when market regions are given. The analysis assumes that demand functions are linear and identical in all locations, that marginal production cost is constant, and that transportation cost is proportional to distance. The results go beyond previous findings, but do not seriously contradict them. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 28-04-2005Howard Smith
This paper estimates an oligopoly model of consumer choice and supermarket profitability using a survey of consumer choices and a dataset of store characteristics. The survey data includes expenditure as well as choice of supermarket. Unobserved characteristics associated with the operating firm are incorporated through firm dummies in the utility function. Predicted Nash price–cost markups are close to observed markups. We examine the social e¢ciency of store numbers and store characteristics by making minor changes to the characteristics and solving for new profits and consumer surplus. We find no evidence of excess entry for large stores. There is some excess entry of smaller stores depending on location and operating firm. Increases in store size usually increase welfare. Ownership conversions can increase welfare signi…cantly. Location inefficiencies, in contrast, are small.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Lawrence D. Schall, Gary L. Sundem, William R. Geijsbeek Journal of Finance. 1978. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 281-7.
Recent findings presented in the finance and accounting literature have indicated that firms are using increasingly sophisticated capital budgeting techniques (Istvan , Klammer  and Fremgen . The present paper discusses the results of a more recent survey of large U.S. firms that was conducted by the authors. The survey (presented in the Appendix) inquired about the capital budgeting techniques employed, the computation of the discount rate and of cash flows, and the method of estimating and adjusting for project risk. Section II describes the sample employed and presents the results of the survey. Section III compares the results to those of previous surveys and briefly examines the association between the survey findings and a number of firm economic variables. Section IV is a summary. [Авторский текст]