Quarterly Journal of Economics
1936 1940 1948 1950 1954 1958 1959 1961 1965 1971 1973 1975 1976 1979 1983 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007John DiNardo, Jörn-Steffen Pischke Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997. Vol. 112. No. 1. P. 291-303.
Are the large measured wage differentials for on-the-job computer use a true return to computer skills, or do they just reflect that higher wage workers use computers on their jobs? We examine this issue with three large cross-sectional surveys from Germany. First, we confirm that the estimated wage differential associated with computer use in Germany is very similar to the U.S. differential. Second, we also measure large differentials for on-the-job use of calculators, telephones, pens or pencils, or for those who work while sitting down. We argue that these findings cast some doubt on the literal interpretation of the computer use wage differential as reflecting true returns to computer use or skill.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Daron K. Acemoglu, Jörn-Steffen Pischke Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 113. No. 1. P. 78-118.
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive. The superior information of the current employer regarding its employees' abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power, and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training, even if these skills are general. The model can lead to multiple equlibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high. Using microdata on German apprentices, we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data.