Journal of Finance
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Efficient Capital Markets II [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2007Eugene F. Fama Journal of Finance. 1991. Vol. 46. No. 5. P. 1575-1617.
SEQUELS ARE RARELY AS good as the originals, so I approach this review of the market efficiency literature with trepidation. The task is thornier than it was 20 years ago, when work on efficiency was rather new. The literature is now so large that a full review is impossible, and is not attempted here. Instead, I discuss the work that I find most interesting, and I offer my views on what we have learned from the research on market efficiency.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness Journal of Finance. 1991. Vol. 46. No. 3. P. 861-878.
We identify negotiated trades of large-percentage blocks of stock as corporate control transactions. When a block trades and the firm is not fully acquired, cumulative abnormal returns average 5.6%, and 33% of the chief executives are replaced within a year. Stock-price increases are larger when control passes to the new blockholder, when management does not resist the blockholder's effort to influence corporate policy, and when the block purchaser eventually fully acquires the firm. These findings suggest that the specific skills and expertise of blockholders, and not just the concentration of ownership, are important determinants of firm value.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004Antoine Conze, Sivakumar Viswanathan Journal of Finance. 1991. Vol. 46. No. 5. P. 1893-1907.
Lookback options are path dependent contingent claims whose payoffs depend on the extreme of a given security's price over a certain period of time. Using probabilistic tools, we derive explicit formulas for various European lookback options, and provide some results about their American counterparts
The Theory of Capital Structure [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Journal of Finance. 1991. Vol. 46. No. 1. P. 297-355.
This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.