Journal of Finance
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis Journal of Finance. 1995. Vol. 50. No. 4. P. 1029-1057.
Autors document that forced resignations of top managers are preceded by large and significant declines in operating performance and followed by large improvements in performance. However, forced resignations are rare and are due more often to external factors (e.g., blockholder pressure, takeover attempts, etc.) than to normal board monitoring. Following the management change, these firms significantly downsize their operations and are subject to a high rate of corporate control activity. Normal retirements are followed by small increases in operating income and are also subject to a slightly higher than normal incidence of postturnover corporate control activity.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004Robert A. Jarrow, Stuart M. Turnbull Journal of Finance. 1995. Vol. 50. No. 1. P. 53-85.
This article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk. Two types of credit risks are considered. The first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default. The second is where the writer of the derivative security may default. We apply the foreign currency analogy of Jarrow and Turnbull (1991) to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a "spot exchange rate." Arbitrage-free valuation techniques are then employed. This methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives, such as swaps and caps.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith Journal of Finance. 1995. Vol. 50. No. 2. P. 609-631.
We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.
The New Issues Puzzle [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 26-10-2004Tim Loughran, Jay R. Ritter Journal of Finance. 1995. Vol. 50. No. 1. P. 23-51.
Companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering, have been poor long-run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5 percent per year for companies going public and only 7 percent per year for companies conducting a seasoned equity offer. Book-to-market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith Journal of Finance. 1995. Vol. 50. No. 3. P. 899-917.
Most discussions of corporate capital structure effectively assume that all debt is the same. Yet debt differs by maturity, covenant restrictions, conversion rights, call provisions, and priority. Here, we examine priority structure across a sample of 4995 COMPUSTAT industrial firms from 1981 to 1991. We analyze the variation in the use of capital leases, secured debt, ordinary debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock both as a fraction of the firm's market value and as a fraction of total fixed claims. Our evidence provides consistent support for contracting cost hypotheses, mixed support for tax hypotheses, and little support for the signaling hypothesis.