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Финансовая экономика - это область теоретико-прикладных знаний о законах функционирования финансовых потоков и отношений между всеми субъектами экономической системы... (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 974

Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Michael L. Costigan, Linda M. Lovata
Economic Value Added is a new measure of performance that is purported to better align managers’ incentives to that of the shareholders. Accordingly, firms that experience higher agency conflicts should be more inclined to use this performance evaluation system. Additionally, the organizational strategy of the firm should influence the likelihood of employing EVA. Prospector firms are defined as firms that apply a differentiation strategy while defender firms focus on being cost-leaders. Firms identified as prospectors should be less likely to use EVA. One hundred and fifteen firms were identified as being adopters of EVA. Logistic regression was performed to contrast these firms to a control group of 1271 non-adopters. The results indicate that firms using EVA exhibit a higher percentage of institutional ownership and a lower percentage of insider ownership than non-adopters. Prospector firms as defined by a higher ratio of research and development to sales tend to use EVA less than defender firms. Accounting adjustments are a focal point of the EVA formulation and the results presented in this study suggest that providing appropriate incentives may be more complex than the developers of EVA imply.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Rob Bauer, Nadja Guenster, Roger Otten Journal of Asset Management. 2004.  Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 91-104. 
This paper analyses whether good corporate governance leads to higher common stock returns and enhances firm value in Europe. Throughout, this study uses Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings for companies included in the FTSE Eurotop 300. Following the approach of Gompers et al. (2003, ‘Corporate Governance and Equity Prices’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 107–55), portfolios are built consisting of well-governed and poorly governed companies and their performances are compared. The impact of corporate governance on firm valuation is also examined. The results show a positive relationship between these variables and corporate governance. This relationship weakens substantially after adjusting for country differences. Finally, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is analysed, as approximated by net profit margin and return on equity. Surprisingly, and contrary to Gompers et al. (2003), a negative relationship is found between governance standards and these earnings-based performance ratios for which possible implications are discussed.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Douglas T. Breeden, Michael R. Gibbons, Robert H. Litzenberger Journal of Finance. 1989.  Vol. 44. No. 2. P. 231-262. 
The empirical implications of the consumption-oriented capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) are examined, and its performance is compared with a model based on the market portfolio. The CCAPM is estimated after adjusting for measurement problems associated with reported consumption data. The CCAPM is tested using betas based on both consumption and the portfolio having the maximum correlation with consumption. As predicted by the CCAPM, the market price of risk is significantly positive, and the estimate of the real interest rate is close to zero. The performances of the traditional CAPM and the CCAPM are about the same.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Laura G. Thatcher Journal of Deferred Compensation. 2005.  Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 50-71. 
Describes the most common forms of equity-based compensation vehicles. Stock options; Restricted stock; Restricted stock units or deferred stock units; Performance awards.
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Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas Journal of Political Economy. 2000.  Vol. 108. No. 2.
This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance, with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, bank debt, and bond financing coexist in equilibrium. The relationship banking aspect of financial intermediation is emphasized: firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks are good at helping them through times of financial distress. This financial flexibility is costly since banks face costs of capital themselves (which they attempt to minimize through securitization). To avoid this intermediation cost, firms may turn to bond or equity financing, but bonds imply an inefficient liquidation cost and equity an informational dilution cost. We show that in equilibrium the riskier firms prefer bank loans, the safer ones tap the bond markets, and the ones in between prefer to issue both equity and bonds. This segmentation is broadly consistent with stylized facts.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Karl V. Lins Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2003.  Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 159-184. 
This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's controlling exceed its cash flaw rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management control limits blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms.
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2004
Burton G. Malkiel American Economic Review. 1963.  Vol. 53. No. 5. P. 1004-1031. 
The first half of 1962 witnessed one of the most precipitous decliues in stock market prices in recent history. In terms of the volume of trading and the magnitude of the daily erosion of stock values, one must look back to the crashed of 1929 and 1937 to find parallels. Moreover, the decline was not confined to U. S. stock prices, for a world-wide revaluation of equity values was transmitted from New York. For most professional financial observers of these developments, two aspects of the decline served as the foci of their analysis. There was first the sharp drop in the level of share prices. Second, and perhaps more interesting, there was a marked change in the structure of share prices, i.e. the relationships among equities of different characteristics.
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Опубликовано на портале: 27-12-2006
Justin Pettit Industrial Management. 2000. 
This article outlines ways to improve production strategy and uncover new opportunities for growth. It explains economic value added, an integrated perfomance measurement, management, and reward system.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Tom Engsted, Enno Mammen, Carsten Tanggaard EFMA 2001 Lugano Meetings. 2001. 
We investigate the C-CAPM and the equity premium puzzle using asset returns and consumption data from the US and Denmark In contrast to previous studies the investigation is carried out with both short and long investment horizons In addition, we introduce a Markovian bootstrap approach to calculate the finite-sample distributions of thevarious test statistics used mong otherthings,our approach allows testing the hypothesis of no pricing errors based on the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) specification error measure, which is not possible based on asymptotic approximations The analysis shows that there are large differences between US and Danish asset markets, and also to some extent differences depending on the length of the investment horizon In addition, with a long investment horizon, the asymptotic and bootstrap estimated distributions often differ markedly We also find that although the Hansen-Jagannathan specification error measure points to large pricing errors, when we account properly (using the bootstrap approach) for sampling error, there is no evidence against the C-CAPM with CRR utility in neither the US nor Danish data However, the bootstrap based tests of a zero-mean risk-adjusted equity premium clearly reject the model on US data
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Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Charles L. Baum, Lee Sarver, Thomas H. Strickland American Business Review. 2004.  Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 82-87. 
The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between a company's performance, measured by Economic Value Added (EVA) and/or Market Value Added (MVA), and the compensation of its chief executive officer. The study also considers whether any relationship between compensation and performance might vary by industry. The results show MVA to be more closely related to executive compensation than is EVA, having a positive and significant association with each component of compensation.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Gerald T. Garvey, Todd T. Milbourn Journal of Accounting Research. 2000.  Vol. 38. P. 209-245. 
Dissatisfaction with traditional accounting-based performance measures has spawned a number of alternatives, of which Economic Value Added (EVA) is currently the most prominent. How can we tell which performance measures best capture managerial contributions to value? There is currently a heated debate among practitioners about whether the new performance measures have a higher correlation with stock values and their returns than do traditional accounting earnings. Academic researchers have relied instead on the variance of performance measures to gauge their relative accuracy. To formally address the above debate, we use a relatively standard principal-agent model in which contracts can be based on any two accounting-based performance measures plus the stock price. Rather than model detailed differences between EVA and traditional measures such as earnings, we focus on the problem that while the variability of each measure is observable, its exact information (signal) content is not. The model provides a formal method for researchers to ascertain the relative value of alternative accounting-based measures based on two distinct uses of the stock price. First, as is well known, prices provide a noisy measure of managerial value-added. In our model, stock prices also can reveal the signal content of alternative accounting-based performance measures. We then show how to combine stock prices, earnings, and EVA to produce an optimally weighted compensation scheme. We find that the simple correlation between EVA or earnings and stock returns is a reasonably reliable guide to its value as an incentive contracting tool. That is, a firm could reasonably gauge the merits of adding a measure like EVA by examining its correlation with the firm's stock price. This is not because stock returns are themselves an ideal performance measure, rather it is because correlation places appropriate weights on both the signal and noise components of alternative measures. We then calibrate the theoretical improvement in incentive contracts from optimally using EVA in addition to accounting earnings. Specifically, we empirically estimate the "value-added" of EVA by firm and industry. These estimates are positive and significant in predicting which firms have actually adopted EVA as an internal performance measure.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
Sunil Poshakwale Finance India. 1996.  Vol. X. No. 3. P. 605-616. 
Stock market efficiency is an important concept, for understanding the working of the capital markets particularly in emerging stock market such as India. The efficiency of the emerging markets assumes greater importance as the trend of investments is accelerating in these markets as a result of regulatory reforms and removal of other barriers for the international equity investments. There is enough evidence on market efficiency and day of the week effect in the developed markets, however, the same is not true for the emerging stock markets. This study provides empirical evidence on weak form efficiency and the day of the week effect in Bombay Stock Exchange over a period of 1987-1994. The results provide evidence of day of the week effect and that the stock market is not weak form efficient. The day of the week effect observed on the BSE pose interesting buy and hold strategy issues.
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Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006
Robert S. Harris, Felicia C. Marston, Dev R. Mishra, Thomas J. O'Brien Financial Management. 2003.  Vol. 32. No. 3.
We estimate ex ante expected returns for a sample of S&P 500 firms over the period 1983-98. The exante estimates show a better overall fit with the domestic version of the single-factor CAPM than with the global version, but the difference is small. This finding has no trend in time and is consistent across groups formed on the basis of relative foreign sales. The findings suggest that, for estimating the cost of equity, the choice between the domestic and global CAPMs may not be a material issue for many large U.S. firms.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Claudio Loderer, Kenneth Martin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997.  Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 223-255. 
We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
Paul Draper, Krishna Paudyal The Journal of Financial Research. 2002.  Vol. 15. No. 4. P. 507-520. 
The Monday effect is reexamined using two stock indexes and a sample of 452 individual stocks that trade on the London Stock Exchange. The results based on conventional test methods reveal a negative average return on Monday. Extending the analysis to examine the effects of various possible influences simultaneously, the average Monday return becomes positive and does not differ significantly from the average returns of most other days of the week. Fortnight, ex-dividend day, account period, (bad) news flow, trading activity, and bid-ask spread effects are all controlled for. The results broadly support the trading time hypothesis.
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