Всего статей в данном разделе : 977
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Laurence Booth, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Vojislav Maksimovic Journal of Finance. 2001. Vol. 56. No. 1. P. 87-131.
This study uses a new data set to assess whether capital structure theory is portable across countries with different institutional structures. We analyze capital structure choices of firms in 10 developing countries, and provide evidence that these decisions are affected by the same variables as in developed countries. However, there are persistent differences across countries, indicating that specific country factors are at work. Our findings suggest that although some of the insights from modern finance theory are portable across countries, much remains to be done to understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure choices.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek Review of Financial Studies. 1999. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 311-345.
We study the precursors and outcomes of refocusing episodes by 107 diversified firms that were not taken over between 1984 and 1993. These firms had more value-reducing diversification policies than diversified firms that did not refocus. However, major disciplinary or incentive-altering events (including management turnover, outside shareholder pressure, changes in management compensation, and financial distress) usually occurred before refocusing took place. The cumulative abnormal returns over a firm's refocusing-related announcements averaged 7.3% and were significantly related to the amount of value reduction associated with the refocuser's diversification policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006William Stammerjohan Corporate Ownership & Control. 2004. Vol. 2. No. 1. P. 86-103.
This study develops and uses a two-stage model to examine the correlation between the compensation of 137 CEO's and the subsequent performance of the 56 companies they manage. This study tests both relationships suggested by the analytical compensation literature and several common assumptions made in the empirical compensation literature. The results suggest that the form of CEO compensation and the relative importance of personal stock ownership both have an effect on subsequent firm performance. Greater reliance on stock options, as a form of CEO compensation, is positively correlated with superior subsequent firm performance, while greater reliance on annual bonuses appears to have the opposite effect. The results also suggest that greater personal stock ownership may not provide the commonly assumed alignment of interest between CEO and stockholder.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Sigurt Vitols Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 386 - 396.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Michelle Jewett Tax Notes. 2004. Vol. 103. No. 12. P. 1501.
Michelle Jewett of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP explores the potential tax-planning changes that will result because of the more advantageous treatment of dividend income versus compensation income following enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
Churning Bubbles [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005Franklin Allen, Gary Gorton Review of Economic Studies. 1993. Vol. 60. No. 4. P. 813-836.
Are stock prices determined by fundamentals or can "bubbles" exist? An important issue in this debate concerns the circumstances in which deviations from fundamentals are consistent with rational behaviour. When there is asymmetric information between investors and portfolio managers, portfolio managers have an incentive to churn; their trades are not motivated by changes in information, liquidity needs or risk sharing but rather by a desire to profit at the expense of the investors that hire them. As a result, assets can trade at prices which do not reflect their fundamentals and bubbles can exist.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Jack Glen, Ajit Singh Emerging Markets Review. 2004. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 161-192.
Balance sheets and income statements from nearly 8000 manufacturing companies in 44 countries are compared for 1994–2000 along several dimensions. Differences across sectors and countries are reported and interpreted. The findings are: first, we find that the size distribution of firms for much of the size range is broadly similar in the two groups of countries, except for the largest and the smallest sizes of firms for which there are observed differences in the expected direction. Second, emerging market firms currently have lower levels of leverage than do their developed market counterparts and leverage has declined in recent years. Third, emerging market firms employ a higher level of fixed assets than do their developed market counterparts. Fourth, returns on assets and equity generally are lower in emerging market countries, but they have increased in recent years. And fifth, country effects account for more of the variation in all variables than do either sector or size effects but individual firm effects account for most of the variation.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Michael Atkin, Jack Glen International Executive. 1992. Vol. 34. No. 5. P. 369-387.
The article presents an analysis of the corporate financial structures in developing countries based on a database compiled by the International Finance Corp.'s Economics Department. Corporate investment is a vitally important part of total investment. There are links between corporate behavior and macroeconomic stability, on the one hand, and the health of financial institutions and the macroeconomy on the other. There are also obvious links between issues of corporate finance and broader issues regarding the kind of financial systems that support long-term economic growth. Specific to the firm itself are considerations such as profitability, earnings volatility, and the nature of its capital assets and markets. Corporations in developed countries have a wide range of choices for financing investment. After internal funding, new debt provided the next highest source of financing. Within this category, bank loans provided far more financing than did corporate bonds. Japan was the largest user of bank funding, financing 50% of its capital needs from this source. Despite the recent concerns over high degrees of gearing, use of internal funds has actually increased in the last two decades compared to the overall postwar era. U.S. corporate experience highlights the dynamic nature of financing decisions, especially the revision that occurred during the 1980s.
Conflicts of Interest or Aligned Incentives? Blockholder Ownership, Dividends and Firm Value in the US and the EU [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006Steen Thomsen European Business Organization Law Review. 2005. Vol. 6. No. 2.
This paper examines the relationship between blockholder ownership, dividend policy and firm value in the largest EU and US companies during 1988-1998. Large owners may benefit other shareholders by effectively controlling company managers, but may also differ from minority investors by a preference for retained earnings, from which they derive private benefits of control. This paper analyses these effects in a non-technical way using simple correlation analysis. The level of blockholder ownership in continental Europe is found to be much higher than in the US/UK, whereas firm value is somewhat lower. A negative association is found between blockholder ownership and firm value in continental Europe, which indicates that the level of blockholder ownership is excessive from a minority shareholder viewpoint. Moreover, although blockholder ownership levels in Europe are not generally associated with lower dividends, increases in blockholder ownership are found to be associated with decreasing dividends, and the stock market appears to respond more favourably to increasing dividends in companies with a high level of blockholder ownership. In the US/UK, higher blockholder ownership is generally associated with lower dividends, which are again negatively correlated with firm value. In both the EU and the US, the results therefore point to conflicts of interest between large blockholders and minority investors, but more strongly so in Europe.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005Xavier Freixas, Bruno Parigi Journal of Financial Intermediation. 1998. Vol. 7. No. 1. P. 3-31.
The increased fragility of the banking industry has generated growing concern about the risks associated with payment systems. Although in most industrial countries different interbank payment systems coexist, little is really known about their properties in terms of risk and efficiency. How should payment systems be designed? We tackle this question by comparing the two main types of payment systems, gross and net, in a framework where uncertainty arises from several sources: the time of consumption, the location of consumption, and the return on investment. Payments across locations can be made either by directly transferring liquidity or by transferring claims against the bank in the other location. The two mechanisms are interpreted as the gross and net settlement systems in interbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the two systems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety and efficiency
Control Systems in Multibusiness Companies: From Performance Management to Strategic Management [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Fredrik Nilsson, Nils-Goran Olve European Management Journal. 2001. Vol. 19. No. 4. P. 344-358.
This article discusses the role of control systems in multibusiness companies. The focus is on formulation and implementation of corporate and business unit strategies. Three widely used categories of control models are discussed: (1) models for performance management, (2) models for value-based management, and (3) models for strategic management. The discussion is based upon central normative texts and examples from applications in Nordic companies. The description and discussion of the control models and their features should facilitate decision-making on the design and use of control systems in multibusiness companies.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Jack Glen, Yannis Karmokolias, Robert Miller, Sanjay Shah Emerging Markets Quarterly. 1997. Vol. 1. No. 4. P. 5-20.
Examines dividend behavior in emerging markets. Differences in dividend behavior in developed and developing countries; Role of shareholders and governments in the dividend decision-making process; Direct shareholder influence on dividend decisions; Examination of the evolution of dividend payments.
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004Stewart C. Myers, Nicholas S. Majluf Journal of Financial Economics. 1984. Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 187-221.
This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know more about the firm's value than potential investors. Investors interpret the firm's actions rationally. An equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision is developed under these assumptions. The model shows that firms may refuse to issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable investment opportunities. The model suggests explanations for several aspects of corporate financing behavior, including the tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and to prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Extensions and applications of the model are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Vidhi Chhaochharia, Yaniv Grinstein Johnson School Research Paper Series. 2005. No. 23-06 .
The 2001-2002 corporate scandals led to rules that affect the governance structure of public U.S. firms. We study the announcement effect of the rules on firm value. On average, the rules have a positive effect on firm value. Firms that need to make more changes to comply with the rules outperform firms that need to make fewer changes. We also find some evidence that the result is concentrated in large firms. Small firms that need to make more changes underperform small firms that need to make fewer changes, suggesting that the costs of the rules outweigh their benefits in small firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul H. Malatesta, Ralph A. Walkling Journal of Financial Economics. 1996. Vol. 42. No. 3. P. 365-395.
Shareholder-initiated proxy proposals on corporate governance issues became popular in the late 1980s as corporate takeover activity declined. We find firms attracting governance proposals have poor prior performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, operating return, and sales growth. There is little evidence that operating returns improve after proposals. The proposals also have negligible effects on company share values and top management turnover. Even proposals that receive a majority of shareholder votes typically do not engender share price increases or discernible changes in firm policies.