Всего статей в данном разделе : 974
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Ricardo P. C. Leal, Andre L. Carvalhal-da-Silva SSRN Working Papers. 2005.
We construct a corporate governance practices index (CGI) from a set of 24 questions that can be objectively answered from publicly available information. Our goal was to measure the overall quality of corporate governance practices of the largest possible number of firms without the biases and low response ratios typical of qualitative surveys. CGI levels have improved over time in Brazil. CGI components demonstrate that Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than in other aspects of corporate governance. We find very high concentration levels of voting rights leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-voting shares. Control has concentrated between 1998 and 2002. We do not find evidence for either entrenchment or incentives in Brazil using ownership percentages but find that the separation of control from cash flow rights destroys value. The CGI maintains a positive, significant, and robust relationship with corporate value. A worst-to-best improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a .38 increase in Tobin's q. This represents a 95% rise in the stock value of a company with the average leverage and Tobin's q ratios. Considering our lowest CGI coefficient, a one point increase in the CGI score would lead to a 6.8% rise in the stock price of the average firm in 2002. We found no significant relationship between governance and the dividend payout but there are indications that dividend payments are greater when control and cash flow rights concentration are greater. We place our results in context by offering a comparative analysis with Chile. We would offer a sound "yes" if asked whether good corporate governance practices increase corporate value in Brazil.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker Journal of Financial Economics. 1999. No. 51. P. 371-406.
We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically signifficant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007C.B. Ingley, Nicholas T. van der Walt Corporate Governance. 2004. Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 534-551.
The paper outlines the problems of conflicts of interest for fiduciary shareholders with respect to the stock of publicly owned companies in their portfolios and considers various approaches proposed to address these problems. The questions of whether fiduciary problems are the result of a vacuum of ownership and an imbalance of power, and the extent to which regulatory reform and shareholder activism can resolve these problems, are examined. From this analysis a framework is developed that describes the sources, outcomes and factors contributing to the effectiveness of conflict management in the context of the current investment environment. A series of recommendations for mediating conflicts of interest by changing board architectures are presented. These recommendations apply principles of participative corporate democracy to the overall governance system.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 61-82.
Theories of corporate payout policy do not explain the observed form of distributions to shareholders. Although open-market repurchases appear to have tax advantages, cash dividends are overwhelmingly chosen. We argue that there are costs associated with open-market-repurchase programs, since they provide managers with opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at stockholders' expense. We offer evidence suggesting that bid-ask spreads widen around repurchase announcements, as predicted by our analysis. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, our analysis implies that repurchases do not dominate cash dividends for making distributions to shareholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Franck Bancel, Usha R. Mittoo Financial Management. 2004. Vol. 33. No. 4. P. 103-132.
We survey managers in 16 European countries on the determinants of capital structure. Financial flexibility and earnings per share dilution are primary concerns of managers in issuing debt and common stock, respectively. Managers also value hedging considerations and use "windows of opportunity" when raising capital. We find that although a country's legal environment is an important determinant of debt policy, it plays a minimal role in common stock policy. We find that firms' financing policies are influenced by both their institutional environment and their international operations. Firms determine their optimal capital structures by trading off costs and benefits of financing.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Franck Bancel, Usha R. Mittoo, Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2005.
We survey managers from 16 European countries to examine cross-country determinants of payout policy. We find that European managers' views on dividend policy are driven largely by factors similar to that of their U.S. peers. They strongly agree with Lintner's findings that dividends are smoothed out and are difficult to cut, although they follow different dividend targets than a fixed payout ratio. A majority of European managers, however, consider repurchases as a tool of flexibility rather than a substitute for dividends. Our cross-country analysis does not support La Porta, Lopez, Shielfer and Vishny's (2000) contention that dividend policy is influenced primarily by the quality of legal system. Instead, we find that dividend policy is determined by a complex interaction of the firm's ownership structure of the firm and the legal and institutional structure of its home country. Repurchase policy, on the other hand, is influenced primarily by tax and institutional ownership variables.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Jeffrey MacIntosh Journal of Business Venturing. 2005. Vol. Volume 21. Issue 5. P. Pages 569-609.
In this paper, we examine a Canadian tax-driven venture capital vehicle known as the “Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation” (LSVCC). As a theoretical matter, we suggest that the LSVCCs can be expected to have higher agency costs and lower profitability than private venture capital funds. We present data that is consistent with this view. The central question that we analyze, however, is whether the tax advantages conferred on LSVCCs have resulted in LSVCCs “crowding out,” or displacing other types of venture capital funds. Empirical analysis of our data (which covers the 1977–2001 period) is highly consistent with crowding out. The data suggest that crowding out has been sufficiently energetic as to lead to a reduction in the aggregate pool of venture capital in Canada, frustrating one of the key governmental goals underlying the LSVCC programs; namely, the expansion of the aggregate pool of capital. In the course of our analysis, we confirm the importance of macroeconomic factors (the performance of the stock market, real interest rates, and changes in real gross domestic product) in affecting the supply of and demand for venture capital. We also generate evidence that is consistent with the proposition that entrepreneurs in the market for venture capital prefer to incorporate their businesses federally, rather than provincially.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2012Андрей Евгеньевич Шаститко Экономическая политика. 2010. № 1. С. 98-105.
В статье представлены экономические основания сопоставимости товарных рынков в контексте оценки состояния конкуренции, подходы к интерпретации и оценке действующих в российском антимонопольном законодательстве норм о сопоставимости товарных рынков, пути развития практики применения конструкции «сопоставимые рынки» для целей антимонопольного регулирования.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Michael R. Gibbons, Patrick Hess Journal of Business. 1981. Vol. 54. No. 4. P. 579-596.
Day of the Week Effect and Market Efficiency - Evidence from Indian Equity Market Using High Frequency Data of National Stock Exchange [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Manoj Dalvi, Golaka C. Nath
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Ercan Balaban Applied Economics Letters. 1995. Vol. 2. No. 5. P. 139-153.
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate day of the week effects in an emerging stock market of a developing country namely Turkey. Empirical results verify that although day of the week effects are present in Istanbul Securities Exchange Composite Index (ISECI) return data for the period January 1988-August 1994, these effects change in direction and magnitude through time.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Michael L. Lemmon, Jaime F. Zender Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2002.
The impact of debt capacity on recent tests of competing theories of capital structure is examined. Controlling for debt capacity, the pecking order appears to be a good description of the financing policies of a large sample of firms. The main results are first, that internally generated funds appear to be the preferred source of financing. Second, if external funds are required, in the absence of debt capacity concerns, debt appears to be preferred to equity and, when possible, debt capacity is "stockpiled." Demonstration of this preference also provides evidence directly contradictory to the tradeoff theory. Finally, we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric information and its attendant costs are the basis for the observed pecking order of financing choice.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006J. R. Franks, J. J. Pringle Journal of Finance. 1982. Vol. 37. No. 3. P. 751-763.
In this paper we consider the role of financial intermediaries in the valuation of firms and projects. We show that security prices should reflect both used and unused debt capacity if some corporations can act as financial intermediaries and can capture the tax benefits of debt capacity unused by the operating firm. We also provide some reasons why the value of the firm might be increased if the financing and operating risks of the firm are separated and financial intermediaries issue debt rather than the unit operating the asset.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-12-2010H Ersel Экономический журнал ВШЭ. 2006. Т. 10. № 2. С. 229-242.
Decision making problem of a bank consisting large number of branches andthe head office that supplies «collectively used inputs» is considered.
Demystifying the Illusion of the Positive Effects of Ownership Concentration on Corporate Performance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005. Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68.
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders (CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles, and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels, except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders expropriate minority absentee owners.