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Финансовая экономика - это область теоретико-прикладных знаний о законах функционирования финансовых потоков и отношений между всеми субъектами экономической системы... (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 20

Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Balasingham Balachandran, Robert W. Faff, Sally Tanner Australian Economic Papers. 2005.  Vol. 44. No. 3. P. 248-268. 
We examine the price and volatility reaction around stock dividend ex-dates for an Australian sample, over the period January 1992 to December 2000. We find that price reaction around stock dividend ex-dates provides positive abnormal returns both prior, and subsequent, to the abolishment of par value of shares in July 1998. When we partitioned the sample into financial, industrial non-financial and mining firms, the price reaction is found to be positive and significant only for industrial non-financial companies. Volatility of daily returns for periods subsequent to ex-dates is significantly greater than corresponding periods prior to announcement dates, while cumulative raw returns subsequent to ex-dates are significantly lower than periods prior to announcement dates for industrial non-financial companies. The magnitude of the price reaction is statistically significantly related to an increase in the volatility of daily returns and to a reduction in cumulative raw returns subsequent to the ex-dates, for industrial non-financial companies. These findings support buying pressure hypothesis suggested by Dhatt et al. (1994, 1996)
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
William Stammerjohan Corporate Ownership & Control. 2004.  Vol. 2. No. 1. P. 86-103. 
This study develops and uses a two-stage model to examine the correlation between the compensation of 137 CEO's and the subsequent performance of the 56 companies they manage. This study tests both relationships suggested by the analytical compensation literature and several common assumptions made in the empirical compensation literature. The results suggest that the form of CEO compensation and the relative importance of personal stock ownership both have an effect on subsequent firm performance. Greater reliance on stock options, as a form of CEO compensation, is positively correlated with superior subsequent firm performance, while greater reliance on annual bonuses appears to have the opposite effect. The results also suggest that greater personal stock ownership may not provide the commonly assumed alignment of interest between CEO and stockholder.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Michelle Jewett Tax Notes. 2004.  Vol. 103. No. 12. P. 1501. 
Michelle Jewett of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP explores the potential tax-planning changes that will result because of the more advantageous treatment of dividend income versus compensation income following enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
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Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006
Steen Thomsen European Business Organization Law Review. 2005.  Vol. 6. No. 2.
This paper examines the relationship between blockholder ownership, dividend policy and firm value in the largest EU and US companies during 1988-1998. Large owners may benefit other shareholders by effectively controlling company managers, but may also differ from minority investors by a preference for retained earnings, from which they derive private benefits of control. This paper analyses these effects in a non-technical way using simple correlation analysis. The level of blockholder ownership in continental Europe is found to be much higher than in the US/UK, whereas firm value is somewhat lower. A negative association is found between blockholder ownership and firm value in continental Europe, which indicates that the level of blockholder ownership is excessive from a minority shareholder viewpoint. Moreover, although blockholder ownership levels in Europe are not generally associated with lower dividends, increases in blockholder ownership are found to be associated with decreasing dividends, and the stock market appears to respond more favourably to increasing dividends in companies with a high level of blockholder ownership. In the US/UK, higher blockholder ownership is generally associated with lower dividends, which are again negatively correlated with firm value. In both the EU and the US, the results therefore point to conflicts of interest between large blockholders and minority investors, but more strongly so in Europe.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Jack Glen, Yannis Karmokolias, Robert Miller, Sanjay Shah Emerging Markets Quarterly. 1997.  Vol. 1. No. 4. P. 5-20. 
Examines dividend behavior in emerging markets. Differences in dividend behavior in developed and developing countries; Role of shareholders and governments in the dividend decision-making process; Direct shareholder influence on dividend decisions; Examination of the evolution of dividend payments.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007
John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker Journal of Financial Economics. 1999.  No. 51. P. 371-406. 
We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically signifficant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Franck Bancel, Usha R. Mittoo, Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2005. 
We survey managers from 16 European countries to examine cross-country determinants of payout policy. We find that European managers' views on dividend policy are driven largely by factors similar to that of their U.S. peers. They strongly agree with Lintner's findings that dividends are smoothed out and are difficult to cut, although they follow different dividend targets than a fixed payout ratio. A majority of European managers, however, consider repurchases as a tool of flexibility rather than a substitute for dividends. Our cross-country analysis does not support La Porta, Lopez, Shielfer and Vishny's (2000) contention that dividend policy is influenced primarily by the quality of legal system. Instead, we find that dividend policy is determined by a complex interaction of the firm's ownership structure of the firm and the legal and institutional structure of its home country. Repurchase policy, on the other hand, is influenced primarily by tax and institutional ownership variables.
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Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006
Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. French AFA 2001 New Orleans; CRSP Working Paper No. 509. 2000. 
The percent of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5 in 1978 to 20.8 in 1999. The decline is due in part to the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms. Fed by new lists, the population of publicly traded firms tilts increasingly toward small firms with low profitability and strong growth opportunities characteristics typical of firms that have never paid dividends. More interesting, we also show that controlling for characteristics, firms become less likely to pay dividends. This lower propensity to pay is at least as important as changing characteristics in the declining incidence of dividend payers.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Varouj Aivazian, Laurence Booth, Sean Cleary Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 2003.  Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 101-122. 
The hypothesis that dividend policy serves as a signaling mechanism and also serves to control managerial opportunism is usually supported by empirical studies showing that firms in developed countries (e.g. the USA) smooth their dividends as noted by Lintner (Am. Econ. Rev. 46 (1956) 97). However, the theoretical justification for these results largely stems from models based on arms length contracting in capital markets. In contrast, most emerging markets have a bank centered financial system, where contracting is not normally at arms length. Consequently, this paper compares the dividend policy of companies from eight emerging markets to the policies adopted by 100 US firms over the same period. Firms in these emerging markets have more unstable dividend payments than their US counterparts. Regression results indicate that dividends are much less sensitive to past dividends. These results support the substitute view of dividend policy on the premise that the institutional structures of these developing countries make dividends a less viable mechanism for signaling and for reducing agency costs than for their US counterparts operating in more highly developed arms length capital markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Susan Belden, Todd William Fister, Robert W. Knapp Business and Society Review. 2005.  Vol. 110. P. 171-180. 

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Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006
Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins, Marc Goergen ECGI - Law Working Paper. 2006.  No. 24/2004 .
Influential contributors to debates concerning corporate governance assert that it is impossible to understand key trends without taking politics into account. This proposition has, however, remained largely untested. This paper therefore offers an empirical study of the relation between politics and corporate governance, with the focus being on the determinants of dividend policy in publicly quoted United Kingdom (U.K.) companies between 1950 and the present. The departure point is the well-known partial adjustment model of dividend policy, which we augment to take into account the ideological orientation of the party in power and other potentially salient proxies for politics (e.g. tax policy and dividend controls). The model is tested by reference to aggregate annual data on earnings and dividends. The results indicate that the political placement of the party in office lacks explanatory power. Moreover, even when politics manifests itself in regulation explicitly designed to regulate corporate behaviour, political variables generally do not correlate in the predicted direction with dividend pay-outs. The evidence therefore is inconsistent with the proposition that politics shape corporate governance.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski, Yvette Harman, James B. Kehr Financial Review. 2005.  Vol. 40. No. 1.
We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around the announcements of sizeable dividend increases. Our results are robust to multivariate controls for firm size, leverage, ownership, growth options, and change in dividend yield. However, we find no evidence that dividend increases reduce agency costs as measured by poison pills or outside blockholdings
Dividends Reconsidered [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Alan Feld Tax Notes. 2003.  Vol. 101. No. 10.
When JGTRRA 2003 reduced the income tax rate on dividends received by individuals to that of net capital gains, Feld explains, it also changed the relative attractiveness of alternative forms of corporate payout. Interest payments on shareholder debt and compensation to shareholder-employees, which generally provide superior returns to individuals, now yield less after-tax benefit in some circumstances than dividend payments. Feld says the change also calls into question the continuing function of a number of code provisions intended to prevent a bailout of corporate earnings at net capital gain rates and whose rules now affect primarily corporate rather than individual shareholders.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Laura G. Thatcher Journal of Deferred Compensation. 2005.  Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 50-71. 
Describes the most common forms of equity-based compensation vehicles. Stock options; Restricted stock; Restricted stock units or deferred stock units; Performance awards.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela Brandes Journal of Business Research. 2005.  Vol. 58. No. 8. P. 1078-1088. 
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.
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