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Финансовая экономика - это область теоретико-прикладных знаний о законах функционирования финансовых потоков и отношений между всеми субъектами экономической системы... (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 80

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2006.  Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 1-31. 
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin Journal of Finance. 1997.  Vol. 52. No. 1. P. 135-160. 
We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Congsheng Wu Journal of Business & Economic Studies. 2005.  Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 19-33. 
This study examines the relation between the offer price adjustment, initial return, and subsequent short-run performance for a sample of initial public offerings (IPO's) made by US industrial companies from 1986 to 1996. The IPO's are divided into three categories (cold, cool, and hot issues) based on the offer price relative to the suggested price range revealed in the preliminary prospectus. It is found that the offer price adjustment not only predicts the first-day return, but also predicts subsequent short-run performance in the same direction up to three months after issuance. Moreover, different types of IPO's demonstrate distinct cross-sectional behavior in multivariate regressions of initial returns. Our results suggest that cold IPO's are quite unique and deserve more attention in future studies.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Hyun-Han Shin, Rene M. Stulz Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998.  Vol. 113. No. 2. P. 531-552. 
Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm's other segments.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Kee H. Chung, Mingsheng Li, Linda Yu Financial Management. 2005.  Vol. 34. No. 3. P. 65-88. 
We consider a simple model positing that initial public offering price is equal to the present value of an entity's assets in place and growth opportunities. The model predicts that initial return is positively related to both the size and risk of growth opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, we find initial return to be positively related to both the fraction of the offer price that is accounted for by the present value of growth opportunities and various proxies of issue uncertainty. We also find that IPO investors equate one dollar of growth opportunities to approximately three quarters of tangible assets.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen, Hans Kurt Kvist Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006.  Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 246-269. 
In this study, Granger tests are used to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and the values of the largest companies in the European Union and the US. Previous studies on US data have found that blockholder ownership has no systematic effect on performance. We propose that these results may not apply to Continental Europe, where ownership concentration is typically higher, the level of investor protection is lower, and influential blockholders may have objectives other than shareholder value. In accordance with previous research, we find no significant association between blockholder ownership and prior or subsequent firm value in either the US or the UK. Nonetheless, in Continental Europe we find a negative association between blockholder ownership and firm value or accounting returns in the next period. Further analysis reveals that this association is significant only for companies with high initial levels of blockholder ownership (>10%). We interpret this finding as evidence of conflicts of interest between blockholders and minority investors. The percentage of blockholder ownership in Continental Europe may be too high from a minority shareholder value viewpoint.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Helen Short, Kevin Keasey, Darren Duxbury International Journal of the Economics of Business. 2002.  Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 375-399. 
This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek Review of Financial Studies. 1999.  Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 311-345. 
We study the precursors and outcomes of refocusing episodes by 107 diversified firms that were not taken over between 1984 and 1993. These firms had more value-reducing diversification policies than diversified firms that did not refocus. However, major disciplinary or incentive-altering events (including management turnover, outside shareholder pressure, changes in management compensation, and financial distress) usually occurred before refocusing took place. The cumulative abnormal returns over a firm's refocusing-related announcements averaged 7.3% and were significantly related to the amount of value reduction associated with the refocuser's diversification policy.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68. 
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders (CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles, and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels, except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders expropriate minority absentee owners.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Francis Declerck Agribusiness. 1995.  Vol. 11. No. 6. P. 523-536. 
Focuses on the created value of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the US Food Industries in the 1980s. Value of LBOs in the food industries in 1989; Analysis of objective of private firms in LBO; Analysis of debt and divestitures.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Susan Belden, Todd William Fister, Robert W. Knapp Business and Society Review. 2005.  Vol. 110. P. 171-180. 

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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Shenghui Tong, Ning Yixi Journal of Investing. 2004.  Vol. 13. No. 4. P. 53-66. 
The article studies the affect of capital structure on institutional investor choices. Institutional investors play a critical role in supervising the management of the companies. Most of the S&P 500 firms tend to have large institutional holdings. The finding of the study suggests that the capital structure influences stock picking choices of institutional investors. There is a negative relation between dividend yield and institutional ownership. There is limited evidence that institutional investors prefer firms with low debt ratios, high ratios of capital expenditures to assets, and high ratios of cash flow to sales.
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Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Christopher Polk, Owen Lamont Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 63. No. 1. P. 51-77. 
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary in order to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of characteristics, or "diversity." Following the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis, we examine investment diversity. We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to changes in firm value. Thus diversification destroys value. This finding is not caused by measurement error. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to changes in firm value
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Owen Lamont, Christopher Polk Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 63. No. 1.
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of industry investment, or "diversity". We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to firm value. Thus diversification destroys value, consistent with the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis. Measurement error does not cause this finding. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to firm value
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Karl V. Lins Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2003.  Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 159-184. 
This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's controlling exceed its cash flaw rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management control limits blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms.
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