Journal of Financial Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Christopher Polk, Owen Lamont Journal of Financial Economics. 2002. Vol. 63. No. 1. P. 51-77.
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary in order to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of characteristics, or "diversity." Following the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis, we examine investment diversity. We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to changes in firm value. Thus diversification destroys value. This finding is not caused by measurement error. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to changes in firm value
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Owen Lamont, Christopher Polk Journal of Financial Economics. 2002. Vol. 63. No. 1.
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of industry investment, or "diversity". We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to firm value. Thus diversification destroys value, consistent with the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis. Measurement error does not cause this finding. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to firm value
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Claudio Loderer, Kenneth Martin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 223-255.
We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Rene M. Stulz Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 20. P. 25-54.
This paper analyzes how managerial control of voting rights affects firm value and financing policies. It shows that an increase in the fraction of voting rights controlled by management decreases the probability of a successful tender offer and increases the premium offered if a tender offer is made. Depending on whether managerial control of voting rights is small or large, shareholders' wealth increases or falls when management strengthens its control of voting rights. Management can change the fraction of the votes it controls through capital structure changes, corporate charter amendments, and the acquisition of shareholder clienteles.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 193-221.
We report that ownership structure significantly affects the likelihood of a change in top executive. Controlling for stock price performance, the probability of top executive turnover is negatively related to the ownership stake of officers and directors and positively related to the presence of an outside blockholder. In addition, the likelihood of a change in top executive is significantly less sensitive to stock price performance in firms with higher managerial ownership. Finally, we document an unusually high rate of corporate control activity in the twelve months preceding top executive turnover. We conclude that ownership structure has an important influence on internal monitoring efforts and that this influence stems in part from the effect of ownership structure on external control threats.
Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Robert Comment, G. William Schwert Journal of Financial Economics. 1995. Vol. 39. No. 1. P. 3-43.
This paper provides large-sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not systematically deterred takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. We show that poison pills and control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders, both unconditionally and conditional on a successful takeover, and we provide updated event study evidence for the three-quarters of all poison pills not yet analyzed. Antitakeover measures increase the bargaining position of target firms, but they do not prevent many transactions.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness Journal of Financial Economics. 1989. Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 371-395.
We analyze the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and 1982 involving at least 5% of the common stock of NYSE or Amex corporations. These blocks are typically priced at substantial premiums to the post-announcement exchange price. We argue that the premiums, which average 20%, reflect private benefits that accrue exclusively to the blockholder because of his voting power. The premiums paid by both individual and corporate block purchasers increase with firm size, fractional ownership, and firm performance. Individuals pay larger premiums for firms with greater leverage, lower stock-return variance, and large cash holdings.
Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, E.Han Kim Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 3-40.
This paper documents that a successful tender offer increases the combined value of the target and acquiring firms by an average of 7.4%. We also provide a theoretical analysis of the process of competition for control of the target and empirical evidence that competition among bidding firms increases the returns to targets and decreases the returns to acquirers, that the supply of target shares is positively sloped, and that changes in the legal/institutional environment of tender offers have had no impact on the total (percentage) synergistic gains created but have significantly affected their division between the stockholders of the target and acquiring firms.