Всего статей в данном разделе : 80
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Claudio Loderer, Kenneth Martin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 223-255.
We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.
Family firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2003. Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 .
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Leonard L. Lundstrum Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting. 2003. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 141-156.
Examines how information problems between the firm and the investor affect the value of an internal capital market. Relation of the firm's access to an internal capital market to firm value; Asymmetric information and excess firm value.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Maretno Harjoto, John Garen Journal of Corporate Finance. 2005. Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 661-679.
This study examines the firm's equity ownership by insiders and blockholders starting right after the firm goes public, its decline thereafter, and what alters the decline. Previous literature has shown the incentive of insiders to let their ownership fall after their initial public offering (IPO). After the IPO, management attains only a fraction of the benefits of good governance, so has an incentive to let inside ownership erode. We verify this, but examine the effect that re-entry into capital market via a seasoned equity offering (SEO) has on insider ownership. The incentive of management to hold stock is restored by a desire to raise additional capital because it implicitly raises management's stake. We show empirically that it raises insider stockholding relative to what it otherwise would have been, thus providing an avenue by which this aspect of corporate governance is improved. This, and other results, is shown with a sample of IPO firms during 1996 and 1997. Our findings indicate that, in expectation, the increased holdings due to re-entry into the capital market almost exactly offsets 1 year's downward trend in management shareholdings. Also, we find an interesting interplay between types of blockholders in that CEOs tend to hold less stock after the IPO if external blockholders initially hold more.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela Brandes Journal of Business Research. 2005. Vol. 58. No. 8. P. 1078-1088.
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Baruch Lev, Stefano Zambon European Accounting Review. 2003. Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 597-603.
The authors believe that intangibles are the major drivers of company growth. In an economy where innovation, information and communication technologies, networks and alliances, as well as the quality of human resources and the way in which they are organized, intangibles will continue to be vital to companies, and the challenge of how to manage, measure and visualize them has to be addressed in theoretical and practical terms. As is well known, intangible assets have a value in use and in some cases also a value in exchange. Beyond their potential informativeness for external stakeholders, intellectual capital (IC) statements seem to have a fundamental function of self-analysis for the firm, forcing it to recognize both its implicit assets and the different links between the various types of capital. The relationship between IC statements and other forms of company reporting, such as social, ethical and environmental reports, should also be explored in depth, to avoid a proliferation of statements which increases the reporting burden on companies and decision-makers.
Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints: Evidence from Belgian Firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Marc Deloof Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 1998. Vol. 25. No. 7/8. P. 945-968.
Presents information on the interpretation regarding the Belgian firms belonging to a corporate group, where investment is incompletely financed on an internal capital market of the group. How many firms are indirectly controlled; Important role the holding companies and corporate groups play in the financing of Belgian firms; Reference to the tracing of origins of these networks.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Julia Porter Liebeskind Organization Science. 2000. Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 58-77.
Diversification not only internalizes transactions of goods and services, but it also internalizes transactions of capital. Hence, the value of diversification will depend, inter alia, on whether internal capital markets are relatively efficient or inefficient. This essay reviews and discusses the possible benefits and costs of internal capital markets by conducting a careful comparative institutional analysis. The essay concludes that internal capital markets can add value to lines of business only under a limited number of circumstances. Some recent developments in the organization of internal capital markets in diversified firms can be understood as attempts to increase their efficiency.
Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006Murillo Campello Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 6. P. 2773-2805.
This paper looks at internal capital markets in financial conglomerates by comparing the responses of small subsidiary and independent banks to monetary policy. I find that internal capital markets in financial conglomerates relax the credit constraints faced by smaller bank affiliates. Further analysis indicates that those markets lessen the impact of Fed policies on bank lending activity. The paper also examines the role of internal capital markets in influencing the investment allocation process of those conglomerates. My findings suggest that frictions between conglomerate headquarters and external capital markets are at the root of investment inefficiencies generated by internal capital markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2006. Vol. 24. No. 1. P. 125-147.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006François Derrien Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2005. Vol. 32. No. 1/2. P. 325-350.
This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. Using a model in which the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment, I show that IPOs can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return. A sample of recent French offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model. Individual investors' demand is positively related to market conditions. Moreover, large individual investors' demand leads to high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long-run performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Political Economy. 1986. Vol. 94. No. 3. P. 461-488.
In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?
Long-run Stock Price Performance after IPOs: What Do Tests for Stochastic Dominance Tell Us [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006K. Ho Applied Economics Letters. 2003. Vol. 10. No. 1. P. 15-20.
Traditional studies of long-run stock price abnormal performance after corporate events compare the mean returns of an event firm portfolio and a benchmark firm portfolio or index. However, it is well known that long-run abnormal returns are non-normal leading to problems with statistical inference on abnormal performance. Instead in this paper, the entire return distributions of event firms and the benchmark index using non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance are compared. Tests are applied for first and second order stochastic dominance to Ritter's (1991) IPO data. It is found, contrary to results that compare only mean returns, that IPO firms do not underperform a benchmark index. The results are robust to extreme values of buy-and-hold return of IPO firms and underline the fact that long-run abnormal performance measurement is sensitive to the methodology used.
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Rene M. Stulz Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 20. P. 25-54.
This paper analyzes how managerial control of voting rights affects firm value and financing policies. It shows that an increase in the fraction of voting rights controlled by management decreases the probability of a successful tender offer and increases the premium offered if a tender offer is made. Depending on whether managerial control of voting rights is small or large, shareholders' wealth increases or falls when management strengthens its control of voting rights. Management can change the fraction of the votes it controls through capital structure changes, corporate charter amendments, and the acquisition of shareholder clienteles.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006Adolfo De Motta Journal of Finance. 2003. Vol. 58. No. 3. P. 1193-1220.
Capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm, as well as on headquarters' assessment of the divisions. While corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions, the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who, consequently, are tempted to free ride. As the number of divisions increases, the free-rider problem is aggravated, and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives. The analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm, the industry, and the capital market.