Всего статей в данном разделе : 80
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005. Vol. 29. No. 7. P. 1813-1834.
This paper investigates the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using data on Finnish listed firms, we show, consistent with our model, that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value is significantly affected by the identity of these blockholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness Journal of Finance. 1991. Vol. 46. No. 3. P. 861-878.
We identify negotiated trades of large-percentage blocks of stock as corporate control transactions. When a block trades and the firm is not fully acquired, cumulative abnormal returns average 5.6%, and 33% of the chief executives are replaced within a year. Stock-price increases are larger when control passes to the new blockholder, when management does not resist the blockholder's effort to influence corporate policy, and when the block purchaser eventually fully acquires the firm. These findings suggest that the specific skills and expertise of blockholders, and not just the concentration of ownership, are important determinants of firm value.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Cynthia Van Hulle International Review of Law and Economics. 1998. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 255-277.
This paper offers a new rationale for the emergence of European holding groups and especially for the frequently observed intergroup ownership connections. Large holding groups typically control many of the most important companies in the country where they reside and usually consist of (sometimes many) non-holding firms (i.e., industrial companies and banks) with layers of holding companies on top. The holding firms in these layers often show shared ownership between groups, whereas ownership of the non-holding firms may be shared as well. So far no explanation for these intergroup links has been proposed. This paper offers a rationale for this phenomenon. Specifically, drawing on European corporate law, it is shown that holding structures with intergroup connections develop as a response to the need for a flexible, renegotiation-free cooperation mechanism. This mechanism, which solves a principal-agent problem when decisions are sequential and not fully enforceable, becomes especially important in the face of capital constraints. Finally, the paper also investigates the interaction between holding firms and the frequently used shareholder syndicate contracts.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Timothy J. Brailsford, Barry R. Oliver, Sandra L. H. Pua Accounting & Finance. 2003. Vol. 42. No. 1. P. 1-26.
The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Maciej Dzierzanowski, Piotr Tamowicz Corporate Ownership & Control. 2004. Vol. 1. No. 3. P. 20-30.
With the company-level data on listed and unlisted companies we analyse ownership and control of Polish corporations. We find that voting control in listed corporations is remarkably concentrated with the median size of the largest block amounting to 39,5%. A sustainable concentration trend has been observed over the whole last decade. Other companies and individuals/families (mostly founders) dominate among the largest block-holders of Polish corporations. Banks' involvement in control is below common expectations. It is also observed that-especially in smaller firms-managerial ownership is quite large. Frequently, managers are also the company founders and first or second largest block-holder. The extent of ownership and control separation is very modest with dual-class shares being the most popular device to leverage control over ownership; control through subsidiaries is applied to a lesser extent. The presence of large blockholders in listed corporations puts the minority rights and conflict of interests among stakeholders on the top of the policy agenda. Our analysis shows that the Polish capital market may be in desperate need of improvement in this respect.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen Strategic management journal. 2000. Vol. 21. No. 6. P. 689-696.
The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market -to- book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 193-221.
We report that ownership structure significantly affects the likelihood of a change in top executive. Controlling for stock price performance, the probability of top executive turnover is negatively related to the ownership stake of officers and directors and positively related to the presence of an outside blockholder. In addition, the likelihood of a change in top executive is significantly less sensitive to stock price performance in firms with higher managerial ownership. Finally, we document an unusually high rate of corporate control activity in the twelve months preceding top executive turnover. We conclude that ownership structure has an important influence on internal monitoring efforts and that this influence stems in part from the effect of ownership structure on external control threats.
Planning in Ambiguous Context: The Dilemma of Meeting Needs for Commitment and Demands for Legitimacy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Melissa Middleton Stone, Candida Greer Brush Strategic management journal. 1986. Vol. 17. No. 8. P. 633-652.
This paper argues that ambiguity of context manifested in pressures for legitimacy and commitment affect planning processes. Ambiguity arises from multiple conflicting constituencies and the lack of direct control over resources. Using nonprofit and enterpreneurial organizations as examples of organizations facing ambiguous contexts, we examine their planning practices to develop an understanding of the relationship between commitment, legitimacy, and planning.
Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Robert Comment, G. William Schwert Journal of Financial Economics. 1995. Vol. 39. No. 1. P. 3-43.
This paper provides large-sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not systematically deterred takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. We show that poison pills and control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders, both unconditionally and conditional on a successful takeover, and we provide updated event study evidence for the three-quarters of all poison pills not yet analyzed. Antitakeover measures increase the bargaining position of target firms, but they do not prevent many transactions.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Carrie A. Leana The academy of management journal. 1986. Vol. 29. No. 4. P. 754-774.
This research examined predictors and consequences of delegation. Participants were 44 supervisors and 198 claims adjusters employed in 19 branch offices of a large insurance company. Delegation was operationally defined as the dollar level of authority exercised by adjusters to settle claims. Results indicated that supervisors' perceptions of subordinates, the volume of supervisors' workloads, and the importance of decisions were significant predictors of delegation. In addition, subordinates' job competence and congruence between supervisors' and subordinates' goals moderated the effects of delegation on subordinates' job performance. Neither supervisors' personalities or predispositions to share authority nor subordinates' satisfaction were significantly related to delegation. Implications of the findings for research on participative decision making and leadership are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness Journal of Financial Economics. 1989. Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 371-395.
We analyze the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and 1982 involving at least 5% of the common stock of NYSE or Amex corporations. These blocks are typically priced at substantial premiums to the post-announcement exchange price. We argue that the premiums, which average 20%, reflect private benefits that accrue exclusively to the blockholder because of his voting power. The premiums paid by both individual and corporate block purchasers increase with firm size, fractional ownership, and firm performance. Individuals pay larger premiums for firms with greater leverage, lower stock-return variance, and large cash holdings.
Regional Regulation of Multistate Holding Companies: A Model for Readjusting the Federal-State Boundary [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Clinton A. Vince, Sherry A. Quirk, Richard A. Glick The Electricity Journal. 1990. Vol. 3. No. 10. P. 56-67.
There is now a conspicuous gap in regulation of holding company systems. This proposal for multistate involvement in these systems' planning processes would restore balance to the state-federal regulatory relationship.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Mark G. Brown Euromoney. 2005. Vol. 36. No. 433. P. 29-29.
This article focuses on the leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe. Two contrasting European leveraged buyouts have shown how the leveraged finance market is developing in 2005. While ideas like Cablecom's refinancing and Greece's first ever LBO are being funded largely in the bond markets, the secondary buyout of German motorway service station chain Tank & Rast backed the trend and used senior debt. Allianz Capital Partners, Lufthansa and funds advised by Apax Partners agreed to sell their shares in Tank & Rast to British private-equity house Terra Firma Capital Partners in November 2004. Terra had been looking at the acquisition for more than a year. Meanwhile,JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank are acting as arrangers and bookrunners on the LBO of 80.87% in Telecom Italia's Greek mobile operator Tim Hellas Communications.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Susana Álvarez, Víctor M. González Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2005. Vol. 32. No. 1/2. P. 325-350.
Academic research into firms that have gone public has focused on the study of two anomalies: initial underpricing and long-run underperformance. We analyse Spanish Initial Public Offerings to provide additional evidence on the long-run performance of IPOs and its relationship with initial underpricing. Results reveal the existence of negative long-run abnormal stock returns, in line with the international literature. Long-run performance presents a positive relationship with underpricing and the volume of funds obtained in seasoned offerings, in consonance with the predictions of,and.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Anthony Yanxiang Gu American Business Review. 2003. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 101-109.
Examines the impact of state ownership, firm size and initial public offering performance in China. High initial and short-term returns; Indication that firm size, has a significant positive impact on the Suggestion that investors believe that large companies are less risky and have stronger demand for their stocks.