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Journal of Economic Theory

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
David M. Kreps, Robert B. Wilson Journal of Economic Theory. 1982.  Vol. 27. No. 2. P. 253-279. 
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage games, players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a small amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects.
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