Review of Economic Studies
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007Debraj Ray, Kaljan Chatterjee, Kunal Sengupta, Bhaskar Dutta Review of Economic Studies. 1993. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 463-77.
The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta' approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high 'delta'.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-05-2004Leo K. Simon Review of Economic Studies. 1984. Vol. 51. P. 209-230.
Presents a study which developed a game-theoretic model of a pure exchange, monetary economy in which buyers and sellers announce both quantities and prices. Motivation and outline of the model; Similarities and differences between the model and that of Bertrand's; Components of the strategic market game.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007Eric S. Maskin Review of Economic Studies. 1999. Vol. 66. No. 1. P. 23-38.
If is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of 'welfare optima.' A game form (or 'mechanism') implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (1) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (2) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties - monotonicity and no veto power--can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007Eric S. Maskin, Partha Sarathi Dasgupta Review of Economic Studies. 1986. Vol. 53. No. 1. P. 1-26.
The article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games. In this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where agents' payoff functions are discontinuous. The enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games. In the sequel to this paper, authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi-concave. However, they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which, together with the requirement of quasi-concavity, suffice for the existence of an equilibrium. From this one may conclude that, at least in the modified versions of these models, discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem. Rather, it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi-concave which is "responsible" for the non-existence of equilibrium. These observations bear on the existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.