Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts
В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Review of Economic Studies

Выпуски:
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Debraj Ray, Kaljan Chatterjee, Kunal Sengupta, Bhaskar Dutta Review of Economic Studies. 1993.  Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 463-77. 
The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta' approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high 'delta'.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию