American Economic Review
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007Lawrence M. Ausubel American Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 94. No. 5. P. 1452-1475.
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are "clinched," and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.
Auctions versus Negotiations [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007Paul D. Klemperer, Jeremy I. Bulow American Economic Review. 1996. Vol. 86. No. 1. P. 180-94.
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller's choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory.
Bidding Rings [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007John McMillan, R. Preston McAfee American Economic Review. 1992. Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 579-99.
The authors characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.