# Econometrica

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Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*Motty Perry*,

*Philip John Reny*Econometrica. 1994. Vol. 62. No. 4. P. 795-817.

A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable
utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation
for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This
idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of
the core - there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Muhamet Yildiz*Econometrica. 2003. Vol. 71. No. 3. P. 793-811.

In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining
power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This
paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different
beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about
making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states
that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently
long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also
extended to other canonical models of optimism.

**Common Agency**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*B. Douglas Bernheim*,

*Michael D. Whinston*Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. No. 4. P. 923-942.

We extend the principal-agent framework with risk-neutral principals to situations
in which several principals simultaneously and independently attempt to influence
a common agent. We show that implementation is, in the aggregate, always efficient
(cost-minimizing), and that noncooperative behavior induces an efficient (potentially
second-best) action choice if and only if collusion among the principals would implement
the first-best action at the first-best level of cost. We also investigate the existence
of equilibria, the distribution of net rewards among principals, the characteristics
of actions chosen in inefficient equilibria, and potential institutional remedies
for welfare losses induced by noncooperative behavior.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Philip John Reny*,

*R. Preston McAfee*Econometrica. 1992. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 395-421.

In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents
for the possessors. This induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency.
The authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is
independently distributed. Rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games
is analyzed, and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents
to private information is provided. Additionally, the two-person bargaining game
is shown to have an efficient solution under first-order stochastic dominance and
a hazard rate condition. Similar conditions allow full rent extraction in Milgrom-Weber
auctions.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*Robert J. Aumann*,

*Adam Brandenburger*Econometrica. 1995. Vol. 63. No. 5. P. 1161-1180.

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms
of what the players know and believe - about the game, and about each other's rationality,
actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations,
but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player will do. Common
knowledge plays a smaller role in characterizing Nash equilibrium than had been supposed.
When n=2, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions, of rationality, and of the
conjectures implies that the conjectures form a Nash equilibrium. When n (greater
than or equal to) 3 and there is a common prior, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions
and of rationality, and common knowledge of the conjectures, imply that the conjectures
form a Nash equilibrium. Examples show the results to be tight.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*George J. Mailath*,

*Larry Samuelson*,

*Jeroen M. Swinkels*Econometrica. 1993. Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 273-302.

Different extensive form games with the same reduced normal form can have different
information sets and subgames. This generates a tension between a belief in the strategic
relevance of information sets and subgames and a belief in the sufficiency of the
reduced normal form. We identify a property of extensive form information sets and
subgames which we term strategic independence. Strategic independence is captured
by the reduced normal form, and can be used to define normal form information sets
and subgames. We prove a close relationship between these normal form structures
and their extensive form namesakes. Using these structures, we are able to motivate
and implement solution concepts corresponding to subgame perfection, sequential equilibrium,
and forward induction entirely in the reduced normal form, and show close relations
between their implications in the normal and extensive form.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Drew Fudenberg*,

*Eric S. Maskin*Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. No. 3. P. 533-554.

When either there are only two players or a "full dimensionality" condition holds,
any individually rational payoff vector of a one-shot game of complete information
can arise in a perfect equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if players are
sufficiently patient. In contrast to earlier work, mixed strategies are allowed in
determining the individually rational payoffs (even when only realized actions are
observable). Any individually rational payoffs of a one-shot game can be approximated
by sequential equilibrium payoffs of a long but finite game of incomplete information,
where players' payoffs are almost certainly as in the one-shot game.

**Games Played Through Agents**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Aldo Rustichini*,

*Andrea Prat*Econometrica. 2003. Vol. 71. No. 4. P. 989-1026.

We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple
common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals.
Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action
taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions-in
terms of game balancedness-for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient
outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that
is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Eric van Damme*,

*Hans Carlsson*Econometrica. 1993. Vol. 61. No. 5. P. 989-1018.

A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure
is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player
makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that,
when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global
game forces the players to conform to J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten's risk dominance
criterion.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*Dilip Abreu*,

*Paul Robert Milgrom*,

*David Pearce*Econometrica. 1991. Vol. 59. No. 6. P. 1713-1734.

In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the
effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions
are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is
reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With
imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities
for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the
interest rate is small.

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007

*Edward Green*,

*Robert H. Porter*Econometrica. 1984. Vol. 52. No. 1. P. 87-100.

Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms
in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This
paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty.
A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry
structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007

*Hugo F. Sonnenschein*,

*Faruk Gul*Econometrica. 1988. Vol. 56. No. 3. P. 601-611.

Recently, attention has been given to a model of two-person bargaining in which the
parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one
party. The purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a
screening process, where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves
by waiting longer to settle. We point out a fundamental difficulty with this program
by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only
in so far as the time between offers is significant.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*John Hillas*Econometrica. 1990. Vol. 58. No. 6. P. 1365-1390.

A new definition of strategic stability is shown to satisfy all of the requirements
given by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens (1986). The definition follows the
general form of the original definition of Kohlberg and Mertens, but, rather than
working with perturbations of the payoffs or strategy space, works directly with
perturbations to the best reply correspondence. With the appropriate topology on
this space of perturbations, the resulting definition does satisfy all of the requirements
given by Kohlberg and Mertens. It is shown that one does not have much freedom in
the topology one uses.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*Jean-François Mertens*,

*Elon Kohlberg*Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. No. 5. P. 1003-1037.

A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash
equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have
a strategically stable equilibrium? We list three conditions which seem necessary
for strategic stability - backwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance
- and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them. We
prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set. Also, we show that the
departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor,
because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Ehud Kalai*,

*Meir Smorodinsky*Econometrica. 1975. Vol. 43. No. 3. P. 513-518.

A two-person bargaining model is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that
describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution for such a problem. The
axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also,
families of solutions which are continuous are discussed.