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Sequential Equilibria [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007David M. Kreps, Robert B. Wilson Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. No. 4. P. 863-94.
We propose a new criterion for equilibria of extensive games, in the spirit of Selten's perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that players' strategies be sequentially rational: Every decision must be part of an optimal strategy for the remainder of the game. This entails specification of players' beliefs concerning how the game has evolved for each information set, including information sets off the equilibrium path. The properties of sequential equilibria are developed; in particular, we study the topological structure of the set of sequential equilibria. The connections with Selten's trembling-hand perfect equilibria are given.
Strategic Information Transmission [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. No. 6. P. 1431-1451.
This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Reciever (R), who then takes an action that determines the welfare of both. We characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria under standart assumptions, and show that equilibrium signaling always takes a strikingly simple form, in which S partitions the support of the (scalar) variable that represents his private information and introduces noise into his signal by reporting, in effect, only which element of the partition his observation actually lies in. We show under further assumptions that before S observes his private information, the equilibrium whose partition has the greatest number of elements is Pareto-superior to all other equilibria, and that if agents coordinate on this equilibrium, R`s equilibrium expected utility rises when agents` preferences become more similar. Since R bases his choice of action on rational expectations, this establishes a sense in which equilibrium signaling is more informative when agents` preferences are more similar.