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Econometrica

Выпуск N5 за 1993 год

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Eric van Damme, Hans Carlsson Econometrica. 1993.  Vol. 61. No. 5. P. 989-1018. 
A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten's risk dominance criterion.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Ehud Lehrer, Ehud Kalai Econometrica. 1993.  Vol. 61. No. 5. P. 1019-1045. 
Subjective utility maximizers, in an infinitely repeated game, will learn to predict opponents' future strategies and will converge to play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. Players' initial uncertainty is placed directly on opponents' strategies and the above result is obtained under the assumption that the individual beliefs are compatible with the chosen strategies. An immediate corollary is that, when playing a Harsanyi-Nash equilibrium of a repeated game of incomplete information about opponents' payoff matrices, players will eventually play a Nash equilibrium of the real game, as if they had complete information.
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