Всего статей в данном разделе : 74
Опубликовано на портале: 14-02-2005David Knudsen Levine, Michele Boldrin International Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 327-350.
In the modern theory of growth, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an effect of innovation. Innovative firms, it is argued, would have insufficient incentive to innovate should the prospect of monopoly power not be present. This theme of monopoly runs throughout the theory of growth, international trade, and industrial organization. We argue that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a necessary consequence of innovation. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary for, and may hurt more than help, innovation and growth. We argue that, as a practical matter, it is more likely to hurt.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007Dilip Abreu, Paul Robert Milgrom, David Pearce Econometrica. 1991. Vol. 59. No. 6. P. 1713-1734.
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small.
Опубликовано на портале: 08-07-2005Kenneth Joseph Arrow Games and Economic Behavior. 2003. Vol. 45. No. 1. P. 15-18.
I give some personal reactions to the development of game theory as it found application in economic analysis during the last half-century. I discuss which contributions have in fact found use and, in particular, what was the role of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in light of previous and subsequent developments.
Learning to Play Bayesian Games [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-02-2005Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David Knudsen Levine Games and Economic Behavior. 2004. Vol. 46. No. 2. P. 282-303.
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007Jeremy I. Bulow, John Geanakoplos, Paul Klemperer Journal of Political Economy. 1985. Vol. 3. No. 93. P. 488-511.
A firm's actions in one market can change competitors' strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other market. Whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on (a) whether it increases or decreases marginal costs in the second market and (b) whether competitors' products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The latter distinction is determined by whether more "aggressive" play (e.g., lower price or higher quantity) by one firm in a market lowers or raises competing firms' marginal profitabilities in that market. Many recent results in oligopoly theory can be most easily understood in terms of strategic substitutes and complements.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007Eric S. Maskin Review of Economic Studies. 1999. Vol. 66. No. 1. P. 23-38.
If is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of 'welfare optima.' A game form (or 'mechanism') implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (1) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (2) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties - monotonicity and no veto power--can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007Edward Green, Robert H. Porter Econometrica. 1984. Vol. 52. No. 1. P. 87-100.
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007Hugo F. Sonnenschein, Faruk Gul Econometrica. 1988. Vol. 56. No. 3. P. 601-611.
Recently, attention has been given to a model of two-person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party. The purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process, where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle. We point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007John Hillas Econometrica. 1990. Vol. 58. No. 6. P. 1365-1390.
A new definition of strategic stability is shown to satisfy all of the requirements given by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens (1986). The definition follows the general form of the original definition of Kohlberg and Mertens, but, rather than working with perturbations of the payoffs or strategy space, works directly with perturbations to the best reply correspondence. With the appropriate topology on this space of perturbations, the resulting definition does satisfy all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens. It is shown that one does not have much freedom in the topology one uses.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007Jean-François Mertens, Elon Kohlberg Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. No. 5. P. 1003-1037.
A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable equilibrium? We list three conditions which seem necessary for strategic stability - backwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance - and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them. We prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set. Also, we show that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
Optimal Auction Design [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007Roger B. Myerson Mathematics of Operations Research. 1978. Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 58-73.
This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Kyle Bagwell, Susan Carleton Athey RAND Journal of Economics. 2001. Vol. 32. No. 3. P. 428-465.
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. In the most profitable collusive schemes, firms implement productive efficiency, and high-cost firms are favored with higher expected market share in future periods. If types are discrete, there exists a discount factor strictly less than one above which first-best profits can be attained using history-dependent reallocation of market share between equally efficient firms. We also analyze the role of communication and side-payments.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007Ehud Kalai, Meir Smorodinsky Econometrica. 1975. Vol. 43. No. 3. P. 513-518.
A two-person bargaining model is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution for such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which are continuous are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole Journal of Economic Theory. 1991. Vol. 53. No. 2. P. 236-260.
We introduce a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for multi-period games with observed actions. In a PBE, (P) the strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium for each continuation game, given the specified beliefs, and (B) beliefs are updated from period to period in accordance with Bayes rule whenever possible, and satisfy a “no-signaling-what-you-don't-know” condition. PBE is equivalent to sequential equilibrium if each player has only two types, or there are only two periods, but differs otherwise. Equivalence is restored by requiring that (B) apply to the relative probabilities of types with posterior probability zero.
Power to the People [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-02-2004Vernon L. Smith Wall Street Journal. 2002. No. 16. P. 20-.
Conduct the following mental experiment in the airline and hotel examples: Imagine that a flat average cost price is charged independent of day of week, holidays and season. Presto, there would be a shortage of airplane seats and accommodation rooms at all peak demand times, more airplanes and more hotels would have to be built and this extra capacity would be idle at all other times. All customers able and willing to consume more off-peak, if they could save money, would be forced to help pay for the idle capacity caused by the peak users…