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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 146

Опубликовано на портале: 19-07-2007
Иван Вадимович Розмаинский TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2005.  Т. 3. № 1. С. 62-73. 
В данной работе автор исходит из того, что для полноценного анализа экономического поведения россиян в 1990-е гг., а также понимания проблем экономики постсоветской России, вместо неоклассической парадигмы необходимо выбрать новый, адекватный теоретический базис в лице посткейсианской школы, отличающейся реалистичностью предпосылок и теоретической целостностью. В статье излагаются основные аспекты взглядов посткейнсианцев на природу человека и природу мира. Затем обобщаются основные типы хозяйственного поведения людей в реальной действительности. Автор также представляет концепцию «инвестиционной близорукости», которая служит развитием посткейнсианской теории экономического поведения. Заключительный раздел статьи посвящён обобщению «посткейнсианской модели человека», применению этой теории к проблемам постсоветской экономики и подведению некоторых итогов.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005
Октай Юсуфович Мамедов TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2003.  Т. 1. № 4. С. 5-10. 
В полемических заметках главного редактора иронически обрисован предмет и метод аксиологии. Автор указывает на недопустимость применения аксиологического подхода к экономическим процесса, формам и противоречиям, развенчивает аксиологические принципы анализа российской экономики, указывает на эклектичность аксиологической системы критериев благосостояния, а также нелогичность формирования универсальных ценностей аксиологического анализа. Критикуя методологические посылки экономической аксиологии, автор тем самым не отрицает социально-созидательного потенциала аксиологической науки.
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Опубликовано на портале: 27-02-2004
Sara Rosenbaum, Phyllis C. Borzi, Vernon L. Smith Inquiry - Excellus Health Plan. 2001.  Vol. 38. No. 2. P. 193-195. 
The large number of uninsured working Americans and the extent of public support enjoyed by employment-based health insurance argues for a coverage initiative that fosters access to affordable benefits through employment. A proposal which reflects models in both Massachusetts and Michigan is described: it entails the development of publicly organized and subsidized group health insurance for small firms with low-wage workers. States would provide overall administration and subsidies to both employers and employees. The program would be a legislative extension of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), with federal financing to participating states at each respective SCHIP rate.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Lawrence M. Ausubel American Economic Review. 2004.  Vol. 94. No. 5. P. 1452-1475. 
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are "clinched," and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Robert H. Porter, Kenneth Hendricks American Economic Review. 1988.  Vol. 78. No. 5. P. 865-883. 
This paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1969. These are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered. The authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms; that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions; and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium model for first-price, sealed-bid auctions with asymmetric information.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Robert H. Porter RAND Journal of Economics. 1983.  Vol. 14. No. 2. P. 301-314. 
This article employs weekly time series data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior. An equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms, together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand, determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model. The hypothesis that no switch took place, so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions, is then tested against this alternative and rejected.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Paul D. Klemperer, Jeremy I. Bulow American Economic Review. 1996.  Vol. 86. No. 1. P. 180-94. 
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller's choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004
Steven Tadelis, Patrick L. Bajari Stanford Law and Economics Working Paper Series. 2003.  No. 02007.
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of auctions.Auctions may perform poorly when projects are complex,contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders.Furthermore,auctions may still be communication between buyers and sellers,preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004
Hal R. Varian
In a world with no transactions costs there is no reason to choose between the Coasian and Pigovian treatments: both come down to finding a way to achieve an efficient allocation that Pareto dominates some initial endowment. A mechanism that solves one problem will solve the other. I have described one such mechanism, the compensation mechanism here. This is, however, only one example among many. I think that the compensation mechanism has nice theoretical properties. The question is, how does it work in practice? I am currently carrying out a series of laboratory experiments to investigate this question.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Kee H. Chung, Jeong-Kuk Kim Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999.  Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 35-54. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Philip John Reny, R. Preston McAfee Econometrica. 1992.  Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 395-421. 
In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors. This induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency. The authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed. Rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed, and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided. Additionally, the two-person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first-order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition. Similar conditions allow full rent extraction in Milgrom-Weber auctions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer Econometrica. 1987.  Vol. 55. No. 3. P. 615-632. 
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim- individually- rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party.
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Опубликовано на портале: 01-06-2004
Daniel Kahneman American Psychologist. 2003.  Vol. 58. No. 9. P. 723-730. 
Описывается личный опыт Д. Канемана по проведению коллективных исследований в области экономики (прежде всего, его сотрудничества с А. Тверски), достоинства, трудности и противоречия совместных проектов.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-07-2005
Reinhard Selten European Economic Review. 1998.  Vol. 42. No. 3-5. P. 413-436. 
On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction based on reciprocity and fairness, avoidance of circular concepts in step by step strategic reasoning, ex-post rationality and learning direction theory, presence of both adaptive and analytic approaches to repeated decision tasks, and the absence of quantitative expectations and optimization in typical repeated game strategies
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Incentives in Teams [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Theodore Groves Econometrica. 1973.  Vol. 41. No. 4. P. 617-631. 
This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits.
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