Journal of Finance
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Finance.
2000.
Vol. 55.
No. 1.
P. 1-33 .
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome
model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders
to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing
equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment
of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder
rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts
the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with
different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model
of dividends.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Finance.
2002.
Vol. 57.
No. 3.
P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and
of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We
then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries
with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow
ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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