Journal of Political Economy
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
David C. Ribar, Mark O. Wilhelm
Journal of Political Economy.
2002.
Vol. 110.
No. 2.
P. 425-457.
This study theoretically and empirically examines altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations underlying contributions to charitable activities. The theoretical analysis shows that in an economy with an infinitely large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead to either asymptotically zero or complete crowd-out. The paper then establishes conditions on preferences that are sufficient to yield zero crowd-out in the limit. These conditions are fairly weak and quite plausible. An empirical representation of the model is estimated using a new 198692 panel of donations and government funding from the United States to 125 international relief and development organizations. Besides directly linking sources of public and private support, the econometric analysis controls for unobserved institution-specific factors, institution-specific changes in leadership, year-to-year changes in need, and expenditures by related organizations. The estimates show little evidence of crowd-out from either direct public or related private sources. Thus, at the margin, donations to these organizations appear to be motivated solely by joy-of-giving preferences. In addition to addressing the basic question of motives behind charitable giving, the results help explain the existing disparity between econometric and experimental crowd-out estimates.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-05-2004
Steven Tadelis
Journal of Political Economy.
2002.
Vol. 110.
No. 4.
P. 854-882.
Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short-lived agents to work hard,
but it is well known that these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement.
This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life
cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium model
with moral hazard and adverse selection generates two main results. First, incentives
of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless"
with a market for reputations. Second, good reputations cannot act as effective sorting
devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot outbid lesser ones in the market
for good reputations. In addition, welfare analysis shows that social surplus can
fall if clients observe trade in firm reputations.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Kiminori Matsuyama
Journal of Political Economy.
2002.
Vol. 110.
No. 5.
P. 1035-1070.
This paper studies mechanisms behind the rise of mass consumption societies. The development process depicted follows the Flying Geese pattern, in which a series of industries take off one after another. As productivity improves in these industries, each consumer good becomes affordable to an increasingly large number of households, which constantly expand the range of goods they consume. This in turn generates larger markets for consumer goods, which leads to further improvement in productivity. For such virtuous cycles of productivity gains and expanding markets to occur, income distribution should be neither too equal nor too unequal. With too much equality, the economy stagnates in a poverty trap. With too much inequality, the development stops prematurely.
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