British Journal of Sociology
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Manuel Castells British Journal of Sociology. 2001. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 541-546.
Manuel Castells responds to an essay by Abell and Reyniers criticizing his work. Castells describes the essay as an angry refusal of the entire intellectual effort that he has submitted to collegial consideration, proceeding on the basis of selected paragraphs quoted out of context, and a series of unfounded statements. In Castells' view, Abell and Reyniers's is a marginal attitude in today's diverse and tolerant intellectual world.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Paul Gay British Journal of Sociology. 1999. Vol. 50. No. 4. P. 575-587.
In his highly regarded and influential Modernity and the Holocaust Zygmunt Bauman launched one of the most passionate and sustained critiques of bureaucracy rationality seen within social theory for some time. In so doing he drew heavily upon the work of Max Weber for support. The extent to which Weber really is the anti-bureaucratic ally Bauman claims him to be is examined. The main elements of Bauman's critique of bureaucratic rationality is outlined, drawing particular attention to its reliance upon a self-consciously Weberian theoretical lexicon. It is indicated that, despite his claims to be following in Weber's tracks, Bauman's conclusions regarding the moral vacuity of bureaucratic conduct are the very antithesis of Weber's own.
Values-intuitive rational action: The dynamic relationship of instrumental rationality and values insights as a form of social action [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Phillip A. Woods British Journal of Sociology. 2001. Vol. 52. No. 4. P. 687-706.
This paper is concerned with the implications for conceptualizing social action which arise from a consideration of whether human beings are capable of knowing ultimate (universal, unconditionally valid) values. This issue is framed within the view that the validity of our understanding of social action is inextricably linked with the validity of our conception of humankind: the scope and variety of social action has potentialities and limitations that are inscribed by the nature of human beings qua human beings. The paper suggests an enlargement, through the addition of a proposed conceptual tool, of the framework that comprises Weber's typology of social action. It argues that the common human properties of the person in whom social action is embedded should not arbitrarily exclude questions of the genesis of values.