American Journal of Sociology
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-05-2004Paul Ingram, Peter W. Roberts American Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 106. No. 2. P. 387-421.
Friendships with competitors can improve the performance of organizations through the mechanisms of enhanced collaboration, mitigated competition, and better information exchange. Moreover, these benefits are best achieved when competing managers are embedded in a cohesive network of friendships (i.e., one with many friendships among competitors), since cohesion facilitates the verification of information culled from the network, eliminates the structural holes faced by customers, and facilitates the normative control of competitors. The first part of this analysis examines the performance implications of the friendship-network structure within the Sydney hotel industry, with performance being the yield (i.e., revenue per available room) of a given hotel. This shows that friendships with competitors lead to dramatic improvements in hotel yields. Performance is further improved if a manager's competitors are themselves friends, evidencing the benefit of cohesive friendship networks. The second part of the analysis examines the structure of friendship ties among hotel managers and shows that friendships are more likely between managers who are competitors.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-05-2004Linda D. Molim, Nobuyuki Takahashi, Gretchen Peterson American Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 105. No. 5. P. 1396-1427.
The classical exchange theorists proposed that trust is more likely to develop between partners when exchange occurs without explicit negotiations or bringing agreements. Under these conditions, the risk and uncertainty of exchange provide the opportunity for partners to demonstrate their trustworthiness. This study develops the theoretical implications of this proposition and conducts an experimental test that compares levels of both trust and commitment in two forms or direct exchange, negotiated and reciprocal. The results support the classical proposition, showing that reciprocal exchange produces stronger trust and affective commitment that negotiated exchange, and that behaviors signaling the partners trustworthiness have greater impact on trust in reciprocal exchange.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004Alberto Palloni, Douglas S. Massey, Miguel Ceballos American Journal of Sociology. 2001. Vol. 106. No. 5. P. 1262-1298.
This article uses a multistate hazard model to test the network hypothesis of social capital theory. The effects of family network ties on individual migration are estimated while controlling for measured and unmeasured conditions that influence migration risks for all family members. Results suggest that social network effects are robust to the introduction of controls for human capital, common household characteristics, and unobserved conditions. Estimates also confirm the ancillary hypothesis, which states that diffuse social capital distributed among community and household members strongly influences the likelihood of out-migration, thus validating social capital theory in general and the network hypothesis in particular.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004Roberto M. Fernandez, Emilio J. Castilla, Paul Moore American Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 105. No. 5. P. 1288-1356.
This article argues that a common organizational practice the hiring of new workers via employee referrals provides key insights into the notion of social capital. Employers who use such hiring methods are quintessential social capitalists, viewing workers social connections as resources in which they can invest in order to gain economic returns in the form of better hiring outcomes. Using unique data on the dollar costs of screening, hiring, and training, this article finds that the firm s investment in the social capital of its employees yields significant economic returns.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-05-2004Nobuyuki Takahashi American Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 105. No. 4. P. 1105-1134.
The existence of generalized exchange characterized by unilateral resource giving has been a puzzle when we assume rational actors, because free riding can occur. This article first identifies pure-generalized exchange in which each actor gives resources to the recipient(s) of his choice. Then, it proposes the fairness-based selective-giving strategy. An actor adopting this strategy selects a recipient whose behaviors satisfy her criterion of fairness, provided perfect information is given. The results of evolutionary simulation show that pure-generalized exchange can emerge among egoists without collective norms, even in societies in which individuals have information only about their immediate neighbors.