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Что такое экономическая социология? Это не "междисциплинарные исследования". Это не "изучение социальных проблем в экономике". Это не проведение опросов населения. Это не маркетинговые исследования. Что же это? (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 171

Опубликовано на портале: 15-09-2006
Виктор Борисович Студенцов Социологические исследования. 1993.  № 4. С. 116-126. 
Статья посвящена анализу концепции, которая в Великобритании носит название «демократия собственников». В других странах она выступает под именами «народного капитализма», концепции создания собственности у трудящихся и т. п. Автор рассматривает причины оживления в 1980-х интереса к идеям «демократии собственников». Прежде всего, это желание посредством диффузии капитала снять с повестки дня императив обеспечения масс работой. В статье также дан сравнительный анализ деклараций и достижений неоконсерваторов в политике «обуржуазивания» народа.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-06-2006
Владимир Ефимович Гимпельсон, Алла Константиновна Назимова Социологические исследования. 1991.  № 8. С. 22-31. 
В качестве догмы в статье рассматривается один из основополагающих идеологических мифов, будто общенародная (а на самом деле государственная) собственность авто¬матически превращает каждого из граждан в ее хозяина. Авторы признают и то, что данное положение не имеет никакого отношения к действительности, и то, что до сих пор не известен ответ ни на один из ключевых вопросов, связанных с преобразованием административной экономики в рыночную. Неизвестно, в какой мере ря¬довые советские работники готовы к изменению своих социальных ролей, к тому, чтобы стать либо настоящими хозяевами-предпринимателями, либо столь же настоящими наемными рабочими. Некоторое представление о ситуации авторы пытаются составить, опираясь на данные опроса, проведенного ими на нескольких предприятиях в крупных промышленных центрах.
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Patrick Raines, Charles G. Leathers Journal of Socio-Economics. 2000.  Vol. 29. No. 4. P. 375-388. 
The behavioral influences of large bureaucratic organizations that were noted by Schumpeter would seem to weigh heavily against the plausibility of the Schumpeterian hypothesis that large corporations are more powerful engines of technological innovations than small competitive firms. But those influences also offer clues about how cultural differences between the US and Japan resulted in large Japanese corporations in the later post-WWII era conforming closely to the Schumpeterian hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Vivek Chibber American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 107. No. 4. P. 951-989. 
There has been a resuscitation of the view that the state can play an important role in the industrialization process. But, for states to be successful in fostering development, they need a considerable degree of internal cohesiveness, which is generally supplied by the presence of a robust, Weberian bureaucratic corps. This article argues that, while internal cohesiveness is indeed critical, bureaucratic rule following can produce results in the opposite direction, depending on the interagency relations that obtain within the state. The effect of interagency relations is demonstrated through an examination of India and Korea. Both have worked to foster industrialization, and both are endowed with relatively healthy bureaucracies. However, the Indian state was paralyzed and fragmented, while its Korean counterpart did secure the requisite internal coherence. Not only did the culture of rule following fail to generate a cohesive state in India, but it, in fact, worked against such an outcome.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Paul Windolf, Jurgen Beyer British Journal of Sociology. 1996.  Vol. 47. No. 2. P. 205-231. 
This study examines the capital network (ownership) and the network of interlocking directorates among the 623 largest business firms in Germany and the 520 largest in Britain. Three major differences are identified in the structure of these networks in the two countries: (1) In Germany ownership is highly concentrated, i.e., shareholdings - generally by the non-financial sector - tend to be sufficiently large to allow the owners to dominate the firm. In Britain ownership is much less concentrated, with almost half of all shareholdings - generally in the financial sector - amounting to less than 5 per cent of company stock. (2) In Germany - in contrast to Britain - the network of interlocking directorates is closely related to the capital network, i.e., it serves to enhance the power of the owners. (3) In Germany - in contrast to Britain - both networks are concentrated within the same industry, i.e., potential competitors are associated with one another. Germany thus illustrates 'co-operative capitalism' whereas Britain exemplifies 'competitive capitalism'.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Yishay Yafeh Oxford Review of Economic Policy. .  Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 74-84. 
Much has been written about the Japanese model of corporate governance. This article describes the evolution of corporate governance in Japan since the Second World War, and surveys the empirical evidence on its performance. Although there is substantial evidence on the effectiveness of the Japanese system, there is also evidence on its significant shortcomings. The article also evaluates the effects of the current macroeconomic and banking crises on corporate governance in Japan, and suggests possible directions for future changes, which are likely to make Japan more similar to the U.S. in this respect.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009
Nicole Woolsey Biggart

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Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 437-446. 
There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others“deviant”– a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the“reformers” of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the reforms in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Peter C. Kostant Journal of Socio-Economics. 1999.  Vol. 28. No. 3. P. 203-246. 
Striking changes in the norms and practices of corporate governance have occurred since the 1980s. Corporate directors have become more independent and diligent and institutional investors have become more activist. If one applies Albert Hirschman's insights about the interactions of exit, voice and loyalty, it is found that over-reliance on exit as the remedy of choice of shareholders and educate managers effectively. After the wave of hostile takeovers, the extent of management failure became apparent and the increased power of voice was an important factor in accelerating changes in conduct and norms. The new Team Production Model is useful in describing how public corporations are increasingly being governed. The model helps to explain why corporate boards should function as independent arbitrators among the corporate constituents that have invested in the entity. Mechanisms to increase stakeholder voice and loyalty can help the board function effectively and may increase both efficiency and fairness. The role of corporate msel, as co-agent with corporate management, and having an independent fiduciary duty to the entity and not its management, is essential to assist the corporate board in meeting its obligations within the Team Production Model. Lawyers, as honest brokers with duties to the enterprise, can an important role in increasing stakeholder voice and loyalty.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-08-2003
Neil Fligstein Экономическая социология. 2001.  Т. 2. № 1. С. 4-25. 
"New Institutional" Theories have proliferated across the social sciences. While they have substantial disagreements, they agree that institutions are created to produce local social orders, are social constructions, fundamentally about how powerful groups create rules of interaction and maintain unequal resource distributions, and yet, once in existence, both constrain and enable actors in subsequent institution building. I present a critique of these theories that focuses on their inadequate attention to the role of social power and actors in the creation of institutions. An alternative view of the dynamics of institutions is sketched out based on a more sociological conception of rules, resources, and social skill.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer Competition and Change. 2005.  Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 7–47. 
Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols International Journal of Disclosure and Governance. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 357-367. 
Close links between banks and large companies have been seen as a key component of Germany’s corporate governance system. The recent sale of large shareholdings by banks raises the question of to what extent this system will converge to the US model of dispersed ownership. This paper argues that concentrated ownership will remain a key feature of this system. In addition, board-level representation of employees and the lack of a culture of independent directors are further factors supporting incremental change in Germany’s corporate governance system rather than wholesale convergance to the US model.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009
Wai-Keung Chung, Gary G. Hamilton
This article answers the following question: 'What is the organizational medium that has allowed a few Chinese businesspeople in East and Southeast Asia to accumulate considerable wealth and economic power?' In the course of giving an answer, we show the organizational differences between traditional business networks in the late Qing and early Republican periods and the Chinese business networks in modern capitalist Asia. We argue that, throughout the twentieth century, Chinese business people outside of China proper began to adapt Western corporate structures for their own purposes and that this organizational innovation allowed Chinese to develop and sustain personal networks through which wealth and power could be concentrated.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004
Wayne E. Baker, Robert R. Faulkner, Gene A. Fisher American Sociological Review. 1998.  Vol. 63. No. 2. P. 147-176. 
We propose a theory of the market as an "intertemporal" process that integrates multiple theoretical perspectives. Using event-history methods, we analyze the dissolution of interorganizational market ties between advertising agencies and their clients as a function of three forces-competition, power, and institutional forces. The informal "rules of exchange" institutionalized in the "emergence" phase of the advertising services market include exclusivity (sole-source) and loyalty (infrequent switching). We find that most exchange relationships between advertising agencies and their clients are indeed exclusive, and most last for several years; but competition, power, and institutional forces support or undermine these rules. Most institutional forces reduce the risk of dissolution of agency-client ties. Powerful advertising agencies mobilize resources to increase tie stability, but powerful clients mobilize resources to increase or decrease stability. Competition is the weakest market force, but it has a consistent and substantial effect on tie dissolution: Competition always increases the risk of dissolution. We conclude that the market is institutionalized as imperfectly repeated patterns of exchange, because competition and changing norms about the duration of market ties destabilize market relationships.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
James D. Westphal, Laurie P. Milton Administrative Science Quarterly. 2000.  Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 366-398. 
This study examines how the influence of directors who are demographic minorities on corporate boards is contingent on the prior experience of board members and the larger socia structural context in which demographic differences are embedded. The effects of minority status are assessed according to functional background, industry background, education, race, and gender for a large sample of corporate outside directors at Fortune/Forbes 500 companies.