Всего статей в данном разделе : 171
How to Control and Reward Managers? The Paradox of the 90s. From Optimal Contract Theory to a Political Economy Approach [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005. No. 2005-1.
Why did CEOs remuneration exploded during the 90s and persisted to high levels, even after the bursting out of the Internet bubble? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy, network analysis. Basically, it is argued that the diffusion of stock-options and financial market related incentives, that were supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at the micro and macro levels. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have thus exploited the long run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. At the company level, the power of top-managers derives from their control over financial information, and from a better knowledge than outsiders of the sources of company profitability. This power of top-managers is directly linked to the ability for a company to generate profits, via the complementarity of specific assets, at odds with the conventional neoclassical theory that assumes a cybernetic approach concerning the substitution of factors of production in response to the price signal of markets. Insider trading, the low sensitivity of CEOs compensation with respect to performance in large companies, the contradictory impact of mergers and acquisitions upon managers on one side shareholder on the other side, and the rarity of indexed stock-options are relevant empirical evidences of this intrinsic, micro founded, power of managers. Why financial scandals about excessive CEOs compensation took place at the end of the 90s and not before? A political economy approach complements the previous one and conveys the hypothesis that CEOs and CFOs have converted a part of their economic power into a political power, expressed at the society wide level. Generous stock-options grants derive from the impact of financial liberalisation, contemporary societies seem to accept more easily the widening of inequalities, whereas many governments tend to be pro-business: they lower the taxation of capital but they increase households taxation and weaken the redistributive role of tax and welfare systems. The article finally discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEOs and top-managers opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception).
Опубликовано на портале: 22-07-2003Arne L. Kalleberg, Mark E. Van Buren American Sociological Review. 1996. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 47-66.
Is there a role for transaction cost economics if we view firms as complex adaptive systems? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002John Foster Contemporary Economic Policy. 2000. Vol. 18. No. 4. P. 369-385.
This article assesses the usefulness of transaction cost economics when we view economic organizations, such as firms, as complex adaptive systems. Modern complexity science is a radically different in orientation to neoclassical economics, which deals with decision making in contexts that are presumed to be simple and, therefore, disconnected from complex reality. However transaction cost economics can be related to aspects of modern complexity science: bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are all associated with behavioral complexity.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Martin Tolich, Martin Kenney Journal of Management Studies. 1999. Vol. 36. No. 5. P. 587-607.
One of the greatest difficulties Japanese multinationals have had is managing American managers in their US subsidiaries. The reason for this is fundamental and profound: Americans and Japanese conceive of management very differently and have strikingly different conceptions of themselves as managers and of correct management practice. We do two things in this paper. First, borrowing from social psychology, we explore the idea of the `management self'. Second, we report our research on management self-conception and style in Japanese-owned factories or `transplants' in the USA. The research reports the results of 34 interviews conducted with 19 US and Japanese managers in three electronics transplants. Each factory had adopted different combinations or `hybridizations' of the management styles of the two countries. The three factories had very different characters. One was dominated by Japanese management practice, another by American practice, and the third was a hybrid of the two styles. We found four factors critical determinants of management style: the nationality of the general manager, a stated preference (or lack thereof) for bicultural management, control over the budget-setting process, and the strength of the Japanese assignees
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Sigurt Vitols Competition and Change. 2004. Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 357-374.
In comparative political economy it has become commonplace to distinguish between two types of corporate governance systems. In shareholder systems, influence over company management is concentrated with institutional investors holding small percentages of companies' shares. In stakeholder systems, influence is shared between large shareholders, employees, the community and suppliers and customers. This paper contributes to the literature addressing recent changes in the German variant of the stake-holder system by proposing a few new concepts. On the level of institutions, it is argued that the stakeholder system is not being replaced by a shareholder system in Germany. Rather, an augmented stakeholder system is emerging through the inclusion of institutional investors in the old stakeholder coalition of interests. On the level of practice, it is argued that negotiated shareholder value is being adopted in Germany. This German variant of shareholder value is distinct from Anglo-American practice because major changes implementing shareholder value must be negotiated within the augmented stakeholder coalition. As a result, performance incentives for employees tend to be less strong than is the case in the USA and UK.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009Robert C. Feenstra, W. Choe, Gary G. Hamilton, Eun Mie Lim International Sociology. 2009. Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 288-305 .
This article shows that economic organization has independent and direct effects on the course of economic development. Most existing theories of economic development ignore the dynamic role of inter-firm interactions and, instead, stress state policies and macro-economic forces as the decisive factors creating a country's industrial structure. Our research shows that developing economies have emergent organizational dimensions that, once they become going concerns, create momentum and trajectory. Using South Korea and Taiwan as ease studies, this article demonstrates that the divergent economic outcomes of these two countries can best be explained by emerging differences in the organization of economies.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2003Stavros Ioannides American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 2003. Vol. 62. No. 3. P. 533-.
We explore the relevance to the theory of economic organization of the distinction introduced by Hayek between two kinds of social order: spontaneous orders and organizations. We argue that Hayek's ideas lead to an understanding of the business firm as a process, which comes very close to some of the core notions of the evolutionary theory of the firm, while they still view the firm as the outcome of a contract among asset owners. First of all, we put forth a simple conceptual schema in order to differentiate between contracts that lead to the formation of an organization and ordinary market contracts. We then explore the conditions for an understanding of the firm as a set of interconnected processes, rather than as an end state. Finally, we introduce the concept of purposeful direction as an important condition for the existence of the firm and we show the history-contingent character of the firm's growth.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Industrial and Corporate Change. 2006. Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 77-99 .
The increasing significance of project-based forms of organizing economic activities in many industries has stimulated considerable interest in project-based firms (PBFs) as distinctive kinds of economic actors that are seen by some as heralding a new logic of organizing. In particular, their fluid, temporary nature and membership of multiple networks, alliances, and partnerships have been construed as critical to the generation of radical innovations. However, PBFs differ considerably in a number of respects, notably the singularity of their goals and outputs and the distinctiveness and stability of work roles and task organization. At least four distinct ideal types of PBFs can be distinguished in these terms that can be expected to vary in their prevalence and importance across industrial sectors and in different kinds of societies because of differences in investor and employee commitment and coordination costs.
Promotion Paradox: Organizational Mortality and Employee Promotion Chances in Silicon Valley Firms, 1946-1996 [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-05-2004Damon J. Phillips American Journal of Sociology. 2001. Vol. 106. No. 4. P. 1058-1098.
This article argues that there is a promotion paradox a negative relation between firm life chances and employee promotion chances. Author argues that this is due to a firms bargaining power, which increases with firms competitive strength. Author finds strong support using data on 50 years of Silicon Valley law firms and attorneys. Young, small, specialist, and low-status firms are more likely to fail but are also contexts with the highest promotion likelihood. Moreover, except for those firms that are "near death," an associate's promotion likelihood increases with the law firm's probability of failure.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-12-2009Mauro F. Guillén, W.D. Schneper Administrative Science Quarterly. 2004. Vol. 49. No. 2. P. 263-295.
We examine the role of three types of stakeholders in the uneven adoption of an organizational practice in different countries, arguing that organizational practices achieve widespread use only when they are consistent with the interests of the most powerful social actors as enshrined in legal rights. Building on a "stakeholder-power" approach to corporate governance, we examine whether the interests of shareholders, workers, and banks are consistent with the practice of hostile takeovers. Regressions using data on as many as 37 countries between 1988 and 1998 lend support to predictions that hostile takeovers increase in frequency with the extent to which shareholder rights are protected and decrease with the degree to which workers' and banks' rights are protected. We discuss the implications for the analysis of comparative institutions and for organizational theory.
Strong Legacies and Weak Markets: Bulgarian State-Owned Enterprises during Early Transition [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-05-2004Kenneth I. Spenner, Olga O. Suhomlinova, Sten A. Thore American Sociological Review. 1998. Vol. 63. No. 4. P. 599-617.
We examine the factors affecting the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during early transition to a market economy. Data come from a longitudinal study of a representative sample of Bulgarian SOEs for the period from 1989 (the last year under communism) to 1993 (three years after major macroeconomic shifts). We investigate how changes in authority structure, work organization, technology, marketing strategy, and organizational boundaries during these years affected organizational performance in 1993. We also assess the degree of path dependence in performance and the role of competitive industry conditions. Numerous organizational changes made by SOEs during early transition had little effect on performance. Yet organizational performance from 1989 to 1993 was highly path-dependent, although this dependence was mediated by the competitive conditions: Stronger markets displayed less path dependence. Overall the results favor the interpretations derived from selected neo-institutional and ecological perspectives of organizational sociology over neoclassical economic interpretations.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-05-2004Olav Sorenson, Stuart E. Toby American Journal of Sociology. 1970. Vol. 106. No. 6. P. 1546-1588.
Sociological investigations of economic exchange reveal how institutions and social structures shape transaction patterns among economic actors. This article explores how interfirm networks in the U.S. venture capital (VC) market affect spatial patterns of exchange. Evidence suggests that information about potential investment opportunities generally circulates within geographic and industry spaces. In turn, the circumscribed flow of information within these spaces contributes to the geographic- and industry-localization of VC investments. Empirical analyses demonstrate that the social networks in the VC community built up through the industry's extensive use of syndicated investing diffuse information across boundaries and therefore expand the spatial radius of exchange. Venture capitalists that build axial positions in the industry's coinvestment network invest more frequently in spatially distant companies. Thus, variation in actors' positioning within the structure of the market appears to differentiate market participants' ability to overcome boundaries that otherwise would curtail exchange.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-12-2009Mauro F. Guillén
Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2007Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey, Timothy Sturgeon Review of International Political Economy. 2005. Vol. 12. No. 1. P. 78-104 .
This article builds a theoretical framework to help explain governance patterns in global value chains. It draws on three streams of literature – transaction costs economics, production networks, and technological capability and firm-level learning – to identify three variables that play a large role in determining how global value chains are governed and change. These are: (1) the complexity of transactions, (2) the ability to codify transactions, and (3) the capabilities in the supply-base. The theory generates five types of global value chain governance – hierarchy, captive, relational, modular, and market – which range from high to low levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry. The article highlights the dynamic and overlapping nature of global value chain governance through four brief industry case studies: bicycles, apparel, horticulture and electronics.