Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 149
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004
Lisa E. Cohen, Joseph P. Broschak, Heather A. Haveman
American Sociological Review.
1998.
Vol. 63.
No. 5.
P. 711-727.
We study how organizational sex composition influences the intraorganizational mobility of male and female managers. We test hypotheses linking organizational sex composition to hiring and promotion using longitudinal data on all managers in the California savings and loan industry. We find that the impact of sex composition depends on hierarchical level: Not only does it matter what relative proportions of men and women are working in organizations, but it also matters at what levels in the managerial hierarchies they are working. Our findings demonstrate a catch-22 situation: Women are more likely to be hired and promoted into a particular job level when a higher proportion of women are already there. The question remains, how can women gain entry into these positions? We also find that women are more likely to be hired and promoted when there is a substantial minority of women above the focal job level, but not when women constitute the majority in those higher-level positions: Hence women in high ranks can sometimes be a force for demographic change. Finally, we find evidence that women are more likely to be hired and promoted when higher proportions of women hold positions below the focal job level, indicating that gains made by women are not entirely dissipated by endogenous organizational processes.

Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Heidi Gottfried
British Journal of Sociology.
2000.
Vol. 51.
No. 2.
P. 235-259.
This paper adopts a regulation framework to chart the emergence of neo-Fordism as a flexible accumulation regime and mode of social regulation. Neo-Fordism relies on old Fordist principles as well as incorporating new models of emergent post-Fordisms; old and new social relationships, in their particular combination, specify the trajectory of national variants. It is argued that Fordist bargains institutionalized the terms of a compromise between labor, capital and the state. These bargains embedded a male-breadwinner gender contract compromising women's positions and standardardizing employment contracts around the needs, interests and authority of men. A focus on compromises and contracts makes visible the differentiated gender effects of work transformation in each country.

Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008
Gregory Jackson
RIETI Discussion Paper.
2004.
No. 04-E-022 .
This article examines the role of ambiguity in processes of institutional change. One challenge for understanding institutional change is to overcome the rather "oversocialized" view of action within Institutional theory. Drawing upon recent work in sociology, the paper introduces a non-teleological model of action that stresses the ambiguity of institutionalized beliefs. Ambiguity is then applied to Masahiko Aoki's concept of institutions as "summary representation" of a strategic game. Rather than institutional break down, ambiguity is associated with incremental modes of institutional change through creative reinterpretation and redeployment of old institutions for new purposes. Empirically, the paper applies these considerations to understanding the historical evolution of employee codetermination in Germany. The continuity in formal legal rules of codetermination contrasts with remarkable diversity as an organizational practice-over time, across industrial sectors and between individual firms. Codetermination illustrates how ambiguity originated in political compromise, but also how ambiguous agreement allows scope for institutional innovation. Ambiguity is, thus, central for understanding how codetermination was partially reproduced and partially changed over time.


Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore
Corporate Governance: An International Review.
2005.
Vol. 13.
No. 3.
P. 437-446.
There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others“deviant”– a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the“reformers” of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the reforms in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson
Industrielle Beziehungen.
2005.
Vol. 23.
No. 3.
P. 1-28.
Why do employees have rights to representation within corporate boards in some countries,
but not in others? Board-level codetermination is widely considered a distinctive
feature of coordinated or nonliberal models of capitalism. Existing literature stresses
three sets of explanations for codetermination rooted in corporate governance, union
strength and political systems. The paper compares data from 22 OECD countries using
the QCA method (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) and fuzzy sets approach to explore
necessary and sufficient conditions for board-level codetermination. The results
show two central pathways toward codetermination both rooted primarily in union coordination
and consensual political systems, but with divergent implications for corporate governance
systems in Scandinavia and Germany.


Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer
PSE Working Papers.
2006.
No. 2006-21.
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the dynamism of employment is
always
contradictory to the enforcement of some forms of security for workers. Contemporary
theorizing now recognizes the specificity of the wage-labour nexus. Consequently,
minimum
security is required for good economic performance by firms and national economies.
A
comparative analysis of OECD countries shows that the extended security promoted
by welfare
systems has not been detrimental to innovation, growth and job creation. Developing
countries
cannot immediately catch up with the emerging standards of flexicurity but the methodology
of
employment diagnosis might help them in designing security/flexibility configurations
tailored
according to their domestic economic specialization, social values and political
choices.


Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Accounting, Organizations and Society.
1999.
Vol. 24.
No. 5-6.
P. 507-524 .
It is becoming increasingly recognized that management accounting and management
control procedures and systems vary significantly between organizations, sectors
and societies. Four characteristics of control systems, in particular, differ considerably
between institutional contexts. These are: the extent to which control is exercised
overwhelmingly through formal rules and procedures, the degree of control exercised
over how unit activities are carried out, the influence and involvement of unit members
in exercising control, and the scope of the information used by the control system
in evaluating performance and deciding rewards and sanctions. These four characteristics
can be combined to constitute four distinct types of control system: bureaucratic,
output, delegated and patriarchal. The relative use of these kinds of control systems-and
their effectiveness-reflect major variations in the kinds of organizations and firms
that coordinate economic activities through administrative procedures, and their
related institutional contexts. The key features of firms here are the diversity
of activities coordinated, their rate of change, shareholder lock-in and the degree
of owner management. These in turn reflect the nature of the financial system and
state structures and policies. Additionally, the ways that skill development is organised
in a society and skills are controlled in labour markets affect control techniques
and practices, as do the nature of authority and trust relations. Thus, Taylorian
control systems are unlikely to be widely used in countries where skill training
is highly organised and controlled jointly by employers and unions-as for example
in many Central and Northern European states, just as delegated ones are improbable
in societies where systemic trust is low and authority patterns are patriarchal.


Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Wolfgang Streeck
MPIfG Working Paper.
2003.
No. 03/2.
The paper is a contribution to a book edited by Simon Green and Willie Paterson, Semi-sovereignty Revisited: Governance, Institutions and Policies in United Germany (2005). It explores to what extent Peter Katzenstein's seminal study of the "semi-sovereign" German state in the 1980s is still valid. The paper looks at one of the showpieces of Katzenstein's theory of beneficial semi-sovereignty, German industrial relations, and follows their development from the Modell Deutschland of the 1976 election campaign to Schröder's Bündnis für Arbeit. It comes to the conclusion that as far as Germany is concerned, the days are gone when it was an advantage for the governance of industrial relations to have a weak state.


Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Janette Webb
Work, Employment, and Society.
2001.
Vol. 15.
No. 4.
P. 825-844.
The paper describes the current employment patterns of men and women in local government in Scotland, Wales and England, and examines the gender relations of work during a period of restructuring which is challenging the professionalised welfare bureaucracy and replacing it with a managerialised state informed by market principles. Men are declining as a percentage of employees, alongside decreasing numbers of full-time jobs and increasing part-time and temporary contracts, suggesting some decrease in the relative desirability of public service employment. Nevertheless the challenges to traditional conceptions of paternalistic, bureaucratic welfare have facilitated women's increasing access to professional and managerial grades, but men have continued to dominate most positions of power and authority. The continuing gender divisions of labour, and women's perceptions of a sharper axis of gender conflict surrounding the period of reorganisation into single tier authorities in Scotland and Wales, suggest that it is not simply a matter of time until a rational, functional state eradicates remaining inequalities between the sexes. Neither however can a radical feminist perspective, which treats the state as bound to reproduce women's subordination, account for the degree of progressive change. Instead it is argued that there is genuine indeterminacy in the restructuring process, which, given women's representation and participation, seems likely to disrupt further the legacy of patriarchal relations informing the trajectory of state bureaucracies.

Опубликовано на портале: 02-12-2008
Ulrike Mühlberger
Organization Studies.
2007.
Vol. 28.
No. 5.
P. 709-727.
The focus of this paper is outsourcing activities, where the contracting worker is
formally self-employed but the conditions of work are similar to those of employees.
It is argued that the outsourced workers are dependent on or integrated into the
firm for which they work. We investigate the mechanisms by which firms mix governance
structures and give evidence of how these 'hierarchical' forms of outsourcing create
dependency. The key argument of this paper is that firms have established governance
structures based on markets, hierarchies and self-enforcing relational contracts
so that they are able to keep a substantial amount of control despite sourcing out
of labour. Furthermore, we argue that such hierarchical forms of outsourcing produce
dependency. Using empirical evidence of the Austrian insurance industry, it is demonstrated
that dependency is created, firstly, by the contractual restriction of alternative
uses of resources, secondly, by support measures that bind the worker closely to
the outsourcing firm, thirdly, by relationship-specific investments made by the worker
and, fourthly, by authority elements.


How Do Financial Markets Affect Industrial Relations: an Institutional Complementarity Approach [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Bruno Amable, Ernst Ekkehard, Stefano Palombarini
Socio-Economic Review.
2005.
Vol. 3.
No. 2.
P. 311-330.
This article presents a simple formal model of institutional complementarity (IC)
applied to industrial relations, and develops two important aspects of IC. We first
develop a formal definition for the static and dynamic aspects of IC and then relate
these to the interaction between financial relations and the outcome of a wage bargaining
between firms and trade unions. Trade unions and firms have the choice between a
cooperative negotiation targeting at the long-term success of the firm and a conflictual
relation targeting at maximizing the current share. One important determinant in
this game will be the time horizon financial investors have as they influence the
realization of future gains of cooperation between workers and firms. When financial
investors are patient, a pareto-superior cooperative equilibrium can be attained.
On the other hand, whenever one of the two bargaining parties gets too weak, the
viability even of the long-term equilibrium is threatened.


Опубликовано на портале: 22-07-2003
Arne L. Kalleberg, Mark E. Van Buren
American Sociological Review.
1996.
Vol. 61.
No. 1.
P. 47-66.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Mari Sako, Gregory Jackson
Industrial & Labor Relations Review.
2006.
Vol. 59.
No. 3.
P. 347-366.
This comparison of labor-management relations at Deutsche Telekom (DT) and NTT Group (formerly Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) demonstrates the value of considering both institutions and strategic decision-making to understand the interaction between companies and unions. As corporations diversify, multi-divisional or holding company structures emerge, but the degree of diversity introduced in employment relations within the corporate group depends on the interaction between corporate strategy and the strategy of organized labor. The authors' field research, based on interviews with managers and labor leaders, shows that despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of diversification by DT and NTT after the liberalization of telecommunication markets, employment relations became more decentralized-both for unions and for works councils-within the DT group than within the NTT group. This difference in outcomes is explained by the relative power and strategic choices of labor and management, rather than by constraints and opportunities specific to the existing national institutions.


Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Martin Höpner
Socio-Economic Review.
2005.
Vol. 3.
No. 2.
P. 331-358.
The concept of institutional complementarity is central to the recent debate on the
internal logics of production regimes, redirecting our attention from the effects
of single institutions to interaction effects. The article provides definitions of
complementarity, coherence and compatibility and discusses the ways in which different
authors describe interaction effects between corporate governance and industrial
relations. It turns out that some of the interaction effects are actually direct
causal links rather than effects deriving from complementarity. It is argued that
complementarity may be caused by both structural similarity and incoherence, and
that the concept provides only weak predictions with respect to institutional change.
The article is followed by comments from Bruno Amable, Robert Boyer, Colin Crouch,
Peter A. Hall, Gregory Jackson, Wolfgang Streeck, and an epilogue by Martin Höpner.


Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer
PSE Working Papers.
2005.
No. 2005-39.
Contrary to the prognosis derived from the variety of capitalism literature, since
the mid-90s
the significant restructuring of large German corporations in the direction of shareholder
value
seems to have been compatible with the persistence of a genuine configuration of
industrial
relations, including co-determination at the firm level. This article investigates
whether this is a
long lasting compatibility and tests various research programs in institutional economics
and thus
explores the consequences alternative hypotheses about institutional complementarity
or
hierarchy, comparative institutional analysis, comparative historical analysis, hybridization
and
finally régulation theory. Even if the process is highly uncertain, one major
conclusion emerges: the
old German model is probably irreversibly transformed and is evolving towards an
unprecedented configuration, with only mild and distant relations to a typical liberal
brand of
capitalism.

