Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 73
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
David C. Ribar, Mark O. Wilhelm
Journal of Political Economy.
2002.
Vol. 110.
No. 2.
P. 425-457.
This study theoretically and empirically examines altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations underlying contributions to charitable activities. The theoretical analysis shows that in an economy with an infinitely large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead to either asymptotically zero or complete crowd-out. The paper then establishes conditions on preferences that are sufficient to yield zero crowd-out in the limit. These conditions are fairly weak and quite plausible. An empirical representation of the model is estimated using a new 198692 panel of donations and government funding from the United States to 125 international relief and development organizations. Besides directly linking sources of public and private support, the econometric analysis controls for unobserved institution-specific factors, institution-specific changes in leadership, year-to-year changes in need, and expenditures by related organizations. The estimates show little evidence of crowd-out from either direct public or related private sources. Thus, at the margin, donations to these organizations appear to be motivated solely by joy-of-giving preferences. In addition to addressing the basic question of motives behind charitable giving, the results help explain the existing disparity between econometric and experimental crowd-out estimates.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Jocelyn F. Pixley
American Journal of Economics and Sociology.
1999.
Vol. 58.
No. 4.
P. 1091-1116.
New developments in the sociology of money are outlined. Certain aspects of Post Keynesian monetarism are highlighted and Keynesian concepts of emotions relative to economics and economic sociology are explored. Underdeveloped areas of discourse in both sociology and economics are identified and the resulting superficiality of references to money are examined.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Geoffrey Ingham
British Journal of Sociology.
1999.
Vol. 50.
No. 1.
P. 76-96.
A conception of money as a neutral veil masking a real economy was adopted by economic theory after the Methodenstreit, and is also to be found, in a different form, in Marxian political economy. Both derive from an erroneous functionalist and anachronistic commodity theory of money which, as Post-Keynesian economists argue, cannot explain the distinctive form of capitalist credit-money. Orthodox economic theory and classic Marxism have tacitly informed and flawed historical sociology's understanding of money's role in capitalist development. Mann (1986) and Runciman (1989), for example, consider the economy exclusively in terms of the social relations of production and imply that money is epiphenomenal and is to be explained as a response to the needs of the real economy. They do not recognize the structural specificity of capitalist money and banking nor its importance. An alternative account of the autonomous historical conditions of existence of the specifically capitalist form of bank and state credit-money and its role in capitalist development is outlined.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Xavier Vives
Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
.
Vol. 17.
No. 4.
P. 535-547.
This paper reviews the role of competition in banking against the background of a transforming sector. It uses industrial organization and modern financial intermediation analysis to study the relationships between the level of competition, risk-taking incentives, and the regulatory frame. The consequences for market structure of the liberalization process and the need for competition policy in the sector are highlighted.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004
Brian Uzzi
American Sociological Review.
1999.
Vol. 64.
No. 4.
P. 481-505.
The article investigates how social embeddedness affects an organization's acquisition and cost of financial capital in middle-market banking-a lucrative but understudied financial sector. Using existing theory and original fieldwork, Author develops a framework to explain how embeddedness can influence which firms get capital and at what cost. I then statistically examine my claims using national data on small-business lending. At the level of dyadic ties, author finds that firms that embed their commercial transactions with their lender in social attachments receive lower interest rates on loans. At the network level, firms are more likely to get loans and to receive lower interest rates on loans if their network of bank ties has a mix of embedded ties and arm's-length ties. These network effects arise because embedded ties motivate network partners to share private resources, while arm's-length ties facilitate access to public information on market prices and loan opportunities so that the benefits of different types of ties are optimized within one network. Author concludes with a discussion of how the value produced by a network is at a premium when it creates a bridge that links the public information of markets with the private resources of relationships.
Fine tuning the Zelizer view [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 09-09-2003
Viviana Zelizer
Economy and Society.
2000.
Vol. 29.
No. 3.
P. 383 - 389.
Fine and Lapavitsas accept my critique of neoclassical economics as well as my empirical
findings, but too hastily reject the arguments underlyng both of them. Despite their
complaints to the contrary, my work provides viable definitions of money and markets,
offers a theoretically motivated research program, demonstrates the heterogeneity
of money and markets, deals with standard economic processes, and addresses general
theoretical issues. Within recent economic sociology, both 'context' and 'alternative'
approaches improve on the stark choice between neoclassical economics and conventional
Marxist political economy posed by Fine and Lapavitsas.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-05-2004
Mark S. Mizruchi, Linda Brewster Stearns
American Sociological Review.
2001.
Vol. 66.
No. 5.
P. 647-671.
Economic actors confront various forms of uncertainty making decisions, and how they deal with these obstacles may affect their success in accomplishing their goals. This study examines the means by which relationship managers in a major commercial bank attempt to close transactions with their corporate customers. It is hypothesized that under conditions of high uncertainty, bankers will rely on colleagues with whom they are strongly tied for advice on and support of their deals. Drawing on recent network theory, it is also hypothesized that transactions in which bankers use relatively sparse approval networks are more likely to successfully close than are transactions involving dense approval networks. Both hypotheses are supported. Bankers are faced with a strategic paradox: Their tendency to rely on those they trust in dealing with uncertainty creates conditions that render deals less likely to be closed successfully. This paradox represents an example of unanticipated consequences of purposive social action.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-10-2004
Urs Bruegger, Karin Knorr Cetina
American Journal of Sociology.
2002.
Vol. 107.
No. 4.
P. 905-950.
Using participant-observation data, interviews, and trading transcripts drawn from
interbank currency trading in global investment banks, this article examines regular
patterns of integration that characterize the global social system embedded in economic
transactions. To interpret these patterns, which are global in scope but microsocial
in character, this article uses the term "global microstructures". Features of the
interaction order, loosely defined, have become constitutive of and implanted in
processes that have global breadth. This study draws on Schutz in the development
of the concept of temporal coordination as the basis for the level of intersubjectivity
discerned in global markets. This article contributes to economic sociology through
the analysis of cambist (i.e., trading) markets, which are distinguished from producer
markets, and by positing a form of market coordination that supplements relational
or network forms of coordination.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Alison J. Wellington
Contemporary Economic Policy.
2001.
Vol. 19.
No. 4.
P. 465-478.
This article estimates the importance of health insurance coverage on the probability of self-employment. Using data from the 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS), the author focuses on the impact of having health insurance through one's spouse on the likelihood of self-employment. The best estimates suggest that a guaranteed alternative source of health insurance would increase the probability of self-employment between 23 and 4.4 percentage points for husbands and 1.2 and 4.6 percentage points for wives. The author's more conservative estimates suggest that universal coverage could increase the percentage of self-employed in the workforce by 2 to 3.5 percentage points.
Institutional determinants of savings: Implications for low-income households and public policy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Sondra G. Beverly, Michael Sherraden
Journal of Socio-Economics.
1999.
Vol. 28.
No. 4.
P. 457-473.
There is an emerging policy and academic discussion, supported by a growing body of empirical evidence, regarding the potentially positive effects of asset accumulation in low-income households. However, at least two questions precede this discussion: Can the poor save? And, if so, how can programs and policies promote saving by the poor? These questions are addressed by examining the effects of institutional variables on saving behavior. It is posited that four institutional variables-institutionalized saving mechanisms, targeted financial education, attractive saving incentives, and facilitation-promote saving. However, low-income households are substantially less likely to have access to these institutions, a phenomenon that may help explain their below-average saving rates. This discussion has implications, especially as policy-makers consider various proposals to increase the saving rates of low- and middle-income Americans.
Insuring morality [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Tom Baker
Economy and Society.
2000.
Vol. 29.
No. 4.
P. 559 - 577.
This article describes and compares two forms of moral regulation employed in connection with insurance institutions. The first governs through moralized personal attributes or pressures like 'temptation' and 'character'. The second governs through moralized institutional or system attributes and processes described in terms of 'efficiency'. The article traces these forms of moral regulation from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, arguing that both continue to inform popular and specialized discourses of risk.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas
Economy and Society.
2000.
Vol. 29.
No. 3.
P. 357 - 382.
This article addresses the issue of how the market and the non-market are to be understood especially by concentrating on the theory of money. For mainstream economics, the market is simply an institution facilitating exchange, money being the key instrument for alleviating the inefficiencies of barter. In contrast, recent work in other social sciences, such as that by Zelizer, distinguishes among markets, and various roles of money, depending on cultural and social content. While being sympathetic to such an approach, we claim that the commodity is a better analytical starting point than the market. Based on Marx's work, we then show what commodities have in common and establish a common essence for money as generalized purchasing power. This is a peculiarly bland essence that allows money to undertake the variety of social roles identified by Zelizer.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Jürgen G. Backhaus
American Journal of Economics and Sociology.
1999.
Vol. 58.
No. 4.
P. 1075-1090.
An attempt is made to put Georg Simmel's The Philosophy of Money into the context of current monetary discussions in economics. It is argued that Simmel is able to transcend subdisciplinary borders, to great benefit for today's scholar. It is shown that Simmel's approach, transgressing interdisciplinary borders, has merits even today. It is not monetary economics but constitutional political economy which is the unifying concept to explain the peculiar features of European monetary integration.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Timothy Wolters
Enterprise and Society.
2000.
Vol. 1.
No. 2.
P. 315-354.
Drawing from newly available archival material, this article explores the early history of one of today's most ubiquitous financial instruments, the bank credit card. It focuses on the managerial decisions that led to the implementation and development of charge card programs at the 2 largest American banks of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Even though the initial performance of the 2 programs was comparable, top management at each bank ultimately adopted different business strategies. The differences resulted from managers' contrasting interpretations of the appropriate market for the credit card, interpretations formed within the context of 2 distinct banking cultures.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007
Christopher D. Carroll, Jody Overkand, David N. Weil
American Economic Review.
2000.
Vol. 90.
No. 3.
P. 341-55.
Saving and growth are strongly positively correlated across countries. Recent
empirical evidence suggests that this correlation holds largely because high growth
leads to high saving, not the other way around. This evidence is difficult to reconcile
with standard growth models, since forward-looking consumers with standard
utility should save less in a fast-growing economy because they know they will be
richer in the future than they are today. We show that if utility depends partly
on how consumption compares to a ‘habit stock’ determined by past consumption,
an otherwise-standard growth model can imply that increases in growth can cause
increased saving
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