American Sociological Review
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Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004Brian Uzzi American Sociological Review. 1999. Vol. 64. No. 4. P. 481-505.
The article investigates how social embeddedness affects an organization's acquisition and cost of financial capital in middle-market banking-a lucrative but understudied financial sector. Using existing theory and original fieldwork, Author develops a framework to explain how embeddedness can influence which firms get capital and at what cost. I then statistically examine my claims using national data on small-business lending. At the level of dyadic ties, author finds that firms that embed their commercial transactions with their lender in social attachments receive lower interest rates on loans. At the network level, firms are more likely to get loans and to receive lower interest rates on loans if their network of bank ties has a mix of embedded ties and arm's-length ties. These network effects arise because embedded ties motivate network partners to share private resources, while arm's-length ties facilitate access to public information on market prices and loan opportunities so that the benefits of different types of ties are optimized within one network. Author concludes with a discussion of how the value produced by a network is at a premium when it creates a bridge that links the public information of markets with the private resources of relationships.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-05-2004Mark S. Mizruchi, Linda Brewster Stearns American Sociological Review. 2001. Vol. 66. No. 5. P. 647-671.
Economic actors confront various forms of uncertainty making decisions, and how they deal with these obstacles may affect their success in accomplishing their goals. This study examines the means by which relationship managers in a major commercial bank attempt to close transactions with their corporate customers. It is hypothesized that under conditions of high uncertainty, bankers will rely on colleagues with whom they are strongly tied for advice on and support of their deals. Drawing on recent network theory, it is also hypothesized that transactions in which bankers use relatively sparse approval networks are more likely to successfully close than are transactions involving dense approval networks. Both hypotheses are supported. Bankers are faced with a strategic paradox: Their tendency to rely on those they trust in dealing with uncertainty creates conditions that render deals less likely to be closed successfully. This paradox represents an example of unanticipated consequences of purposive social action.