American Journal of Sociology
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004Erik Olin Wright American Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 105. No. 6. P. 1559-1571.
In commenting on Aage Sorensen's "Toward a Sounder Basis for Class Analysis," Wright argues against the ideas that exploitation can be fruitfully defined in terms of rent-generating processes or that a class analysis built on such foundations will be satisfactory.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-05-2004Xueguang Zhou American Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 105. No. 4. P. 1135-1174.
Using panel data of 4,730 urban residents drawn from 20 cities in China, this article examines changes in income determinants between the prereform and reform eras. To guide this empirical study, a conceptual model is developed that emphasizes the coevolution of politics and markets to synthesize theoretical ideas in the recent debate on the transformation of state socialist societies. The findings show significant changes in returns to education and in the rise of private/hybrid firms in the reform era. There is also strong evidence of institutional persistence in returns to positional power and in the organizational hierarchy. These findings reveal multifaceted processes of transformation that call for more sophisticated theoretical models and in-depth institutional analyses.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Roger V. Gould American Journal of Sociology. 2002. Vol. 107. No. 5. P. 1143-1178.
This article offers a formal theoretical model of the emergence of hierarchy that bridges the division between individualistic and structuralist accounts of inequality. In the model, actors reproduce status hierarchies by adjusting their own status-conferring gestures according to collective attributions. These collective attributions are just the aggregate of individual gestures, leading to a self-reinforcing status ranking. Winner-take-all hierarchies are discouraged, however, when people prefer reciprocation of their status-conferring actions. The model therefore depicts a status ranking as an equilibrium resulting from individual responses to the trade-off between social influence and the distaste for making unreciprocated gestures. Analysis of the model generates several precise predictions about the patterns that social networks should exhibit at equilibrium. Data on interaction in task groups, friendship ratings in a fraternity, and play in a set of infant quintuplets is used to show that the formal theory makes unusually accurate predictions about network structure.