Всего статей в данном разделе : 221
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Heidi Gottfried British Journal of Sociology. 2000. Vol. 51. No. 2. P. 235-259.
This paper adopts a regulation framework to chart the emergence of neo-Fordism as a flexible accumulation regime and mode of social regulation. Neo-Fordism relies on old Fordist principles as well as incorporating new models of emergent post-Fordisms; old and new social relationships, in their particular combination, specify the trajectory of national variants. It is argued that Fordist bargains institutionalized the terms of a compromise between labor, capital and the state. These bargains embedded a male-breadwinner gender contract compromising women's positions and standardardizing employment contracts around the needs, interests and authority of men. A focus on compromises and contracts makes visible the differentiated gender effects of work transformation in each country.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008Gregory Jackson RIETI Discussion Paper. 2004. No. 04-E-022 .
This article examines the role of ambiguity in processes of institutional change. One challenge for understanding institutional change is to overcome the rather "oversocialized" view of action within Institutional theory. Drawing upon recent work in sociology, the paper introduces a non-teleological model of action that stresses the ambiguity of institutionalized beliefs. Ambiguity is then applied to Masahiko Aoki's concept of institutions as "summary representation" of a strategic game. Rather than institutional break down, ambiguity is associated with incremental modes of institutional change through creative reinterpretation and redeployment of old institutions for new purposes. Empirically, the paper applies these considerations to understanding the historical evolution of employee codetermination in Germany. The continuity in formal legal rules of codetermination contrasts with remarkable diversity as an organizational practice-over time, across industrial sectors and between individual firms. Codetermination illustrates how ambiguity originated in political compromise, but also how ambiguous agreement allows scope for institutional innovation. Ambiguity is, thus, central for understanding how codetermination was partially reproduced and partially changed over time.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, A. Moerke Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2008. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 2005.
Germany and Japan are often seen deviating from an economic model of shareholder control and thereby as being similar by virtue of their mutual contrast with the US. Given the common challenges for bank-based and stakeholder-oriented models of corporate governance, Germany–Japan comparison seems particularly timely. This article provides an introductory overview and analysis for the Special Issue by comparing recent developments in corporate law reform, banking and finance, and employment in Germany and Japan. While rejecting arguments for international convergence, we discuss this evidence of simultaneous continuity and change in corporate governance as a potential form of hybridisation of national models or renegotiation of stakeholder coalitions in German and Japanese firms. One consequence is the growing diversity of firm-level corporate governance practices within national systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Sigurt Vitols Competition and Change. 2004. Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 331-338.
The concept of a German model of economic organization and production.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2007. No. 7/12.
This paper suggests a two-dimensional concept of nonliberal capitalism: coordinated capitalism (as described in the varieties of capitalism framework) and organized capitalism. While the coordination function of institutions canalizes individual maximization strategies of firms in order to adjust for collective action problems, the organization function transcends maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective interests beyond maximization. Political economies are highly organized when firms are not only the private business of owners and insiders but, in addition, quasi-public infrastructures and, therefore, highly constrained in their economic decisions by institutionally sanctioned collective interests (such as sectoral interests, class interests, or political interests). I construct an index on organized capitalism by combining data on ownership structures, board level codetermination, the density of employers’ associations and trade union density in order to allow for comparison between varying extents of coordination and organization in 20 OECD countries. The German example is used to demonstrate the analytical usefulness of the coordination–organization distinction in qualitative terms. The distinction allows for differentiation between two forms of liberalization: declining coordination and disorganization.
Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Gregory Jackson, Antje Kurdelbusch RIETI Discussion Paper. 2004. No. 04-E-008.
This article examines institutional linkages between corporate governance and labour management in Germany. German corporate governance was characterised by the importance of banks, ownership concentration, long-term investment, and stable corporate networks. This system displayed important complementarities with stable long-term employment, investment in worker training, flexible quality production, low variability and dispersion in pay, and cooperative industrial relations during the post-war period. Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically – a decline in the role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and institutional investors, en emerging market for corporate control, and changing careers and compensation of top managers. The paper investigates the resulting introduction of shareholder-value management practices and their impact on employees in large German companies. The findings show that these changes are related to the shrinking of stable core employment and the growth of variable pay. However, such tensions with shareholder value management have not undermined employee codetermination and collective bargaining institutions. Both play an important mediating role between capital market pressures and employment outcomes. The implications for the German “model” of corporate governance are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008Igor Filatotchev, David E. Guest, Jenifer Piesse, Gregory Jackson, Howard Gospel DTI Economics Working Paper. 2005. No. 13.
This collection of short papers examines the role of corporate governance with regard to human resource management and corporate strategy over the course of the firm life cycle, as well as in diverse institutional environments such as the UK, Germany and Japan.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Franklin Allen Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 2005. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 164-177 .
Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should be run in the interests of shareholders. This is an appropriate objective function when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. The first theme of the paper is that alternative firm objective functions, such as pursuing the interests of all stakeholders, may help overcome market failures. The second theme is that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure good corporate governance. Other mechanisms such as competition, trust, and reputation may be preferable.
Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2001. No. 01/5.
Within the context of debates over national “varieties” of capitalism, this paper discusses the shareholder value orientation of the 40 largest listed German companies. Three dimensions of shareholder value are distinguished: the communicative dimension, the operative dimension and the dimension of managerial compensation. A shareholder value index compiling data on accounting, investor relations, variable top-management compensation and the implementation of profitability goals makes it possible to compare the shareholder orientations of the companies. The shareholder value phenomenon is explained first by the exposure to markets – the international product market, capital market pressures and the market for corporate control – and, secondly, by internal developments – changing management careers, increasing management compensation and reduced monitoring by banks and corporate networks – which cause external impulses to increase shareholder value to fall on fertile ground. Conflicts over shareholder orientation result in changing coalitions between shareholders, management, and employees. Shareholder value does not make companies opt out of central collective agreements or endanger the existence of employees’ codetermination, but it does lead to more market-driven industrial relations.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner Comparative Politics. 2007. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 401-420.
Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the Christian Democrats, although in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms the situation should be reversed? This empirical puzzle seems to contradict insights from comparative political economy and the varieties of capitalism approach, in particular. Social Democrats and trade unions adopted their liberal attitude to company regulation after World War II. In the 1970s competition policy was introduced to make Keynesian macroeconomic policy work. Since the 1990s labor favored shareholder-oriented reforms because they helped employee representatives in conflicts over managerial control. The analysis has implications for partisan theory, institutional complementarity, and conflict models in comparative political economy.
Corporate Governance versus Economic Governance: Banks and Industrial Restructuring in the U.S. and Germany [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995. No. 95-310 .
This paper critically examines the debate on corporate governance and the claim (often made in Anglo-American companies) that the close links between German banks and industry are primarily responsible for the longer-term investment strategies and greater quality competitiveness of German manufacturing. Instead, it is argued here that manufacturing investment and bank behavior must be examined within a broader system of economic governance. In particular, the regulation of labor markets is a key factor influencing company choices between price and quality-competitive strategies. The corporatist regulation of German labor markets has encouraged quality-competitive strategies by keeping labor costs out of competition to a greater extent than in the US, where a collapse in pattern bargaining in core manufacturing industries and the strategic use of bankruptcy was motivated by companies' attempts to gain a comparative price advantage on the basis of lower labor costs. This argument is supported through a case study of the restructuring of the steel industry in Germany and the US in the 1980s.
Developing Difference: Social Organization and the Rise of the Auto Industries of South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Mauro F. Guillén American Sociological Review. 1999. Vol. 64. No. 5. P. 722-747.
Theories of economic development as diverse as modernization, dependency, world-system, and market reform take a "critical factor" view. Proponents of each theory argue that countries fail to develop because of an obstacle to economic growth. We argue instead that neither a critical factor nor a single path leads to economic development; viable paths vary. Economic growth depends on linking a country's historically developed patterns of social organization to the opportunities of global markets. We formulate a sociological theory of cross-national comparative advantage including not only economic factor endowments but also institutionalized patterns of authority and organization. Such patterns legitimize certain actors and certain relationships among those actors, which facilitate development success in some activities but not in others. We illustrate this approach to understanding development outcomes with a comparative analysis of the difficult rise of the automobile assembly and components industries in South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Industrial and Corporate Change. 2002. Vol. 11. No. 3. P. 497-528 .
The recent development of the biotechnology and computer industries has highlighted the variety of ways in which firms in different countries and sectors can develop innovative competences. Four aspects are particularly important: the degree of involvement in the public science system, involvement in industry collaborations, reliance on specialist skills of individuals, and the ability to change collective competences radically. National and regional variations in these result from differences in dominant institutional frameworks. In addition to the organization of capital and labour markets and the structure of inter-firm relations, these frameworks include the nature of the public science system. Particularly important features of these systems include: the organization of research training, the flexibility of researchers and organizations in developing novel goals and approaches, the organization of scientific careers, and the prevalent science and technology policies of the state. Distinct combinations of these institutional features have become established in different market economies and led to contrasting styles of innovative competence development being adopted. These in turn help to explain continuing variations in patterns of technological change between countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007Ronald Philip Dore Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 437-446.
There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others“deviant”– a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the“reformers” of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the reforms in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008Wolfgang Streeck, Colin Crouch, Robert Boyer, Bruno Amable, Peter A. Hall, Gregory Jackson Socio-Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 359-382.
Martin Höpner's paper was written to structure discussions at a workshop of the ‘Complementarity Project’, which was held in Paris, 26–27 September 2003. The project was organized by Bruno Amable and Robert Boyer (CEPREMAP, Paris), Colin Crouch (EUI, Florence), Martin Höpner and Wolfgang Streeck (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Köln). The subject of the workshop was the complementarity, real or imagined, of financial markets and industrial relations in present-day ‘varieties of capitalism’. Apart from the organizers, participants included Patrick Le Gales, Peter Hall, Gregory Jackson, Bruce Kogut, David Marsden and Pascal Petit. In the following we document short excerpts from five out of nine ‘reaction papers’ written by participants in advance of the workshop. The selections were made by Wolfgang Streeck.