World Bank Policy Research Working Papers
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Allen N. Berger, George R.G. Clarke, Robert Cull, Leora F. Klapper, Gregory F. Udell
World Bank Policy Research Working Papers.
2005.
No. 3632.
We jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign,
and state ownership on bank performance. We argue that it is important to include
indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness"
checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data
from Argentina in the 1990s, our strongest and most robust results concern state
ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those
undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection
effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect).
However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming
loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.


Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Leora F. Klapper, Inessa Love
World Bank Policy Research Working Papers.
2004.
No. 2818.
We use recent data on firm-level corporate governance (CG) rankings across 14 emerging
markets and find that there is wide variation in firm-level governance in our sample
and that the average firmlevel governance is lower in countries with weaker legal
systems.We explore the determinants of firmlevel governance and find that governance
is correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information and contracting imperfections
that firms face. We also find that better corporate governance is highly correlated
with better operating performance and market valuation. Finally, we provide evidence
that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak
legal environments.

