World Bank Policy Research Working Papers
Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: A Joint Analysis of the Static, Selection, and Dynamic Effects of Domestic, Foreign, and State Ownership [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Allen N. Berger, George R.G. Clarke, Robert Cull, Leora F. Klapper, Gregory F. Udell World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. 2005. No. 3632.
We jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. We argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, our strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect). However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Leora F. Klapper, Inessa Love World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. 2004. No. 2818.
We use recent data on firm-level corporate governance (CG) rankings across 14 emerging markets and find that there is wide variation in firm-level governance in our sample and that the average firmlevel governance is lower in countries with weaker legal systems.We explore the determinants of firmlevel governance and find that governance is correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information and contracting imperfections that firms face. We also find that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating performance and market valuation. Finally, we provide evidence that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal environments.