Journal of Banking & Finance
Опубликовано на портале: 12-02-2007
Varouj Aivazian, Ying Ge, Jiaping Qiu
Journal of Banking & Finance.
2005.
No. 29.
P. 1459-1481.
This paper examines empirically the quality of the governance mechanisms of Chinese
state-owned enterprises from 1994–1999, a period marked by substantial changes
in policies affecting the governance structure of these firms. It shows that the
restructuring of these enterprises according to corporate law improved the effectiveness
of their governance system. Specifically, restructuring strengthened the links between
manager turnover and firm performance.
The results indicate that firm performance was significantly and negatively related
to manager demotion for incorporated state-owned enterprises, while this relationship
was insignificant for unincorporated enterprises. They also indicate that manager
turnover was a viable incentive mechanism for improving future enterprise performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste
Journal of Banking & Finance.
2005.
Vol. 29.
No. 7.
P. 1813-1834.
This paper investigates the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the
valuation of firms. Using data on Finnish listed firms, we show, consistent with
our model, that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a
positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled
firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation)
are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another
strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders
and firm value is significantly affected by the identity of these blockholders.
|
|