Journal of Financial Intermediation
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi
Journal of Financial Intermediation.
2006.
Vol. 15.
No. 1.
P. 1-31.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial
incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the
expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because
monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship
between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates
monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration
and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and
monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the
relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone.
This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private
benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate
the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005
Xavier Freixas, Bruno Parigi
Journal of Financial Intermediation.
1998.
Vol. 7.
No. 1.
P. 3-31.
The increased fragility of the banking industry has generated growing concern about
the risks associated with payment systems. Although in most industrial countries
different interbank payment systems coexist, little is really known about their properties
in terms of risk and efficiency. How should payment systems be designed? We tackle
this question by comparing the two main types of payment systems, gross and net,
in a framework where uncertainty arises from several sources: the time of consumption,
the location of consumption, and the return on investment. Payments across locations
can be made either by directly transferring liquidity or by transferring claims against
the bank in the other location. The two mechanisms are interpreted as the gross and
net settlement systems in interbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the
two systems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety and efficiency
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