Journal of Finance
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines Journal of Finance. 2004. Vol. 59. No. 6. P. 2451-2487.
This paper analyzes the capital structures of foreign affiliates and internal capital markets of multinational corporations. Ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8% higher debt/asset ratios, with internal borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. Multinational affiliates are financed with less external debt in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weak creditor rights, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing costs. Instrumental variable analysis indicates that greater borrowing from parent companies substitutes for three-quarters of reduced external borrowing induced by capital market conditions. Multinational firms appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome imperfections in external capital markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006J. R. Franks, J. J. Pringle Journal of Finance. 1982. Vol. 37. No. 3. P. 751-763.
In this paper we consider the role of financial intermediaries in the valuation of firms and projects. We show that security prices should reflect both used and unused debt capacity if some corporations can act as financial intermediaries and can capture the tax benefits of debt capacity unused by the operating firm. We also provide some reasons why the value of the firm might be increased if the financing and operating risks of the firm are separated and financial intermediaries issue debt rather than the unit operating the asset.
Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006Murillo Campello Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 6. P. 2773-2805.
This paper looks at internal capital markets in financial conglomerates by comparing the responses of small subsidiary and independent banks to monetary policy. I find that internal capital markets in financial conglomerates relax the credit constraints faced by smaller bank affiliates. Further analysis indicates that those markets lessen the impact of Fed policies on bank lending activity. The paper also examines the role of internal capital markets in influencing the investment allocation process of those conglomerates. My findings suggest that frictions between conglomerate headquarters and external capital markets are at the root of investment inefficiencies generated by internal capital markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006Adolfo De Motta Journal of Finance. 2003. Vol. 58. No. 3. P. 1193-1220.
Capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm, as well as on headquarters' assessment of the divisions. While corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions, the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who, consequently, are tempted to free ride. As the number of divisions increases, the free-rider problem is aggravated, and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives. The analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm, the industry, and the capital market.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006Naveen Khanna, Sheri Tice Journal of Finance. 2001. Vol. 56. No. 4.
We examine capital expenditure decisions of discount firms in response to Wal-Mart's entry into their markets. Before Wal-Mart's entry, focused incumbents and discount divisions of diversified incumbents are similar in size, geographic dispersion, and firm debt levels. However, discount divisions of diversified firms are significantly more productive. After Wal-Mart's entry, diversified firms are quicker to either “exit” the discount business or “stay and fight.” Also, their capital expenditures are more sensitive to the productivity of their discount business. Internal capital markets function well, as transfers are away from the worsening discount divisions. It appears diversified firms make better investment decisions.
The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006David S. Scharfstein, Jeremy C. Stein Journal of Finance. 2000. Vol. 55. No. 6. P. 2537-2565.
We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Art Durnev, E.Han Kim Journal of Finance. 2005. Vol. LX. No. 3. P. 1461-1493.
Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country variation that decreases with the strength of investors' legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure. Using firm-level governance and transparency data in 27 countries, we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices and that firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All relations are stronger in less investor-friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.